Three areas of concern I want to see the Government focus upon .......... If we are going to have a functional foreign policy that makes Americans safer and not just makes mega bucks for certain Elites
Cyber -warfare - China , Russia or Enemy X ( unknown or not acknowledged )
http://freebeacon.com/the-cyber-dam-breaks/
The Cyber-Dam Breaks
Sensitive Army database of U.S. dams compromised; Chinese hackers suspected
Hoover Dam / AP
BY:
U.S. intelligence agencies traced a recent cyber intrusion into a sensitive infrastructure database to the Chinese government or military cyber warriors, according to U.S. officials.
The compromise of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ National Inventory of Dams (NID) is raising new concerns that China is preparing to conduct a future cyber attack against the national electrical power grid, including the growing percentage of electricity produced by hydroelectric dams.
According to officials familiar with intelligence reports, the Corps of Engineers’ National Inventory of Dams was hacked by an unauthorized user believed to be from China, beginning in January and uncovered earlier this month.
The database contains sensitive information on vulnerabilities of every major dam in the United States. There are around 8,100 major dams across waterways in the United States.
Pete Pierce, a Corps of Engineers spokesman, confirmed the cyber incident but declined to provide details.
“The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is aware that access to the National Inventory of Dams (NID), to include sensitive fields of information not generally available to the public, was given to an unauthorized individual in January 2013 who was subsequently determined to not to have proper level of access for the information,” Pierce said in a statement.
“[U.S. Army Corps of Engineers] immediately revoked this user’s access to the database upon learning that the individual was not, in fact, authorized full access to the NID,” he said.
The Corps is continuing to bolster and review security protocols governing access to the database, he added.
The Corps’ dam database portal recently added a statement that said “usernames and passwords have changed to be compliant with recent security policy changes.” The changes were initiated after the hacking incident.
The database categorizes U.S. dams by the number of people that would be killed if a dam fails. They include “significant” and “high” hazard levels.
Michelle Van Cleave, the former National Counterintelligence Executive, a senior counterintelligence policymaker, said the database compromise highlights the danger posed by hackers who are targeting critical U.S. infrastructure for future attacks.
“In the wrong hands, the Army Corps of Engineers’ database could be a cyber attack roadmap for a hostile state or terrorist group to disrupt power grids or target dams in this country,” Van Cleave said in an email.
“You may ask yourself, why would anyone want to do that? You could ask the same question about why anyone would plant IEDs at the Boston Marathon.”
Van Cleave said the intrusion appears to be part of an effort to collect “vulnerability and targeting data” for future cyber or military attacks.
“Alarm bells should be going off because we have next to no national security emergency preparedness planning in place to deal with contingencies like that,” she said.
Gen. Keith Alexander, commander of the U.S. Cyber Command, warned in a 2011 speech that cyber attacks were escalating from causing disruptions to actual destructive strikes, including cyber attacks on hydroelectric dams.
Alexander provided what he said were indirect examples of two types of anticipated cyber attacks. The first was a cyber strike that could produce a cascading power failure like the August 2003 electrical power outage in the Northeast United States caused by a tree falling on a high-voltage power line
The second involved the catastrophic destruction of a water-driven electrical generator at Russia’s Sayano-Shushenskaya dam, near the far eastern city of Cheremushki, in August 2009. One of the dam’s 10 650-megawatt hydro turbine generators, weighing more than 1,000 tons, was mistakenly started by a computer operator 500 miles away.
As a result, the generator began spinning, rose 50 feet in the air, and exploded, killing 75 people and destroying eight of the remaining nine turbines at the dam.
“That’s our concern about what’s coming in cyberspace—a destructive element,” said Alexander in the September 2011 speech on cyberwarfare. He is also the director of the National Security Agency, the electronic spying agency.
According to the Corps website, the dam inventory was created under a 1972 law and was updated in 1986 to require coordination between the Corps and the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
In 2002 and 2006 the law was updated further in recognition that dams are part of critical U.S. infrastructure and require protection.
Security analysts have said that critical infrastructure—electrical power grids, financial networks, transportation controls, and industrial control systems—are increasingly vulnerable to cyber attack because of computer networks used to run them.
The security lapse highlights the Obama administration’s failure to upgrade cyber security and protect infrastructure despite a recent executive order seeking to improve security.
The dam database compromise also comes amid plans by the administration to expand hydroelectric power in the Untied States, which is considered a “green” renewable energy source, by 15 percent through upgrading dams.
The Energy Department said in a recent report that upgrading dams could produce 12 gigawatts of electricity without carbon emissions, Bloomberg reported recently.
Energy officials analyzed 54,391 dams out of more than 80,000 dams that lack hydroelectric generators. Currently, some 2,500 dams produce hydroelectric power.
Increasing hydroelectric power would “help diversify our energy mix, create jobs and reduce carbon pollution nationwide,” Energy Secretary Steven Chu said in a statement.
President Barack Obama has set a goal of producing 80 percent of U.S. electrical power from so-called clean energy systems by 2035.
The Energy Department report said that adding generators to existing dams would be faster and less expensive than building new dams.
Hydropower made up six percent of total U.S. electricity produced in 2011. More than half of all hydroelectric power is produced in Washington, Oregon, and California.
http://m.state.gov/md183589.htm
Prepared by
Prof. Maurizio Martellini, IWG-LNCV and University of Insubria, Como, Italy
Dr Thomas Shea, IWG and TomSheaNuclear Consulting Services, West Richland, WA, US
Dr. Sandro Gaycken, IWG and Freie Universität, Berlin, Germany
January 2012
Setting the Stage
Nuclear power plants may be vulnerable to cyber attacks, which might – in extreme cases – lead to substantial releases of radioactive material with consequent loss of lives, radiation sickness and psycho-trauma, extensive property destruction and economic upheaval.Today’s cyber attacks are made on computer systems operated for a wide spectrum of purposes. Until now, no cyber attacks on nuclear power plants have resulted in releases of radioactive material, but the trends are disquieting.[2] The objective of a cyber attack may not be to cause death and destruction, for example, but to disrupt the operation of a nuclear facility, to inflict economic damage, to embarrass government or utility officials, to blackmail companies, to get even, or just to test one’s skills or to see what happens. There is even a risk of cyber attacks aimed at other targets migrating into nuclear facilities and causing unpredictable damages. The overly large distribution of Stuxnet has demonstrated this possibility.[3] Given the potential for great harm, any successful cyber attack on a nuclear facility would – at the least – undermine confidence in the ability of the State to be a responsible host and the owner and operator to run the facility in a safe and secure manner.
Cyber attacks may be intended to have local and limited effects, but radioactive material ejected from a failed reactor pays no heed to national boundaries.
Foreign governments, groups hostile to the government of a given State, or individuals motivated by greed, hatred or curiosity may carry out cyber attacks. The systems intended to deter and defeat such threats must address all potential perpetrators, taking into the consideration the range of motivations noted above:
a. Cyber attacks carried out by the citizens of a State against targets within that State may violate the laws of the State intended to protect the public health and welfare and may be identified as acts of domestic terrorism;
b. Cyber attacks created by activities outside the targeted State or affecting other States in addition to the targeted State may be considered as acts of international terrorism; [4]
c. Cyber attacks carried out by or under the aegis of foreign governments may be considered as acts of war; [5]
d. Cyber attacks in certain circumstances might be classified as crimes against humanity. [6]
Contemporary nuclear power plants rely extensively on a large and diverse array of computers for a host of tasks. Some computers may play a role in monitoring or controlling the operation of the reactor itself or of ancillary systems. The nuclear power plant operating and technical support staff commonly uses computer networks, and connections may exist between these systems and plant control systems, sometimes known, sometimes not known. If the hard- or software used is modified or replaced, the reactor might be forced into an accident and the emergency response systems may fail to prevent calamity.
In principle, a plant employee acting alone might accomplish such an attack either acting on his/her own volition or under duress. Or, fabricated hardware or software introduced into the plant might contain surreptitious instructions that might be activated according to preset conditions, once in use.[7] Or, an attempt may be made to hack into the protective systems making it possible to take over the plant controls externally, from within the plant, within the State or virtually anywhere in the world.
Some such scenarios are known and have even been tested:
- In one case, a group of hackers successfully manipulated the displays in the operating center, forcing the employees into false and potentially catastrophic reactions.
- In another case, hackers were able to gain control of the cooling system of a nuclear power plant.[8]
Moreover, in addition to the direct consequences of a successful attack, the axiom that ‘an accident in any nuclear power plant is an accident in all nuclear power plants,’ would likely extend to a security event – including a cyber attack. A successful cyber attack on a nuclear reactor with substantial consequences would undermine global public confidence in the viability of nuclear power.
Some states are apparently establishing the ability to engage in such attacks, probing defensive barriers, exercising tests of cyber weapons or simply protecting their security by creating the ability to engage in cyber warfare in case the need arises.
Cyber security in relation to nuclear facilities is under increasing scrutiny. It is described in many publications, nowhere more cogently than in a “backgrounder” note provided by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. That note is included in the Annex A to this document.
The 2012 Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul will take up the issue of cyber security. The Summit should address the key underlying questions in order to establish a future course of actions. How real is the threat? How and when should it be addressed? What mechanisms already exist for the international community to combat this global menace? What else is needed? What should the Summit agree to, and what steps should be taken collectively following the Summit – directly, as part of the Security Summit process, and indirectly, by States, international organizations and other bodies?
Domains for Engagement
The extent to which a nuclear power plant is vulnerable to such attacks will depend upon the design of the plant,[9] the technical and organizational history of the plant, how and which computers are used, whether the computers allow for internal and/or external networked interactions, and how effective the countermeasures employed are at preventing such attacks or mitigating the consequences of any attacks that succeed.Some problems can best be dealt with nationally while others have to be dealt with internationally. National approaches can mobilize national technological and legal assets, giving less cause for dispute. International efforts should be driven by three concerns: firstly, the fact that a threat against a State may originate in a foreign land and the impact could affect other States; secondly, that a threat to one State today may presage an attack on another tomorrow; and thirdly, that international investment may help to strengthen the resolve of the international community and may provide more robust and secure hard- and software.
While nuclear cyber threats are in many ways unique, the security environment reflects interests common to other concerns. The security cycle presented below provides opportunities for engagement and collaboration at various levels.
1. Threat definition: Each State and each nuclear utility must assess the potential for cyber attacks that could result in major consequences. Specific models for threat assessment have to be developed to achieve this kind of oversight. Anticipating cyber threats from past events has not proven to be a viable method. Cyber threat modeling must include the types of malicious actors in question, their differing capacities for cyber attacks, the costs and benefits of attacks, typical and individual vulnerabilities providing potential attack vectors and) the security profile for the State, including the extent to which adversaries threaten the State, and the extent to which cyber attacks occur. [10] Cyber threat modeling should quantify and rank the threats and identify appropriate countermeasures. (The IAEA offers assistance to States seeking to develop a design basis threat to serve as the basis for all protective measures, and its mission could be expanded along these lines.[11])
2. Legal infrastructure:
a. The international community needs to review regularly whether the treaties and other measures in place are adequate. Such measures should reflect the fact that a cyber attack on a nuclear power plant with the intention of substantial radiation releases should be considered as act of terrorism and hence be prohibited by the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism[12] or a crime against humanity subject to other relevant anti-terrorism treaties, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the Nuclear Safety Convention.
b. It is incumbent on the national government of each State to establish an inter-departmental response to the threat of cyber attacks on nuclear power plants, including its national security structure in all of its dimensions. It may be appropriate to define such arrangements within an existing governmental body or to create a new agency for this and related purposes.
c. It is further incumbent on each national government to enact legislation together with subordinate regulations and guidelines consistent with its legal structure and the threats it faces, in conformance with its treaty obligations and other considerations.
3. Intelligence: It is essential for a State to continually search for information on States, organizations and individuals who might engage in cyber attacks, and to devise appropriate response mechanisms. While protecting sensitive sources, each government should keep all nuclear utilities informed of emerging threat information. Nuclear utilities in turn have to be able to comprehend threat information and assess their individual potential impact.
4. Capability development: Each State must determine its national requirements and seek to establish national programs to detect, block and determine the source of hacking attacks. If detection is unlikely to be effective, security concepts have to be developed which compensate the loss of capabilities of early warning and crisis management. Capability development also includes educating experts to specialize in cyber security. (Standardized educational certifications to signify sufficient expertise are necessary and need to be created.) Cooperation with trusted States or international organizations could significantly enhance the cost-effectiveness of national and utility programs.[13], [14], [15]
5. Cyber security systems implementation: At the level of each reactor, the utility should implement a robust system aimed at reducing potential vulnerabilities and preventing cyber attacks. Such a system should include the following elements:
a. A detailed IT mapping of each nuclear facility;
b. Limiting network access, preferably disconnecting all critical areas from networks;
c. Highly hardened information security with standards to be determined by international bodies;
d. Capabilities for detecting abnormal instructions;
e. Capabilities for detecting attempts to gain access or to escalate access privileges;
f. Provisions and procedures for informing the national command authority;
g. Provisions and procedures for engaging law enforcement, as appropriate; and
h. Provisions and procedures for informing international bodies, as agreed by the national government.
6. Law enforcement: Depending on the circumstances of individual attacks, the site security force, local law enforcement, national law enforcement and international bodies, especially Interpol, should be prepared to respond and be engaged as soon as possible.[16] Law enforcement agencies have to develop sufficient capacities in the field of IT-forensics, including the undeveloped field of IT-forensics of Industrial Control Systems (ICS).
7. System assurance: What steps should be taken at each level from a specific nuclear power plant up to the international community to guarantee that adequate protection is in place. Controls should be implemented to monitor compliance. Liabilities for non-compliance should be formulated. In addition, methodologies and certificates have to be given out to distinguish insufficient security technologies and configurations from effective ones.
8. Lessons learned: Characteristics of each attempt should be analyzed to determine the need for system modifications. Reviews of cyber attempts should be broadened to include the national government and all nuclear utilities, neighboring States (excluding adversaries), and the international community. To ensure cooperation, protocols for trusted information sharing have to be created and obligations to disclose such information have to be formulated.
Nuclear terrorism and the proliferation of nuclear weapons
Concerned with the threats associated with the proliferation of nuclear weapons, over the years the international community has created a remarkable nonproliferation regime. It is imperfect, as all things human are, but it is extensive and represents something unique in international relations. It is and likely will always remain a work in progress, evolving to meet new challenges and implementing new capabilities. Its elements are shown in Table 1. Its extent and pervasiveness reflect the all nations except for the remaining few interested in acquiring nuclear arsenals support the regime and continue to join in additional steps to make it perfect.| Authorities | Actors | Activities |
| National Laws and Regulations | Public (or parts thereof) | Create Nonproliferation Culture Diminishing Appeal of Nuclear Weapons |
| UN Charter, esp. Chapter VII | Sovereign National Governments and Agencies | Encourage States to Accept Binding Nonproliferation Commitments |
| UN Security Council Resolutions (including 1540) | Regional Control Bodies (EURATOM, ABACC) | Promote Proliferation-Resistant Nuclear Technology and Commercial Arrangements |
| Proliferation Security Initiative Agreed Principles | United Nations and UN Security Council | Obtain Intelligence and Other Information on a State’s Nuclear Activities |
| Treaty for the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the NPT | International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) | Verify Design Information, Absence of Diversion or Clandestine Production of Nuclear Material, Weaponization |
| IAEA Statute | Nuclear Suppliers Group and Zangger Committee | Investigative Reporting, Scholarly Analysis |
| IAEA Safeguards Agreements | Nuclear Vendors | Deny Suspicious Export Requests and Notify Appropriate States & Organizations |
| Nuclear Suppliers Group and Zangger Committee | Nuclear Facility Operators | Interdict Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Materials |
| Nuclear Supply Commercial Contracts | Non-governmental Organizations (e.g., World Institute of Nuclear Security, World Nuclear Association) | Use Diplomacy to Address Suspected Acts of Noncompliance |
| Nuclear Facility Policies, Procedures and Practices | Professional Societies (e.g., Institute of Nuclear Materials Management, European Safeguards Research & Development Association) | Apply Sanctions to Compel Compliance |
| Nuclear Weapon Free-Zone Treaties | National Laboratories and Universities | Employ Military Force as a Last Resort |
| Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (not in force) | Armed Forces | |
| Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (negotiations not underway) | ||
| Table 1. | ||
It may be appropriate now to create a parallel table describing the national and international measures undertaken in relation to the prevention of nuclear terrorism, including cyber-terrorism, even if the likelihood of cyber terrorism is very low at present.
Cyber attacks may be directed at military or civilian targets including virtually any computer used for any purpose. Nuclear power plants or fuel cycle facilities could be attacked by other means involving force or guile; attacks by military forces are not within the scope of the Summit,[17] however, attacks aimed at taking over or destroying nuclear power reactors carried out by paramilitary forces clearly is and on that basis, nuclear cyber attacks should be addressed.
Recommended actions for the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit
Taking into account the potentially extreme consequences of a cyber attack on a nuclear reactor (especially) or on a nuclear fuel cycle facility, recognizing that nuclear facilities may already be reasonably well protected against credible threats today, and acknowledging that the trajectory of threats is a matter of uncomfortable speculation, we believe that the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit should take prudent steps to ensure that the peaceful use of nuclear energy is not vulnerable to cyber attack and that the international efforts directed as a result of this consideration are chosen so as to build strength and trust among States embarking on prudent and legitimate peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We recommend the following specific steps.1. Definitions
The Summit should seek to define terms related to this topic, including nuclear cyber threat, nuclear cyber attack and nuclear cyber security according to the potential for damage, the motivation and the outcome; e.g., as presented above. The definitions should include the full range of possible attacks, ranging from those made by clever individuals to attacks mounted by or on behalf of a hostile government or terrorist organization.a. Cyber attacks carried out by the citizens of a State against targets within that State may violate the laws of the State intended to protect the public health and welfare and may be identified as acts of domestic terrorism; [18]
b. Cyber attacks created by activities outside the targeted State or affecting other States in addition to the targeted State may be considered as acts of international terrorism;
c. Cyber attacks carried out by or under the aegis of foreign governments may be considered as acts of war; [19] or
d. Cyber attacks may be considered as crimes against humanity. [20]
2. Legal authority
The Summit should create the legal frameworks necessary to ensure that states protect themselves against domestic and international nuclear cyber attacks:a. Each state should enact and enforce legislation to prevent cyber attacks on nuclear reactors and nuclear fuel cycle facilities, detect and apprehend perpetrators and punish individuals or organizations operating within the territory of a state responsible for or abetting such activities.
b. States should examine the provisions of existing conventions (especially the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the Convention for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material) with the intention of identifying interpretations and/or modifications as necessary to extend their provisions to include domestic and international nuclear cyber-terrorism.
c. Using once again its extraordinary authority under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council should determine whether existing Resolutions 1373[21] and 1540 should be amended to address nuclear cyber terrorism, and whether under specific circumstances acts of nuclear cyber terror should be identified as crimes against humanity.
d. The Summit should examine the role of specific regional and international organizations in relation to the prevention, detection and resolution of nuclear cyber attacks, to seek a clear and streamlined ability to confront the threats of nuclear cyber-terror, including Interpol, the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), the UN Group on Information Security, the International Atomic Energy Agency, EURATOM and ABACC.
3. Protective measures
The Summit should organize and oversee investigations into technical and administrative barriers that would prevent cyber attacks from succeeding.4. Capability
The Summit should:a. Define the specific human skills required to protect against nuclear cyber-terrorism, and create internationally recognized standards and certifications to confirm that the people involved are adequately prepared for their work;[22]
b. Identify education and training institutes engaged in this field and encourage cross fertilization;
c. Encourage the development and presentation of “best practices” in cyber security;[23]
d. Encourage further work by professional societies and national bodies to create standards affecting cyber security;
e. Encourage continued R&D into protection against cyber attacks on nuclear reactors and nuclear fuel cycle facilities;
f. Define computer hardware and software intended to be immune to cyber attacks;
g. Using probabilistic risk assessments identifying failure modes for nuclear reactors and nuclear fuel cycle facilities, define methods and procedures for facility officials and national security officials to test the adequacy of applied counter-cyber terrorism systems;
h. Define mechanisms for detecting the source of cyber attacks;
i. Establish communication arrangements and associated security protocols to facilitate information sharing and problem solving; and
j. Remain seized of the issue and the importance of prevention.
5. Creation & sharing of relevant national & international intelligence
The Summit should encourage states to share intelligence on evolving threats and information associated with the source of any attack.6. Cyber security systems implementation
The Summit should explore alternative means through which states seeking assurance in the cyber security systems they employ could provide advice, recommendations on system hardware, software, expert advice, quality assurance and certification, including performance requirements for facility-level systems, national systems, and the response capabilities suitable for local law enforcement.7. Law enforcement
The Summit should provide encouragement and possibly funding as needed to assist States concerned about their ability to protect against nuclear cyber attacks. The Summit should ensure that essential international bodies receive cooperation and financial support as necessary to excel in performing their required functions.8. Lessons learned
The Summit should create a mechanism for reviewing progress in relation to the prevention of nuclear cyber terrorism, including progress by States, advancement of counter-cyber terrorism measures, and systematic a posteriori reviews of attacks that have occurred – including those that fail and those that succeed.-------------------------
Annex 1. The following is an NRC Background Note on Cyber Security[24]
Cyber SecurityBackground
Nuclear facilities use digital and analog systems to monitor and operate equipment, and to obtain and store vital information. Analog systems do their job by following “hard-wired” instructions, while digital computer-based systems follow instructions (software) stored in memory. In addition, many plant computer systems are now linked to digital networks that extend across the plant, performing safety, security and emergency preparedness functions. Protecting these critical digital assets and the information they contain from sabotage or malicious use is called cyber security. All power reactor facilities licensed by the NRC must have a cyber security program.
Cyber Security Requirements After 9/11
Shortly after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, the NRC ordered its nuclear power plant licensees to enhance their overall security. The order included specific requirements for addressing certain cyber security threats and vulnerabilities. The order contains sensitive information and is not available to the public.
A year later, the NRC issued another order that, for the first time, added cyber attacks to the adversary threat types the plants must be able to defend against. This order also contains sensitive information and is not available to the public.
In October 2004, the NRC again addressed cyber security concerns by publishing a self-assessment tool for use by nuclear power plants. In 2005, the NRC also endorsed a program developed by the Nuclear Energy Institute to help nuclear power reactor licensees establish and maintain cyber security programs at their facilities. Additional cyber security guidance was published in January 2006 and March 2007. It included specifics for designing, developing and implementing protective measures for digital instrumentation and controls used in nuclear safety-related applications.
In March 2009, the NRC issued a new cyber security rule. This new section of the NRC Code of Federal Regulations, “Protection of Digital Computer and Communications Systems and Networks” (10 CFR 73.54), affected existing nuclear power reactor licensees and those corporations applying for new reactor licenses. The new regulation requires licensees to submit a new cyber security plan and an implementation timeline for NRC approval. The plan must show how the facility identified (or would identify) critical digital assets and describe its protective strategy, among other requirements.
Most recently, in January 2010, the NRC published a Regulatory Guide that provides comprehensive guidance to licensees and applicants for licenses on an acceptable way to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 73.54. The guidance includes recommended best practices from such organizations as the International Society of Automation, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology, as well as guidance from the Department of Homeland Security. This guide is publically available.
How the NRC Regulates Cyber Security Power reactor licensees and those seeking permission to construct and operate new reactors must prove that their digital computer and communication systems and networks are protected against cyber attacks, including those systems and networks associated with:
- safety-related and important-to-safety functions,
- security functions,
- emergency preparedness functions, including offsite communications, and
- support systems and equipment important to safety and security.
Ongoing Actions of the NRC Cyber Security Staff
Defending against hackers, criminals, and cyber terrorists is a complex endeavor that involves facing a changing and evolving threat. The NRC’s cyber security team includes technology and threat assessment experts who team with other federal agencies and the nuclear industry to evaluate and help resolve issues that could affect digital systems. This team makes recommendations to other offices within the NRC and is also designing a cyber security inspection program for future implementation. All sites will be required to satisfy those inspection requirements.
In addition, the NRC is collaborating with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) and other organizations on cyber security. The NRC has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with NERC to clarify the regulatory roles and responsibilities of each organization, including inspection protocols and enforcement actions. This MOU ensures a continuity of cyber security oversight that extends from the plant itself to the electrical grid as a whole.
To be successful in combating the cyber threat, the NRC, and its government and private sector partners must continue to build on their relationships and make use of advances in technology. That partnering, when combined with the use of technology, helps ensure that cyber attacks at both prevented and deterred.
The Mexico problems - Cartels , drugs and guns - and alleged US collusion .......
http://freebeacon.com/the-mexican-drug-policy-shift/
The Mexican Drug Policy Shift
WH officials downplay security concerns ahead of Obama trip to Mexico
Armed villagers in Mexico / AP
BY:
Senior Obama administration officials downplayed concerns that the newly installed Mexican government is moving away from its cooperation with the United States on security matters and efforts to combat narcotics trafficking.
Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto, an Institutional Revolutionary Party (IRP) member who was inaugurated in December, has indicated his government will be a less helpful partner in the cross-border fight to repel Mexican drug traffickers, according to reports.
President Barack Obama will seek to bolster security cooperation agreements when he visits with Nieto Thursday during a trip to Mexico.
Nieto has indicated his government will move away from previous efforts to stymie drug cartels, which has led to violence along the U.S.-Mexico border.
“The new administration has shifted priorities away from the U.S.-backed strategy of arresting kingpins, which sparked an unprecedented level of violence among the cartels, and toward an emphasis on prevention and keeping Mexico’s streets safe and calm,” the Washington Post reported on Sunday.
Administration officials downplayed these reports Wednesday afternoon during a conference call with reporters.
“We find it completely normal” for the new Mexican government to reexamine past security agreements with the United States, Ricardo Zuniga, a special assistant to the president and senior director for western hemisphere affairs, told reporters.
These recent moves are not a sign Mexico wants to bow out of the ongoing drug war, Zuniga said.
President Barack Obama will mainly seek to focus on the U.S.-Mexico economic relationship rather than security agreements during the trip, according to White House deputy national security adviser Ben Rhodes.
While there has been a focus on “security cooperation” during past visits to Mexico, “on this trip, however, we want to broaden the relationship beyond security,” Rhodes said.
There is “significant potential to increase and deepen our commercial ties,” Rhodes said.
Rhodes also said the political battle over U.S. immigration reform efforts would take center stage during the president’s discussions with Nieto.
“Mexico is an important partner in immigration reform,” Rhodes said.
http://www.globalresearch.ca/mexican-drug-cartel-was-working-alongside-the-us-government/5303454
Mexican Drug Cartel was working alongside the US Government
by Jason Howerton
A high-ranking Mexican drug cartel operative currently in U.S. custody is making startling allegations that the failed federal gun-walking operation known as “Fast and Furious” isn’t what you think it is.
It wasn’t about tracking guns, it was about supplying them — all part of an elaborate agreement between the U.S. government and Mexico’s powerful Sinaloa Cartel to take down rival cartels.
The explosive allegations are being made by Jesus Vicente Zambada-Niebla, known as the Sinaloa Cartel’s “logistics coordinator.” He was extradited to the Chicago last year to face federal drug charges.
Zambada-Niebla claims that under a “divide and conquer” strategy, the U.S. helped finance and arm the Sinaloa Cartel through Operation Fast and Furious in exchange for information that allowed the DEA, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and other federal agencies to take down rival drug cartels. The Sinaloa Cartel was allegedly permitted to traffic massive amounts of drugs across the U.S. border from 2004 to 2009 — during both Fast and Furious and Bush-era gunrunning operations — as long as the intel kept coming.
This pending court case against Zambada-Niebla is being closely monitored by some members of Congress, who expect potential legal ramifications if any of his claims are substantiated. The trial was delayed but is now scheduled to begin on Oct. 9.
Zambada-Niebla is reportedly a close associate of Sinaloa Cartel kingpin Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman and the son of Ismael “Mayo” Zambada-Garcia, both of which remain fugitives, likely because of the deal made with the DEA, federal court documents allege.
Based on the alleged agreement ”the Sinaloa Cartel under the leadership of defendant’s father, Ismael Zambada-Niebla and ‘Chapo’ Guzman, were given carte blanche to continue to smuggle tons of illicit drugs into Chicago and the rest of the United States and were also protected by the United States government from arrest and prosecution in return for providing information against rival cartels which helped Mexican and United States authorities capture or kill thousands of rival cartel members,” states a motion for discovery filed in U.S. District Court by Zambada-Niebla’s attorney in July 2011.
A source in Congress, who spoke to TheBlaze on the condition of anonymity, said that some top congressional investigators have been keeping “one eye on the case.” Another two members of Congress, both lead Fast and Furious Congressional investigators, told TheBlaze they had never even heard of the case.
One of the Congressmen, who also spoke to TheBlaze on the condition of anonymity because criminal proceedings are still ongoing, called the allegations “disturbing.” He said Congress will likely get involved once Zambada-Niebla’s trial has concluded if any compelling information surfaces.
“Congress won’t get involved in really any criminal case until the trial is over and the smoke has cleared,” he added. “If the allegations prove to hold any truth, there will be some serious legal ramifications.”
Earlier this month, two men in Texas were sentenced to 70 and 80 months in prison after pleading guilty to attempting to export 147 assault rifles and thousands of rounds of ammunition to Mexico’s Los Zetas cartel. Compare that to the roughly 2,000 firearms reportedly “walked” in Fast and Furious, which were used in the murders of hundreds of Mexican citizens and U.S. Border Agent Brian Terry, and some U.S. officials could potentially face jail time if they knowingly armed the Sinaloa Cartel and allowed guns to cross into Mexico.
If proven in court, such an agreement between U.S. law enforcement agencies and a Mexican cartel could potentially mar both the Bush and Obama administrations. The federal government is denying all of Zambada-Niebla’s allegations and contend that no official immunity deal was agreed upon.
To be sure, Zambada-Niebla is a member of one of the most ruthless drug gangs in all of Mexico, so there is a chance that he is saying whatever it takes to reduce his sentence, which will likely be hefty. However, Congress and the media have a duty to prove without a reasonable doubt that there is no truth in his allegations. So far, that has not been achieved.
Zambada-Niebla was reportedly responsible for coordinating all of the Sinaloa Cartel’s multi-ton drug shipments from Central and South American countries, through Mexico, and into the United States. To accomplish this, he used every tool at his disposal: Boeing 747 cargo planes, narco-submarines, container ships, speed boats, fishing vessels, buses, rail cars, tractor trailers and automobiles. But Guzman and Zambada-Niebla’s overwhelming success within the Sinaloa Cartel was largely due to the arrests and dismantling of many of their competitors and their booming businesses in the U.S. from 2004 to 2009 — around the same time ATF’s gun-walking operations were in full swing. Fast and Furious reportedly began in 2009 and continued into early 2011.
According Zambada-Niebla, that was a product of the collusion between the U.S. government and the Sinaloa Cartel.
The claims seem to fall in line with statements made last month by Guillermo Terrazas Villanueva, a spokesman for the Chihuahua state government in northern Mexico who said U.S. agencies ”don’t fight drug traffickers,“ instead ”they try to manage the drug trade.”
Also, U.S. officials have previously acknowledged working with the Sinaloa Cartel through another informant, Humberto Loya-Castro. He is also allegedly a high-ranking member of the Sinaloa Cartel as well as a close confidant and lawyer of “El Chapo” Guzman.
Loya-Castro was indicted along with Chapo and Mayo in 1995 in the Southern District of California in a massive narcotics trafficking conspiracy (Case no. 95CR0973). The case was dismissed in 2008 at the request of prosecutors after Loya became an informant for the United States government and subsequently provided information for years.
In 2005, “the CS (informant Loya-Castro) signed a cooperation agreement with the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of California,” states an affidavit filed in the Zambada-Niebla case by Loya-Castro’s handler, DEA agent Manuel Castanon.
“Thereafter, I began to work with the CS. Over the years, the CS’ cooperation resulted in the seizure of several significant loads of narcotics and precursor chemicals. The CS’ cooperation also resulted in other real-time intelligence that was very useful to the United States government.”
Under the alleged agreement with U.S. agencies, “the Sinaloa Cartel, through Loya-Castro, was to provide information accumulated by Mayo, Chapo, and others, against rival Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations to the United States government,” a motion for discovery states.
In return, the United States government allegedly agreed to dismiss the charges in the pending case against Loya-Castro (which they did), not to interfere with his drug trafficking activities and those of the Sinaloa Cartel and not actively prosecute him or the Sinaloa Cartel leadership.
Taken directly from the motion filed in federal court:
“This strategy, which he calls ‘Divide & Conquer,’ using one drug organization to help against others, is exactly what the Justice Department and its various agencies have implemented in Mexico. In this case, they entered into an agreement with the leadership of the Sinaloa Cartel through, among others, Humberto Loya-Castro, to receive their help in the United States government’s efforts to destroy other cartels.”“Indeed, United States government agents aided the leaders of the Sinaloa Cartel.”
The government has denied this and says the deal did not go past Loya-Castro.
Zambada-Niebla was arrested by Mexican soldiers in late March of 2009 after he met with DEA agents at a Mexico City hotel in a meeting arranged by Loya-Castro, though the U.S. government was not involved in his arrest. He was extradited to Chicago to face federal drug charges on Feb. 18, 2010. He is now being held in a Michigan prison after requesting to be moved from Chicago.
“Classified Materials”
During his initial court proceedings, Zambada-Niebla continually stated that he was granted full immunity by the DEA in exchange for his cooperation. The agency, however, argues that an “official” immunity deal was never established though they admit he may have acted as an informant.
Zambada-Niebla and his legal council also requested records about Operation Fast and Furious, which permitted weapons purchased in the United States to be illegally smuggled into Mexico, sometimes by paid U.S. informants and cartel leaders. Their request was denied. From the defense motion:
“It is estimated that approximately 3,000 people were killed in Mexico as a result of ‘Operation Fast and Furious,’ including law enforcement officers in the state of Sinaloa, Mexico, the headquarters of the Sinaloa cartel. The Department of Justice’s leadership apparently saw this as an ingenious way of combating drug cartel activities.”“It has recently been disclosed that in addition to the above-referenced problems with ‘Operation Fast & Furious,’ the DOJ, DEA, and the FBI knew that some of the people who were receiving the weapons that were being allowed to be transported to Mexico, were in fact informants working for those organizations and included some of the leaders of the cartels.”
Zambada’s attorney has filed several motions for discovery to that effect in Illinois Federal District Court, which were summarily denied by the presiding judge who claimed the defendant failed to make the case that he was actually a DEA informant.
In April, 2012, a federal judge refused to dismiss charges against him.
From a Chicago Sun Times report: “According to the government, [Zambada-Niebla] conveyed his interest and willingness to cooperate with the U.S. government, but the DEA agents told him they ‘were not authorized to meet with him, much less have substantive discussions with him,’” the judge wrote.
In their official response to Zambada-Niebla’s motion for discovery, the federal government confirmed the existence of “classified materials” regarding the case but argued they “do not support the defendant’s claim that he was promised immunity or public authority for his actions.”
Experts have expressed doubts that Zambada-Niebla had an official agreement with the U.S. government, however, agree Loya Castro probably did. Either way, the defense still wants to obtain DEA reports that detail the agency’s relationship with the Sinaloa Cartel and put the agents on the stand, under oath to testify.
The documents that detail the relationship between the federal government and the Sinaloa Cartel have still not been released or subjected to review — citing matters of national security.
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2319205/In-gun-control-argument-Obama-blames-Americans-Mexican-deaths-Most-guns-used-commit-violence-Mexico-come-United-States.html
A White House spokesman did not respond to a request for comment about whether President. Obama was referring to Fast and Furious weapons in his speech.
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2319205/In-gun-control-argument-Obama-blames-Americans-Mexican-deaths-Most-guns-used-commit-violence-Mexico-come-United-States.html
Obama blames American guns for Mexican deaths: ‘Most of the guns used to commit violence here in Mexico come from the United States’
The president omitted mention of Operation Fast and Furious, his Department of Justice’s program that ‘walked’ thousands of guns across the border.
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President Obama used a speech at Mexico’s Museo Nacional de AntropologÃa – the National Anthropology Museum – to claim that ‘most of the guns used to commit violence here in Mexico come from the United States.’
‘I think many of you know that in America, our Constitution guarantees our individual right to bear arms,’ Obama said. ‘And as president, I swore an oath to uphold that right, and I always will.’
‘But at the same time, as I’ve said in the United States, I will continue to do everything in my power to pass common-sense reforms that keep guns out of the hands of criminals and dangerous people.’
‘That can save lives here in Mexico and back home in the United States,’ Obama added. ‘It’s the right thing to do.’
'So we'll keep increasing the pressure on gun traffickers who bring illegal guns into Mexico. We'll keep putting these criminals where they belong: behind bars.'
Senate testimony in 2011 from a top Department of Justice official indicates that Obama may be correct in saying that the U.S. is the source of 'most' guns used to commit violence in Mexico.
Lanny Breuer, then the Assistant Attorney General, referred a Senate Judiciary subcommittee to statistics showing that 94,000 weapons had been recovered from Mexican drug cartels in the previous five years, including 64,000 – a 70 per cent ratio – that could be traced back to the United States.
But there are no statistics widely available to show what percentage of Mexico’s violent crime is tied to the illegal drug trade.
While Mexican citizens have their own constitutional right to bear arms, Mexico City has only a single licensed gun shop and the nation’s military controls it, according to a 2009 National Public Radio broadcast.
In part because they lack legal avenues to purchase the weapons they are entitled to own, Mexicans have turned to a black market – including guns purchased in the U.S. and smuggled to the south.
Changes in the Mexican army, including a slow-down in Central American armed conflicts, have brought record numbers of military desertions, dumping countless guns into the private market. According to some news reports, at least 150,000 desertions were recorded between 2003 and 2009.
Obama also did not mention the more than 2,000 firearms that his Department of Justice ‘walked’ across the Mexican border as part of Operation Fast and Furious, a federal law enforcement project that aimed to track weapons to drug traffickers.
Those guns have been connected to the deaths of at least 300 Mexican citizens. And U.S. Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry died in December 2010 when a so-called ‘Fast and Furious gun’ was recovered at the scene of his murder during a routine patrol in Arizona.
An ensuing Congressional investigation led to the first-ever citation of a sitting cabinet member – Attorney General Eric Holder – for contempt of Congress. Holder declined to provide most of the more than 140,000 documents subpoenaed by a House committee, although the Department of Justice did selectively turn over thousands of others.
The term gun ‘walking’ referred to the administration-approved practice of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) of instructing legal gun dealers to sell firearms to so-called ‘straw buyers’ who intended to pass them on to others.
Once sold, the guns would be ‘walked’ across the U.S.-Mexico border with the permission of federal authorities. While their intention was to follow more than 2,000 guns to their destinations inside the illicit Mexican drug trade, barely one-third of them – principally the weapons used in murders and then discarded at the scene, as is common in Mexico – were ever recovered.
Some gun rights groups have argued that Operation Fast and Furious was intentionally devised as a way to promote gun control, citing emails between senior ATF officials that discussed whether the Fast and Furious guns in one region ‘were all purchased from the same [dealer] and at one time.’
‘We are looking at anecdotal cases to support a demand letter on long gun multiple sales,’ one email read.
In another, one ATF leader wrote to another that Fast and Furious ‘could be a strong supporting factor if we can determine how many multiple sales of long guns occurred during the course of this case.’
ATF’s intention, ultimately scrapped under political pressure, was to increase reporting requirements on licensed gun dealers when they sell more than one weapon in a single transaction.
A White House spokesman did not respond to a request for comment about whether President. Obama was referring to Fast and Furious weapons in his speech.
We have to deal with the Saudi role in terrorism - if that means we oil prices and gasoline prices go higher , so be it ..... the cost for Wars based on lies , fables and misdirections cost far more ....starting with 9-11
http://www.zerohedge.com/contributed/2013-04-29/fbi-report-implicates-saudi-government-911
FBI Report Implicates Saudi Government in 9/11
- FBI
- Florida
- FOIA
- Freedom of Information Act
- MSNBC
- New York Times
- Obama Administration
- Saudi Arabia
- White House
- World Trade
Contrary to the official narrative, 9/11 was state-sponsored terror. The only question is which state sponsored it.
A 9/11 Commissioner and Co-Chair of the Congressional Inquiry into 9/11 say in sworn declarations that the Saudi government is linked to the 9/11 attacks.
This week, the Miami Herald provided more evidence of a Saudi link:
A Saudi family who “fled” their Sarasota area home weeks before 9/11 had “many connections” to “individuals associated with the terrorist attacks on 9/11/2001,” according to newly released FBI records.One partially declassified document, marked “secret,” lists three of those individuals and ties them to the Venice, Fla., flight school where suicide hijackers Mohamed Atta and Marwan al-Shehhi trained. Accomplice Ziad Jarrah took flying lessons at another school a block away.Atta and al-Shehhi were at the controls of the jetliners that slammed into the twin towers of New York’s World Trade Center, killing nearly 3,000 people. Jarrah was the hijacker-pilot of United Airlines Flight 93, which crashed in a field in rural Pennsylvania.The names, addresses and dates of birth of the three individuals tied to the flight school were blanked out before the records were released toBrowardBulldog.org amid ongoing Freedom of Information Act litigation.The information in the documents runs counter to previous FBI statements. It also adds to concerns raised by official investigations but never fully explored, that the full truth about Saudi Arabia and the 9/11 attacks has not yet been told.***The documents are the first released by the FBI about its once-secret probe in Sarasota. Information contained in the documents flatly contradicts prior statements by FBI agents in Miami and Tampa who have said the investigation found no evidence connecting the al-Hijjis to the hijackers or the 9/11 plot.Concerned residents in the gated community of Prestancia tipped the FBI, shortly after the 9/11 attacks, to the al-Hijjis’ sudden departure in late August 2001. The family left behind three cars, clothes, furniture, diapers, toys, food and other items.[A] counterterrorism officer and Prestancia’s former administrator, Larry Berberich, both said an analysis of gatehouse security records — log books and snapshots of license tags — had determined that vehicles either driven by or carrying several of the future hijackers had visited the al-Hijji home.Phone records revealed similar, though indirect, ties to the hijackers, said the counterterrorism officer, who spoke on condition of anonymity.***An April 16, 2002, FBI report says “repeated citizen calls” led to an inspection of the home by agents of the Southwest Florida Domestic Security Task Force.***That person and a second individual were said to be flight students at Huffman Aviation — the flight school at the Venice Municipal Airport attended by hijackers Atta and al-Shehhi.The third person on the list “lived with flight students at Huffman Aviation” and was “arrested numerous times by the Sarasota County Sheriff’s Office,” the report says.***A notice on the document indicates the censored information regarding the three individuals associated with the terrorist attacks isscheduled to remain classified for another 25 years — until March 14, 2038.***Al-Hijji, who following 9/11 worked for the Saudi oil company Aramco in England, could not be reached by phone or email last week. Aramco staff said there was no longer anyone by that name in the London office.***The FBI documents also disclose that Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy, D-Vt., queried Attorney General Eric Holder and FBI Director Robert Mueller about the Sarasota investigation six days after its existence was disclosed in Broward Bulldog/Miami Herald story.***Similarly, Weich denied an assertion by then Sen. Bob Graham of Florida that the FBI had not turned over its Sarasota records to Congress. The bureau, he stated, made all of its records available and suggested they may have been overlooked by investigators.The documents the FBI has released do not mention other known aspects of the Sarasota investigation, including information provided to the FBI by al-Hijji’s former friend, Wissam Hammoud.Hammoud, 47, is a federal prisoner classified by the U.S. Bureau of Prisons as an “International Terrorist Associate.” He is serving a 21-year sentence for weapons violations and attempting to kill a federal agent and a witness in a previous case against him.[S]hortly after his 2004 arrest, Hammoud told agents that al-Hijji considered Osama bin Laden a “hero,” may have known some of the hijackers, and once introduced Hammoud to fugitive al-Qaeda leader and ex-Miramar resident Adnan Shukrijumah.When reached last year, al-Hijji acknowledged having known Hammoud well. He did not, however, respond to a question about Hammoud’s allegations and said Shukrijumah’s name did not “ring a bell.”***Other FBI documents about Sarasota are known to exist, but were not released, including a report Graham says he read last year but can’t discuss because it is classified.The [Broward] Bulldog’s FOIA lawsuit asks U.S. District Judge William Zloch to order the FBI to produce all records of its Sarasota investigation, including the records seen by Graham.
The Daily Beast reported last year:
The FBI-led investigation in Sarasota reportedly focused on Saudi millionaire Abdulaziz al-Hijji and his wife, Anoud. Their upscale home was owned by Anoud al-Hijji’s father, Esam Ghazzawi, an adviser to Prince Fahd bin Salman bin Abdulaziz al-Saud, the nephew of King Fahd.
An FBI informant hosted and rented a room to two hijackers in 2000. Specifically, investigators for the Congressional Joint Inquiry discoveredthat an FBI informant had hosted and even rented a room to two hijackers in 2000 and that, when the Inquiry sought to interview the informant, the FBI refused outright, and then hid him in an unknown location, and that a high-level FBI official stated these blocking maneuvers were undertaken under orders from the White House. As the New York Times notes:
Senator Bob Graham, the Florida Democrat who is a former chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, accused the White House on Tuesday of covering up evidence ….The accusation stems from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s refusal to allow investigators for a Congressional inquiry and the independent Sept. 11 commission to interview an informant, Abdussattar Shaikh, who had been the landlord in San Diego of two Sept. 11 hijackers.
The 2 hijackers were Saudis. Indeed, 15 of the 19 9/11 hijackers were Saudis.
The Daily Beast reported last year:
In San Diego, allegations of links between the Saudi government and the 9/11 hijackers revolve around two enigmatic Saudi men: Omar al-Bayoumi and Osama Basnan, both of whom have long since left the United States.Al-Bayoumi had previously worked for the Saudi government in civil aviation (a part of the Saudi defense department), and was alleged by many San Diego Muslims to be an agent for the Saudi government who reported on the activities of Saudi-born students living in Southern California.In early 2000, al-Bayoumi invited two of the hijackers, Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi, to San Diego from Los Angeles. He told authorities he met the two men by chance when he sat next to them at a restaurant.As Newsweek reported in 2002, al-Bayoumi’s invitation was extended on the same day that he visited the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles for a private meeting.Al-Bayoumi arranged for the two future hijackers to live in an apartment near the San Diego Islamic Center mosque and paid $1,500 to cover their first two months of rent.When asked not long after the 9/11 attacks about al-Bayoumi’s possible involvement, San Diego County Sheriff Bill Gore, then the San Diego head of the FBI, told this reporter that there was no evidence al-Bayoumi played a role.But a former top FBI official later told Newsweek, “We firmly believed that [al-Bayoumi] had knowledge [of the 9/11 plot].”After 9/11, al-Bayoumi was detained by New Scotland Yard while living in the U.K. Gore said the FBI sent agents to London to interview him, but he was released a week later and allowed to return to Saudi Arabia.Newsweek reported that classified sections of the congressional 9/11 inquiry indicated that the Saudi Embassy in London pushed for al-Bayoumi’s release.Where is al-Bayoumi now? “I can’t say too much, but what I can tell you is that he is still alive and living in Saudi Arabia,” says Graham.As for Basnan, whom Graham calls “Bayoumi’s successor,” Newsweekreported that he received monthly checks for several years totaling as much as $73,000 from the Saudi ambassador to the United States, Prince Bandar, and his wife, Princess Haifa Faisal.The checks were sent because Basnan’s wife, Majeda Dweikat, needed thyroid surgery, Newsweekand other media outlets reported. But Dweikat inexplicably signed many of the checks over to al-Bayoumi’s wife, Manal Bajadr. This money allegedly made its way into the hands of hijackers Almihdhar and Alhazmi, according to the congressional report.At a post-9/11 gathering in San Diego, Basnan allegedly called the attack “a wonderful, glorious day” and celebrated the hijackers’ “heroism,” a law-enforcement official told Newsweek.Despite all this, he was ultimately allowed to return to Saudi Arabia ….Another man who might have helped investigators get to the bottom of this mystery is Abdussattar Shaikh, a longtime FBI asset in San Diego who was friends with al-Bayoumi and invited two of the San Diego-based hijackers to live in his home.However, Shaikh was not allowed by the FBI or the Bush administration to testify before the 9/11 Commission or the JICI.“For me, that was the low point of the [JICI] investigation,” says Graham. “Bayoumi introduced the hijackers to Shaikh, who clearly knew a lot, but the FBI, who had Shaikh in protective custody, seemed to care more about protecting their asset than allowing us to find out what he knew about 9/11.”During roughly the same period after the 9/11 attacks, San Diego FBI agent Steven Butler alerted his superiors about a flow of money from Saudi government officials that had made its way into the hands of two of the San Diego-based hijackers, according to U.S. News & World Report. But the warning was ignored.“Butler is claiming that people [in the FBI] didn’t follow up,” a congressional source told U.S. News & World Report. Another congressional source told U.S. News: “Butler saw a pattern, a trail, and he told his supervisors, but it ended there.”The investigation into the Saudi government’s alleged connections to the hijackers seemed to end there. Arguably the greatest crime mystery of our time has become a cold case.***[The Co-Chair of the Congressional Inquiry into 9/11 and former Head of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Bob Graham] believes the Bush administration protected the Saudis during the 9/11 inquiry [and] wonders why the Obama administration hasn’t reopened the investigation and sought answers.“Perhaps they feel that we can’t afford to irritate the Saudis, especially with oil prices going up now,” he says. “I don’t know. Someday, I do believe we will get to the bottom of 9/11 and the Saudi government connections.”
Indeed, a U.S. congressman for 6 years, who is now a talking head on MSNBC (Joe Scarborough) says that – even if the Saudi government backed the 9/11 attacks – Saudi oil is too important to do anything about it:
http://larouchepac.com/node/26370
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