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| Contemporary Monetary Analysis |  |  |  |
| Written by Doug Noland | |
| Friday, 24 February 2012 00:00 | |
February 21 – CNBC (John Carney): “The Washington Post ran a long and well-wrought article on Modern Monetary Theory over the weekend. The piece, by Dylan Matthews, starts with Jamie Galbraith’s experience trying to explain to a large audience of economists in the Clinton White House that the budget surpluses the federal government was running was immensely destructive. Or, rather, it starts with those economists laughing at Galbraith’s attempt to explain this. It was obvious to me way back before I had ever heard of MMT that governments should probably never run a budget surplus—or should do so only in dire emergencies. When the government runs a surplus, that means it is taking more money out of the economy than it is spending back into the economy. It is making us poorer.” In my initial CBB back in 1999, I trumpeted the need for a Contemporary Theory of Money and Credit. Some thirteen years later, I lament that the void remains as large as ever. Mr. Matthews’ Washington Post article highlighted “Modern Monetary Theory,” an alternative economic framework with Keynesian roots that is receiving heightened attention in our age of unrelenting government stimulus. I will not be jumping on board. From Mr. Matthews’ article: “‘Modern Monetary Theory’ was coined by Bill Mitchell, an Australian economist and prominent proponent, but its roots are much older. The term is a reference to John Maynard Keynes, the founder of modern macroeconomics. In ‘A Treatise on Money,’ Keynes asserted that ‘all modern States’ have had the ability to decide what is money and what is not for at least 4,000 years. This claim, that money is a ‘creature of the state,’ is central to the theory. In a ‘fiat money’ system like the one in place in the United States, all money is ultimately created by the government, which prints it and puts it into circulation. Consequently, the thinking goes, the government can never run out of money. It can always make more.” And from Wikipedia: “Chartalism is a descriptive economic theory that details the procedures and consequences of using government-issued tokens as the unit of money, i.e. fiat money… The modern theoretical body of work on chartalism is known as Modern Monetary Theory (MMT). MMT aims to describe and analyze modern economies in which the national currency is fiat money, established and created exclusively by the government. In MMT, money enters circulation through government spending; Taxation is employed to establish the fiat money as currency, giving it value by creating demand for it in the form of a private tax obligation… Because the government can issue its own currency at will, MMT maintains that the level of taxation relative to government spending (the government’s deficit spending or budget surplus) is in reality a policy tool that regulates inflation and unemployment, and not a means of funding the government’s activities per se.” My “contemporary theory…” takes an altogether different approach. “Money” is not foremost a creature “ultimately created by the government,” but is instead primarily an issue of market perceptions. “Money” is as money does (“economic functionality”). The reality is that we today operate in an age of globalized electronic Credit – a comprehensive virtual web of computerized general ledger debit and Credit entries linking creditors and debtors round the globe. This “system” of electronic IOUs comprises myriad types of financial obligations of diverse structure, maturity, Creditworthiness and currency units of accounts. Importantly, if the marketplace perceives that a Credit instrument will act as a highly liquid and stable store of nominal value, this Credit enjoys “moneyness.” It is the nature and nuances of contemporary marketable debt – especially with respect to the prominence of governmental and central bank support - that should be the analytical focal point. A static view of government-based “fiat money” is anachronistic. Economists argued in the late-nineties that government budget deficits were a “fiscal economic drag.” They later claimed that the 2001 recession proved their point. Many of these same economists today support ongoing massive deficit spending. They fret over the thought of “austerity.” I take issue with this line analysis, especially from a monetary theory perspective. First of all, it’s generally inaccurate to claim that government surpluses “take money out of the economy” and “make us poorer.” To this day, the economic community fails to appreciate key monetary dynamics from the nineties – issues that remain just as relevant today. The federal government ran a small surplus in 1998, a surplus of about $100bn in 1999 and one approaching $200bn in 2000. There was talk of paying down the entire federal debt. Economists and policymakers alike were oblivious to momentously destabilizing developments in “money” and Credit. We’ve made little analytical headway since. Nineties’ surpluses were primarily driven by a massive inflation of government receipts. In the five year period 1995-2000, federal revenue surged 46% to $2.057 TN. Over this period, federal spending rose 16% to $1.872 TN – hardly a fiscal drag and harbinger of recession. Why were receipts exploding? Well, because system Credit was surging. In the four years ended in 1999, total U.S. marketable debt jumped 37% ($6.9TN) to $25.389 TN. The annual growth in system marketable debt increased from 1995’s $1.196 TN to 1999’s $2.070 TN. In four years, Non-Financial debt expanded 27% ($3.6TN) to $17.291 TN, although the real fireworks were courtesy of an evolving financial sector. In the four years ended 1999, total Financial Sector borrowings jumped 74% ($3.1TN) to $7.349 TN. What was driving this historic growth? Primarily the GSEs. In just four years, GSE Credit obligations (agency debt and GSE MBS) jumped 64% ($1.5TN) to $3.888 TN. And with rampant GSE Credit growth ensuring market liquidity abundance, outstanding Financial Sector corporate bonds jumped 56% in four years, while the Asset-backed Securities (ABS) marketplace doubled. CPI may have been relatively tame, but Credit and speculative excess were fueling historic asset market inflation. And asset market capital gains – bonds, tech stocks, houses, etc. – were helping fill government coffers (and boosting expenditures!) from Sacramento to Washington D.C. I’m not sure how a modern monetary theory can be relevant without delving deeply into the profound role the evolution of GSE and Wall Street finance had on U.S. and global finance; on the fiscal position of the U.S. and advanced economies; on our asset markets, economic structure and on financial fragility more generally. To focus on federal spending, surpluses and deficits at the expense of recognizing the momentous distortions wrought by Washington finance (Treasury, GSE and Federal Reserve – OK, throw in the IMF and World Bank) is a failure of analytical diligence. The 2008 crisis and subsequent economic and financial fragilities were a direct consequence of a historic Bubble in mortgage finance. Washington’s fingerprints were all over the mispricing of finance that fueled near-catastrophic asset market distortions and economic maladjustment. It was an abject failure in policymaking. Those that have called for even greater government involvement in our economy and markets are content to disregard past mistakes. For those of us paying attention, there’s no doubt that we want Washington extricated from monkeying with market pricing mechanisms. The lack of respect for “money” and moneyness is a primary issue I have with most monetary analysis. They don’t get it. From the perspective of my analytical framework, money is both powerful and precious. Historically, sound money has been as rare as government-induced monetary inflation has been commonplace. The biggest risk coming out of the 2008 crisis was that runaway Washington fiscal and monetary stimulus would destroy Creditworthiness at the heart of our monetary system. We're well on our way. Throughout history, mistakes in monetary management have tended to beget only bigger mistakes. Somehow, many “monetary” economists seem to believe that money is like Doritos chips: don’t fret, quite easy for us to make a lot more. After witnessing the consequences of a collapse in confidence in Wall Street Credit and, more recently, the Credit obligations of Greece and Portugal, there is no excuse for such complacency. Yet conventional wisdom holds that Washington will always enjoy the capacity to “print” its way out of trouble. Default risk is a myth, it is believed. It is similar thinking that ensured the spectacular mortgage Credit boom and bust. It is one thing to issue fiat currency; it is quite another to sustain market confidence when Credit is expanding uncontrollably. The GSE/mortgage monetary inflation was not as conspicuous. Today, we are witnessing in broad daylight the dangerous side of “money.” The Treasury is issuing Trillions of debt - in an environment of virtually insatiable demand. Over the years, I’ve noted how a boom fueled by risky junk bonds wouldn’t be that dangerous from a systemic point of view. Limited demand for junk would create self-imposed market constraints. A Bubble in “money,” on the other hand, would tend to last longer, go to greater excess and, as such, have much greater deleterious impacts on financial and economic structures. And severe structural impairment can require multi-decade workouts and restructuring periods (think Great Depression and Japan). Money, even in its modern form, remains precious and, potentially, extremely dangerous – and this is the bedrock of my Contemporary Theory of Money and Credit. Fine, economists can sit around and debate deficit spending and the role of fiscal stimulus in recessions and recoveries. Meantime, there is scant discussion of the extraordinary monetary backdrop and untested experimental nature of monetary management. Governments have assumed unprecedented roles in the marketplace, much to the advantage of a multi-Trillion global leveraged speculating community. Government market backstops have been instrumental in the mushrooming of global derivative positions to the hundreds of Trillions. A financial insurance marketplace of unfathomable scope has been operating on the flimsy premise of liquid and continuous securities markets. Meanwhile, most economists, “monetary” and otherwise, argue that tame inflation ensures that there is little risk associated with ongoing massive government stimulus and market intervention. Most today fail to appreciate the potential catastrophic consequences of a crisis of confidence in “money” – a crisis of confidence in the moneyness of government debt and associated obligations. I sense little appreciation for the momentous role played by “money” as the core foundation of overall global Credit – or for Credit as the fuel for global economic activity. We saw again in 2011 how abruptly things can begin to unravel when the marketplace perceives that policymakers don’t have the situation under control. We’ve witnessed, as well, how quickly aggressive concerted global policy responses can transform de-risking/de-leveraging back to re-risking/re-leveraging. In a span of a few weeks, problematically illiquid markets morphed right back into liquidity abundance and speculative excess. From a monetary and market perspective, we’ve returned to the precarious stage. Risk embracement and leveraging create market liquidity abundance. Strong markets then emboldened the perception that policymakers have everything under control, which stokes even more speculation and stronger risk market inflation. And global risk asset prices - from stocks, to junk bonds to sovereign debt to emerging market debt and equities – enjoy inflated prices based on the view that policymakers can ensure a low-risk macro backdrop. Market players impute moneyness upon Trillions of debt instruments of suspect quality – Credit that will be vulnerable in the next bout of risk aversion and attendant de-leveraging. I just don’t believe that policymakers have the situation under control. Sure, they can incite a reversal of short positions and risk hedges. They so far retain the capacity to foment “risk on” and speculative excess. Yet, in reality, this is more destabilizing than it is a source of system stability. The amount of mercurial speculative finance has become so enormous as to be unmanageable. When this massive pool embraces risk things can quickly get out of hand (how about $150 crude?). But when this pool inevitably turns risk averse, illiquidity and market disruption once again become immediate problems. And it all hinges on the perception of the efficacy of policymaking and the moneyness of sovereign debt – and, in the end, the sustainability of the massive issuance of non-productive government Credit. The analysis of Bubbles and Bubble dynamics is integral to a Contemporary Theory of Money and Credit. This afternoon, former Bundesbank Vice President and ECB Executive Board member Juergen Stark warned that public finances in advanced economies were in “dire straits” and that fiscal deficits were “unsustainable.” He was also critical of the ECB bond purchase program, warning that “intervention in the sovereign bond markets postponed adjustment requirements.” I’m with Mr. Stark on this – and I’m with the German economic viewpoint more generally. Indeed, my analytical framework draws heavily from the “Austrian”/German perspective of the overriding importance of stable money and Credit. The Germans well appreciate the danger of monetary inflation, flawed policymaking doctrine, economic maladjustment and Bubbles. And most American economists believe the Germans remain hopelessly fixated on the Weimar hyperinflation experience. I fear our economic community remains hopelessly fixated on flawed economics. |
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