BBC Documentary "Inside the Meltdown"
The documentary includes footage from early days of the earthquake/tsunami/nuclear disaster that started on March 11, 2011 that I've never seen before - weather camera video when the tsunami hit the plant, a video shot by a plant worker as he tried to escape uphill. The fact I wasn't aware at that time - there were people in Okuma-machi (where the plant is located) on March 12 when they did the vent, looking for their family members lost in the earthquake/tsunami.
People interviewed include a current TEPCO employee at the plant, a former plant inspector, farmers and fishermen in Fukushima, and Naoto Kan, who has been very busy spinning the story ever since he finally quit so that he is portrayed as a "hero", foiled by the scheming bureaucracy.
BBC obliged. But it is still a very good documentary.
People interviewed include a current TEPCO employee at the plant, a former plant inspector, farmers and fishermen in Fukushima, and Naoto Kan, who has been very busy spinning the story ever since he finally quit so that he is portrayed as a "hero", foiled by the scheming bureaucracy.
BBC obliged. But it is still a very good documentary.
and.....
Independent Investigation Commission on Fukushima Accident: Confusion from Interference by PM Kan and His Ministers Made the Situation Much Worse
The Independent Investigation Commission set up by a private foundation called Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation has issued the report of its findings of the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant accident.
Unlike the investigation commissions set up by the administration and the Diet, the RJIF Commission has collected and studied information from the general public as well as from the experts.The Commission will hold a press conference at 3PM on February 28, 2012 and discuss the findings, but Jiji Tsushin has a preview of the topics.
Unlike the investigation commissions set up by the administration and the Diet, the RJIF Commission has collected and studied information from the general public as well as from the experts.The Commission will hold a press conference at 3PM on February 28, 2012 and discuss the findings, but Jiji Tsushin has a preview of the topics.
From Jiji Tsushin (2/28/2012):
官邸の介入で混乱も＝「疑心暗記の連鎖」指摘－民間事故調報告書・福島原発事故
Confusion caused by the interference by the Prime Minister's Office, chain reaction of "doubts begot doubts", a private investigation commission on Fukushima Nuclear Plant accident says
東京電力福島第１原発事故で、民間の「福島原発事故独立検証委員会」（民間事故調、委員長・北沢宏一科学技術振興機構前理事長）は２８日までに、「官邸が現場に介入し混乱を呼んだ」などと指摘した事故報告書をまとめた。
The private "Independent Investigation Commission on Fukushima I Nuclear Plant Accident" (Chairman Koichi Kitazawa, former head of the Japan Science and Technology Agency) has compiled the report on the accident. In the report, the Commission points out that "the Prime Minister's Office meddling in the response at the scene of the accident caused confusion".
民間事故調は昨年９月に設立。菅直人首相（当時）、枝野幸男官房長官（同）ら政府首脳を含む約３００人から事情を聴取。事故発生時の首相官邸や経済産業省原子力安全・保安院の対応や、情報公開の在り方、事故の背景にある「安全神話」成立の背景などを調べた。
The private Commission was set up last September, and has heard from about 300 people including then-Prime Minister Naoto Kan and then-Chief Cabinet Secretary Yukio Edano and other top government officials. The Commission investigated the response at the Prime Minister's Official Residence and Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, information disclosure practice, and how the "safety myth" arose, which contributed to the accident. 報告書は、菅氏が原発に運ぶバッテリーの大きさまで確認するなど、官邸が現場に直接介入したことが混乱の一因になったと指摘。その半面、菅氏が全面撤退を考えていた東電を押しとどめ、制御不能になった原発事故が連鎖する「最悪のシナリオ」を防いだ功績もあるとした。
The report points to the direct interference of the Prime Minister's Official Residence into the response at the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant, causing confusion. For example, the report says Prime Minister Kan personally checked the size of the batteries to be brought to the plant. On the other hand, the Commission gives some credit to Kan, as he didn't allow TEPCO to pull out completely from the plant and prevented the "worst-case scenario" where an uncontrolled nuclear accident would occur one after another at the plant.
事故調は東電の清水正孝社長（同）や吉田昌郎同原発所長（同）ら同社関係者の聴取も要請したが、東電側から拒否されたという。
The Commission says it asked the TEPCO officials including then-President Masataka Shimizu and then-Plant Manager Masao Yoshida to speak in front of the Commission but the request was declined by TEPCO.In my rare defense of TEPCO, it is a lie propagated by Naoto Kan himself that TEPCO wanted to completely withdraw from the plant. TEPCO's president wanted to protect workers who were not directly involved in nuclear emergency response by evacuating them from the plant, when the radiation level at the plant spiked to extremely dangerous levels. In the early days of the crisis, the radiation levels at the plant were sometimes hundreds of millisieverts per hour in certain locations.
Prime Minister Naoto Kan said he knew all about nuclear power plants because he got his BS degree in applied physics (more like engineering). According to the investigation committee set up by the Diet, Kan insisted he be the one to tell TEPCO when to conduct the vent of Reactor 1.
He insisted he visit the plant on the morning of March 12 when everyone at the plant was scrambling to figure out what was happening (or figure out what to do about the meltdown that was happening). When he arrived, he went shouting and screaming at the plant management and workers.I hear that the BBC documentary on Fukushima paints Kan as "decisive leader who made tough decisions". Unbelievable.
He, Edano, and Kaieda should have been the ones who carried hoses in the darkness in 100 millisieverts/hour radiation on the plant, not the Tokyo Metropolitan firefighters, as you see in the clip from the BBC documentary "Inside the Meltdown":
No comments:
Post a Comment