Just when we though that nobody would take advantage of the cover provided by the epic flame out of the FaceBomb IPO and the ongoing market crash, here comes Spain. Because there is nothing quite like a little Friday night action following a market drubbing and an "IPO for the people" shock in which to sneak the news that, oops, sorry, we were lying about all that austerity. Because while it came as a surprise to the market back in December when Spain announced it would post a 2011 budget deficit of 8.5% instead of the previously promised 6%, the market will hardly be impressed that Spain actually overspent by another €4.2 billion, to a brand new total of €95.5 billion of 8.9% of GDP. So Monday now has two things to look forward to: the Spanish bond margin hike on one hand courtesy of LCH.Clearnet earlier, and the fact that despite spending even more than expected, GDP growth has disappointed and the country is now officially in a double dip. Hardly what the country with the record wide CDS needs right now.

From Reuters:

Spain was forced to revise its 2011 budget deficit upwards on Friday, after three of the country's regions restated their own figures, exposing the struggle the autonomous communities have had curbing spending even ahead of deeper cuts this year.

Spain said its 2011 public deficit now came in at 8.9 percent of gross domestic product, up from the 8.5 percent initially stated. The country had already widely overshot its deficit target of 6 percent for last year.

The country's treasury department, which disclosed the new figure late on Friday, said Spain was sticking by its 2012 budget deficit target of 5.3 percent of GDP, despite the setback with last year's numbers.

The move came after three of Spain's 17 regions - Madrid, Valencia together with Castilla and Leon - earlier revealed in their budget plans for this year that their own 2011 budget deficits were higher than initially stated.

The central region of Madrid said it finished 2011 with a deficit of 2.2 of gross domestic product, rather than the 1.13 percent it had initially released. Valencia's budget deficit came in at 4.5 percent at the end of 2011, instead of 3.78 percent.

Castilla and Leon's deficit was also slightly higher than previously stated.

The three regions are among the most important in Spain - Madrid is the second largest by GDP, and Valencia the fourth.

Though the autonomous communities have already struggled to rein in spending, deeper cuts now loom, after the central government on Thursday approved their plans to cut spending by 13 billion euros ($16.54 billion) and increase revenue by 5 billion euros.

Of the 17 highly-devolved regions, only Asturias, in the north-west of Spain, had its budget rejected, meaning it will have to present a new one for approval.

The communities' commitment to savings this year will be crucial for Spain to get its overall budget on track.

Fitch said on Friday the government's approval of the regions' budget plans was positive, adding that the willingness of autonomous regions to pass structural reform had increased, but warned there was still a risk they could yet miss 2012 targets.

"We ... expect the central government to put considerable pressure on the regions to cooperate," the rating agency said. "Nevertheless, in the current economic context we consider that there is a risk that potential reforms might have a limited impact on 2012 accounts."

In other words, more rating agencies, downgrades, which as we explained a month ago means that if all rating agencies have Spain at BBB+ or below, the ECB will demand another 5% collateral for bonds posted as repo. Add that to the toxic spiral of LCH bond margin hikes, and things start to look rather bleak.

But saving the best for last:

The change comes as Spain is racing to restore confidence in its banks
and reassure investors spooked by euro zone fears that it can meet
ambitious spending targets.

Mmhmm.

and somehow the euro powered higher today after the massive bank downgrades and the LCH margin hike during trading hours......

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/lch-hikes-margin-requirements-spanish-bonds

LCH Hikes Margin Requirements On Spanish Bonds

Submitted by Tyler Durden on 05/18/2012 13:40 -0400

Bond

Central Banks

European Central Bank

A few days ago we suggested that this action by LCH.Clearnet was only a matter of time. Sure enough, as of minutes ago thebond clearer hiked margins on all Spanish bonds with a duration of more than 1.25 years. Net result: the Spanish Banks which by now are by far the largest single group holder of Spanish bonds, has to post even more collateral beginning May 25. Only problem with that: it very well may not have the collateral.

And as a reminder: Ponzi Patriotism^TM

Finally, tying it all together is our post from late April, titled The Next Circle Of Spain's Hell Begins At 5% And Ends At 10%:

Three weeks ago we discussed the ultimate-doomsday presentation of the state of Spain which best summarized the macro-concerns facing the nation and its banks. Since then the market, and now the ratings agencies, have fully digested that meal of dysphoric data and pushed Spanish sovereign and bank bond spreads back to levels seen before the LTRO's short-lived munificence transfixed global investors. However, the world moves on and while most are focused directly on yields, spreads, unemployment rates, and loan-delinquency levels, there are two critical new numbers to pay attention to immediately - that we are sure the market will soon learn to appreciate.

The first is 5%. This is the haircut increase that ECB collateral will require once all ratings agencies shift to BBB+ or below(meaning massive margin calls and cash needs for the exact banks that are the most exposed and least capable of achieving said liquidity).

The second is 10%. This is the level of funded (bank) assets that are financed by the Central Bank and as UBS notes, this is the tipping point beyond which banks are treated differently by the market and have historically required significant equity issuance to return to regular private market funding. With S&P having made the move to BBB+ this week (and Italy already there), and Spain's banking system having reached 11% as of the last ECB announcement (and Italy 7.7%), it would appear we are set for more heat in the European kitchen - especially since Nomura adds that they do not expect any meaningful response from the ECB until things get a lot worse. The world is waking up to the realization that de-linking sovereigns and banks (as opposed to concentrating that systemic risk) is key to stabilizing markets.

UBS: A 10% Tipping Point

Greater ECB use defers the point at which a sovereign or bank faces a funding challenge, but accelerates the point at which a return to private market financing is unlikely without external support. We continue to see a level of 10% of funded assets financed at the central bank as a tipping point beyond which banks are treated differently by the market and have historically required significant equity issuance to return to regular private market funding. Spain’s system just passed this figure, reaching 11% with the most recent announcement of ECB drawings

And a 'bad bank' ahead...

We believe that Spain will need an EU program to raise sufficient funds for what we believe needs to be significant further support for its banks and to provide external verification to regain credibility in the resulting financial system. A ‘bad bank’ to deal with the €323 billion in real estate assets is necessary, but not sufficient, in our view: the €545 billion shortfall in domestic savings compared with loans is likely to demand a “funding bank” in addition. We would view the likely loss content of this large headline to be a significant but smaller €100 billion.

Nomura: De-linking sovereigns and banks is key to stabilising markets

The most effective response for Spain would be to de-link sovereigns and their banks, following recent steady accumulation of sovereign debt by peripheral banks, in our view. Reducing the link between Spanish banks and the sovereign remains one of the key aspects for relieving pressure on Spain, whether this be by removing sovereign debt from balance sheets or ensuring sufficient capitalization to absorb losses. Unemployment out this morning at 24.4% shows the fragile state the economy is in, which is likely to keep pressure on Spanish yields. Against this backdrop the effect on the asset side of balance sheets is concerning, with expected weakness in non-core government bond prices coupled with a weak economy decreasing individuals' and corporates' ability to repay

If all agencies downgrade Spain to BBB+ or below, the ECB could increase haircuts by 5% on SPGBs

The key aspect in terms of the Spanish downgrade(s) is the ECB's LTRO. If all three rating agencies move Spain to BBB+ or below then under the ECB's current framework it moves into the Step 3 collateral bucket which requires an additional 5% haircut across the maturities. In classifying its risk management buckets, the ECB uses the highest of the ratings to determine an asset's position (unlike the sovereign benchmark indices which use the lowest rating, in general). Fitch and Moodys currently rate Spain at A and A3 respectively, with both having a negative outlook in place leaving only a small downgrade margin before Spain migrates to the lower ECB bucket.

Italy's position is marginally more precarious in that it shares Spain's A3 rating from Moody's but is rated lower at A- by Fitch, and is similarly outlook negative from both agencies. One would hope ECB pragmatism would prevail and move to be more accommodative on its collateral haircut rules on sovereign debt.

The weakness of the eurozone's growth outlook is undermining the efforts of many sovereigns to rein in budget deficits, thereby highlighting the self-defeating nature of the fiscal compact as currently defined.Including the political impact, this has potential to lead to further downgrades

LTRO funding is not suitable when collateral values are unstable LTRO, like all repo funding, should only have been implemented with quality assets to avoid excessive margin calls. In 2009-10, when the operations were used to good effect, the majority of European sovereign assets were still perceived to be 'risk free'. 5-year SPGBs rallied from 4.95% in mid-2008 to 2.62% in December 2009 and non-performing loans were at roughly half of their current levels. In 2009, despite economic weakness, risk had generally been contained through continued fiscal programs, and with the ECB providing continued cheap funding it was sufficient to allow some normalization. The key difference between then and now is that sovereigns no longer have the ability to utilize the fiscal side. When the ECB announced the twin LTROs at the end of last year the sovereigns were clearly in a different state from 2009.

If the ECB believes in the mandated reforms it should be comfortable with warehousing sovereign risk

If the ECB believes in the currently prescribed course of reforms and their implementation it should have little issue with holding a major sovereign's collateral on its balance sheet. Taking this a step further, the ECB is generally concerned with moral hazard, which along with subordination, is likely also a reason why we have yet to see the SMP program buying bonds recently. But this is a double-edged sword in that it gives investors little confidence in the sovereigns' recovery prospects if the central bank appears to be in internal turmoil and is showing no action besides utilizing measures that are more suited to a strengthening market. One of our common refrains during the crisis is that moral hazard should not frame the reaction function of central banks. Rather, the over-riding and immediate objective of policymakers during a crisis needs to be avoiding non-linear or dual equilibrium risk. This requires aggressive and bold policies to be enacted. Europe's policymakers have notably failed on this front, and, hence, we have a crisis that has entered its third year.

The ECB’s discomfort is no comfort to investors, eroding confidence

The key question remains in Spain as to who is the marginal buyer of debt beyond the domestic banks and primary dealers. Although the Spanish Treasury has sold a significant amount of its 2012 requirements, as things currently stand the country faces a multi-year funding problem. The extent to which domestic savings filtering through to bond buying is limited given that the general level of savings is likely at its limit. Banks, Santander and BBVA, have also said that they have no more capacity for further sovereign bond purchases given they are at the limit of their risk concentration limits (link), which we think was rather diplomatically put. One risk is that domestic institutions shorten their SPBG holdings and focus more on bills, which would likely be unaffected by any debt restructuring.

We will see a worse situation before any meaningful response is produced by the ECB: QE

Our view is that things will get significantly worse before any meaningful policy response occurs. From the ECB?s perspective this entails pre-announced QE in a size which is commensurate to the problems faced. If the ECB believes in the actions taken by sovereign governments, which it has largely mandated, then its current responsibility is to stabilize sovereign markets in order to facilitate sovereigns' continued financing. The key inhibitor is the deterioration in the political union and the consequent ability to formulate a political response. Absent a proportional policy response, euro breakup remains more probable than possible at this juncture.

Key takeaways for us are:

the 5% haircut that will force margin calls on the most cash-strapped banks;

the 10% funding level beyond which the ECB's intervention in the banking system becomes restrictive and self-defeating;

LTRO funding is not suitable when collateral values are unstable LTRO, like all repo funding, should only have been implemented with quality assets to avoid excessive margin calls;

greater ECB use defers the point at which a sovereign or bank faces a funding challenge, but accelerates the point at which a return to private market financing is unlikely without external support;

and finally, the most effective response for Spain would be to de-link sovereigns and their banks, following recent steady accumulation of sovereign debt by peripheral banks, in our view.

and.....

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/eur-soars-no-news-banco-santander-uk-says-30-visiting-customers-pulled-their-deposits-today

EUR Soars On No News, As Santander UK Says 30% Of Visiting Customers Pulled Their Deposits Today

Submitted by Tyler Durden on 05/18/2012 15:12 -0400

Financial Services Authority

United Kingdom

Nothing could be more appropriate than topping a week of surreal newsflow than what just happened with the EURUSD, which soared by 80 pips on absolutely non news, in what can be attributed to either some algo going apeshit and lifting every offer, a fat finger, or just the tried and true Bank of International Settlement stop hunt seeking to send correlated risk assets higher courtesy of a spark in upward momentum. Sadly today not even this glaring attempt to jump broad risk into the stratosphere is working. And ahead of a weekend where it is rumored Europe may reopen on Monday, we can't wait for the inevitable snapback.

What we do know for certain is that what isnot driving the EUR higher, is news of another semi-bank run in post bank-downgrade Spain, only this time not at nationalized Bankia, but at Banco Santander.From the WSJ:

Banco Santander SA's SAN.MC +2.97% U.K. unit lost about £200 million of deposits on Friday as jittery customers worried about the lender's financial health, according to a senior executive.

The deposit outflows on Friday, amounting to about $316 million, represented roughly 0.2% of Santander UK PLC's total customer deposits, said Steve Pateman, Santander's head of U.K. banking. Those deposits stood at £120.1 billion at the end of last year.

"We had a modestly negative day," Mr. Pateman said.

Santander UK has spent the day scrambling to soothe anxious depositors. Customers apparently are nervous about the British bank's vulnerability to Spain and its fragile banking system, and were further rattled by news coverage of a downgrade of the bank's credit rating late Thursday by Moody's Investors Service.

Customers have been visiting Santander branches and calling customer-service agents to discuss the bank's financial situation, Mr. Pateman said. Branch managers are explaining to them that Santander UK is fully independent of its Spanish parent and that the U.K. bank benefits from strong supervision by the U.K.'s Financial Services Authority, he said.

Mr. Pateman said about 70% of customers who visited Santander UK branches on Friday to discuss their concerns left without withdrawing their funds. The other 30% couldn't be convinced, he said.

"They say, 'I got caught by Northern Rock and I don't want to get caught again'," Mr. Pateman said. Northern Rock is a British bank that collapsed in 2007.

and.....

Friday, May 18, 2012 10:46 AM

Spanish Bad-Loans Ratio at 8.37 Percent, a 17-Year High; CDS at Record High; Bankia Suffers Huge Losses Purchasing 15.5 Million Its Own Shares to Stabilize Price; Spain Hires Goldman Sachs to Value Bankia

It's time for another roundup on Spain. Every day is time for another roundup on Spain. Today's report is on bad loans, and complete foolishness at Bankia buying its own shares hoping to stabilize its price.

Spanish Bad-Loans Ratio Hits 8.37 Percent

The Wall Street Journal reports Spanish Bad-Loans Ratio Hits 17-Year High

Bad debts held by Spanish banks rose to a 17-year high in March and the cost of insuring the debt of two major Spanish banks against default hit a record Friday a day after the sector was hit by a downgrade, underscoring the continuing challenges posed by the country's five-year property slump.

The central bank said that 8.37% of the loans held by banks, or €147.97 billion ($188 billion), were more than three months overdue for repayment in March, up from 8.3% in February and the highest since September 1994. The total number of non-performing loans is now almost 10 times higher than the level reported in 2007, just as Spain's decade-high property boom peaked.

The rapid deterioration of the loan books was one of four reasons cited by Moody's Investors Service for its downgrade of the credit ratings of Banco Santander SA, Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA and 14 other banks in the country late Thursday.

"Moody's announcement will increase speculation that the Iberian state will be forced to ask for external support in order to effectively tackle its banking crisis," said interest rates strategists at Lloyds Bank WBM.

At 0956 GMT, Spain's IBEX-35 blue-chip index was up 0.5%, following a negative start. Bankia's shares gained 19% after they fell 14% Thursday and had suffered 10 straight days of declines, while those of other banks including also bounced after deep losses earlier in the week.

Bankia Suffers Huge Losses Purchasing 15.5 Million Its Own Shares

For the "oops" file, courtesy of Google translate please note Bankia bought 15.5 million shares to try to stop its collapse

May 17, 2012

Bankia tried unsuccessfully to halt the collapse of its stock market price in the days when the crisis broke out of the entity. The bank bought 15.55 million of shares for 33,250,000 euros between 7 and 10 May, as has been reported to the National Securities Market. The result now is that accumulates heavy losses on these securities, which subtracts capital at a time when the bank is in need of them.

In the previous 30 days, Bankia just had bought just over 5 million shares, according to El Confidential, which was published this morning purchases of shares of the entity.

Bankia has failed in the attempt to halt the collapse, which today continues to fall that have become over 17% to 1.37 euros per share. At these prices, only purchases made during those four days, Bankia suffer losses of about 12 million euros.

But the losses are even greater in the previously performed operations to try to sustain the price at which the entity has accumulated treasury of 86.124 million shares, 4.319% of its own capital. In total, the bank has more than 100 million in losses to the treasury share transactions.

Bankia Share Prices

Today's rally looks pretty good but here is a little perspective on Bankia Share Prices.

Union Silliness

For the "where there's public unions, there's stupidity file" Unions urge Employees to buy shares in Bankia to prevent the collapse of the price.

Bankia unions urge their employees and clients to buy shares in the company to prevent the collapse of its stock market price and help ensure its future, according to a statement of the Boards and Professional Association (CACAM).

Under the slogan 'I buy Bankia. Do you? Are we united? ', These professionals Bankia broadcast a statement following an email I have received, the undersigned, with whom they want to send a message of confidence in the project entity.

Bankia Bleeds Cash

Meanwhile, Bankia bleeds cash and will not respond to questions.

El Economista reports Bankia has lost 1 billion euros in deposits in one week.

Bankia customers have withdrawn deposits worth over 1,000 million euros since the government announced its intervention last week, according to data presented suggest the board meeting yesterday.

On Wednesday, Bankia not respond to Reuters requests asking whether there were bank runs Thursday and no one has commented on the information published by the newspaper El Mundo in its paper edition.

Goldman Sachs Hired to Value Bankia

Please consider Spain Hires Goldman Sachs to Value Bankia

The Spanish government has hired Goldman Sachs to carry out an independent valuation of Bankia, the ailing bank taken over by the state last week, Spanish newspaper Expansion said on Friday.

The U.S. bank will review Bankia's and its parent company BFA's books and determine within a month how much the state should inject to refloat the lender, which had to be rescued after its auditor, Deloitte, identified several gaps in last year's accounts.

Expansion said without citing sources that Bankia's financial hole may reach 8 billion euros on top of the 10 billion euros it needs to set aside to cover potential losses on real estate assets, as required by two financial reforms passed by the government in February and last week.

Is this one of those deals where a consultant is hired to give give a predetermined opinion?

We will find out soon enough because no one can possibly determine "Bankia is a solvent entity". In fact, the entire Spanish banking system is clearly insolvent.

Here's the question of the day: Is there any reason Bankia shares will not or should not trade for pennies at some time in the near future?

Catharsis Ours

Friday, May 18, 2012

Friday Night Tape Bomb: Spain Hikes Budget Deficit From 8.5% to 8.9%

LCH Hikes Margin Requirements On Spanish Bonds

EUR Soars On No News, As Santander UK Says 30% Of Visiting Customers Pulled Their Deposits Today

Friday, May 18, 2012 10:46 AM

Spanish Bad-Loans Ratio at 8.37 Percent, a 17-Year High; CDS at Record High; Bankia Suffers Huge Losses Purchasing 15.5 Million Its Own Shares to Stabilize Price; Spain Hires Goldman Sachs to Value Bankia

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