Harvey Organ's gold and Silver Report - May 16 , 2013 - Data , News and Views....

http://harveyorgan.blogspot.com/2013/05/gold-falls-by-940silver-holdscomex-gold.html

Thursday, May 16, 2013

Gold falls by $9.40/silver holds/Comex gold inventory falls again to 1.668 million oz (51.88 tonnes)/GLD falls again by 5.71 tonnes/silver by 1.545 million oz/USA records 4 big misses in the Philly index/CPI/housing starts/jobless claims/

Gold closed down $9.40 to $1387.10 (comex closing time).  Silver fell by 3 cents to $22.64  (comex closing time)

In the access market at 7 pm gold and silver are the following :

gold: $1384.60.
silver: $22.58

The bankers showed up early ready to attack gold and silver but the demand for the physical stuff stopped them cold today.  For a change gold and silver equity shares rose.



At the Comex, the open interest in silver rose by 1745 contracts to 146,411 contracts despite silver's fall on Wednesday.  The silver OI is  holding firm at elevated levels . The open interest on the gold contract  rose  by 1445 contracts to 445,251 . With gold's big fall in price on Wednesday, one would have thought that the OI would have contracted big time.  The gold deliveries for May rose considerably today  to  9.365 tonnes and this is an off month for gold.  In silver we continue to see the total number of ounces standing rise above the quantity that stood on first day notice. The number of silver ounces, standing for delivery in May fell a tiny 180,000 oz now stands at 17.180 million oz. ( On first day notice:  14.860 million oz.)


Again, at the Comex,  gold is departing as investors are frightened to death of a confiscation similar to what happened at MFGlobal or Refco. Tonight, the Comex registered or dealer gold plummeted to 1.668 million oz or 51.88 tonnes.  The total of all gold at the comex fell slightly but still well below the 8 million oz at 7.966 million oz or 247.77 tonnes of gold.

The GLD  reported a huge loss in gold inventory of 5.71 tonnes which followed yesterday's loss of 4.52 tonnes of gold. The SLV inventory of silver also lowered by 1.545 million oz. 

In other physical news, we are witnessing continual increase in premiums for physical bars as the physical price deviates from the paper gold price.

From Asia, we have important stories on Japan.

In Europe, we have good stuff on Spain and France.

In the USA, we had another 4 big misses:

i) the Philly mfg index
ii) jobless number increase
iii) housing starts plunge
iv) a surprise fall in the CPI


We will go over these and other stories but first.....................

Let us now head over to the comex and assess trading over there today:


The total gold comex open interest rose by only 1445 contracts  from 443,806 up to 445,251 with gold falling by $28.10 on Wednesday. One would have thought that the OI would have contracted big time, but lo and behold it rose which means that new players entered the arena with a lower gold price.    The front non active delivery month of May saw its OI rise by 243 contracts  up to 1147.  However we had 7 delivery notice filed on Wednesday.  Thus we  gained 250 contracts or 25,000 additional gold ounces will stand for delivery in May.   The next active contract month is June and here the OI fell by 2,524 contracts to 197,953 as most of these paper players rolled into August. June is the second biggest delivery month in gold's calender and first day notice is 2 weeks away.  The estimated volume today was good at 247,723 contracts.    The confirmed volume yesterday was also good at 255,508 contracts.



The total silver Comex OI surprisingly rise big time  by 1745  contracts from 144,666 all the way up to 146,411  with  silver's fall in price of 37 cents yesterday.  The front active silver delivery month of May saw it's OI fall by 57 contracts down to 529.  We had 21 delivery notices filed yesterday so we lost 36 contracts or  180,000  oz will not  stand for delivery in May.  The next  delivery month for silver is June and here the OI fell by 7 contracts to stand at 31. The next big active contract month is July and here the OI surprisingly rose  by 1881 contracts to rest tonight at 80,612.   The estimated volume today was good, coming in at 43,679 contracts.  The confirmed volume on Wednesday was huge at  67,000.

Comex gold/May contract month:

May 16/2013

Gold	Ounces
Withdrawals from Dealers Inventory in oz	10,656.61 (Scotia)
Withdrawals from Customer Inventory in oz	64.3 (Scotia)
Deposits to the Dealer Inventory in oz	2199.94  (Brinks)
Deposits to the Customer Inventory, in oz	225.05 (Brinks)
No of oz served (contracts) today	88 (8800  oz)
No of oz to be served (notices)	1059 (105,900)
Total monthly oz gold served (contracts) so far this month	1952  (195,200)
Total accumulative withdrawal of gold from the Dealers inventory this month	10,656.61
Total accumulative withdrawal of gold from the Customer inventory this month	538,306.48 oz

We had tiny activity at the gold vaults.

The dealer had 1 deposits and 1  dealer withdrawals.


1. Into dealer Brinks:  2199.94 oz
 total dealer deposit:  2199.94 oz

Out of dealer Scotia:  10,656.61 oz

total dealer withdrawal:  10,656.61 oz

We had 1 customer deposit today:

i) Into Brinks vault:  225.05 oz







total customer deposit: 225.05  oz

We had 1 customer withdrawals today:


i Out of Scotia:  64.30 oz

We had 0   adjustments 

  The JPMorgan customer vault remains at 297,426.75  oz today or 9.25 tonnes
as there were no transactions

Tonight the dealer inventory dramatically falls tonight at a low of 1.668 million oz (51.88) tonnes of gold. The total of all gold falls slightly  at the comex resting tonight at 7.966 million oz or 247.77 tonnes.

The CME reported that we had 88 notices filed today for 8800  oz of gold.
To calculate the quantity of gold ounces that will stand, I take the OI standing for May  (1147) and subtract out today's notices (88) which leaves us with 1059 notices or 105,900 oz left to be served upon our longs. 

Thus  we have the following gold ounces standing for metal in May:

1952 contracts x 100 oz per contract  or  195,200 oz (served)  +  1059 notices or 105,900 oz (to be served upon)  =  301,100  oz or 9.365 tonnes of gold.

This is extremely high for a non active month.  We  gained 25,000 additional gold ounces standing for the  May comex gold contract today.

A reader at Lemetropole asked me if we have ever seen anything like this huge number of gold ounces standing in a non active gold month. The answer is simply that it has never happened before.  Traditionally approximately 1 to 2 tonnes at best stand and most of the delivery notices are filed in the first few days.
In May we are witnessing a huge increase in OI (and also an increase in total gold deliveries) as the month of May deliveries progressed.  It is conceivable that the amount standing in this non active month will exceed what usually stands in an active month:

10 to 15 tonnes of gold.



The big June delivery month will surely be exciting to watch judging by the huge demand for gold in May. We will watch what happens with JPMorgan with respect to its customer gold remains (now at 9.25 tonnes of gold) and the entire comex dealer gold close its nadir at 1.676 million oz.(52.13 tonnes)

end

GLD  ETF loses ten tons of physical since Monday....

May 16.2013: (as of 6 pm est)

Tonnes1,041.42

Ounces33,482,727.36

Value US$46.226   billlion

May 15.2013:

Tonnes1,047.13

Ounces33,666,434.30

Value US$47.457  billion

may 14.2013:

Tonnes1,051.65

Ounces33,811,468.47

Value US$48.465  billion

Silver:

May 16.2013:  May silver: 

Silver	Ounces
Withdrawals from Dealers Inventory	nil
Withdrawals from Customer Inventory	638,463.100 oz (Delaware,Scotia)
Deposits to the Dealer Inventory	nil
Deposits to the Customer Inventory	nil
No of oz served (contracts)	27 (135,000)
No of oz to be served (notices)	502  (2,510,000 oz)
Total monthly oz silver served (contracts)	2934  (14,670,000 oz)
Total accumulative withdrawal of silver from the Dealers inventory this month	204,097.65
Total accumulative withdrawal of silver from the Customer inventory this month	2,083,382.3

Today, we  had tiny activity  inside the silver vaults.

 we had 0 dealer deposits and 0  dealer withdrawals.



We had 0 customer deposits:


total customer deposit;   nil  oz


We had 2 customer withdrawals:

i) Out of Scotia:  636,447.70 oz
ii) Out of Delaware:  2015.40 oz




total customer withdrawals: 638,463.100 oz 
  

we had 0   adjustments  today

Registered silver  at :  43.902 million oz

total of all silver:  164.876 million oz.

The CME reported that we had 27 notices filed for 135,000 oz.  To calculate the number of ounces that will stand in silver, I take the OI standing for May (529) and subtract out today's notices (27) which leaves us with 502 notices or 2,510,000 oz 
  
Thus the total number of silver ounces standing in this  active delivery month of May is as follows:

2934 contracts x 5000 oz per contract (served) = 14,670,000 +  502 contracts x 5000 oz =  2,510,000 oz ( to be served)  =  17,186,000 oz.

we lost  180,000 oz of silver standing for May today. The total standing for silver is still superb for May.

Selected news and views....

Ted Butler is angry and rightfully so




(courtesy Ted Butler)

The Worst Regulator Possible

Theodore Butler

  |

May 9, 2013 - 11:24am

   

Sticking with the theme of milestones, we’ve just crossed a few important anniversary dates that relate to silver that taken in proper perspective point to a disturbing conclusion. That conclusion is that the US commodities regulator, the CFTC, has done more public harm than good over the past few years. Simply put, the public and our markets would have been better off had the agency not been run by the commissioners in place, specifically including Chairman Gensler and Commissioner Chilton. In fact, rarely has so much promise for genuine regulatory reform been squandered as badly as has been the case over the past few years.

Four years ago tomorrow, Gary Gensler was sworn in as chairman of the CFTC, following the financial crisis that brought the system to the brink. He hit the road running and immediately began to speak publicly in terms of position limits and concentration that paralleled exactly what I had been espousing for more than 20 years. Gensler followed up his public speeches with a series of unprecedented public meetings designed to garner industry consensus for how to prevent concentration and manipulation and how to institute legitimate speculative position limits in those commodities where they did not exist, such as silver.

To say I was awestruck would be an understatement and I began referring to him as the greatest chairman in CFTC history, much to the dismay of many. The issue of position limits and of prohibiting the big banks from speculating in the markets (the Volker Rule) reached a culmination in the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, the commodities areas of which Gensler spearheaded through Congress. Finally, position limits were a part of commodity law all set out on a rigid timeline. Then it all fell apart. Years after the passage of Dodd-Frank, we are further away from instituting legitimate position limits than ever before. Whereas Gensler deserved great credit for including position limits as a matter of law, with much support from Commissioner Chilton, they must both share the blame for the matter blowing up in their faces. What went wrong? In simple terms, both lacked the courage necessary to deal in specifics when required.

Bart Chilton goes back longer than Gensler, having become a commissioner in mid-2007. Perhaps Chilton’s greatest strength was his willingness to correspond with members of the public who contacted him. I started writing to him in 2007 after his public speech in which he likened the agency to a tough “cop on the beat.” I assumed he was unaware of the allegations of concentration and manipulation in COMEX silver on the short side, the very same issues that have remained to this day. (This was before JPMorgan became the big silver short crook when the bank acquired Bear Stearns in 2008).http://www.investmentrarities.com/ted_butler_comentary/11-13-07.html I stayed in communication with Chilton until the second CFTC public letter of May 2008 (another unfortunate anniversary) which denied any manipulation in silver but that omitted any mention that the biggest COMEX silver short, Bear Stearns, went bankrupt before the report was published. For the past few years, I have sent to Chilton and to all the other commissioners copies of my articles, as I do with JPMorgan and the CME Group.

Despite Commissioner Chilton’s and the agency’s insistence that all was well in silver in accordance with the May 2008 second public letter, the price of silver fell more than 50% that year after JPMorgan added to the Bear Stearns short position it inherited. The release of the August 2008 Bank Participation Report resulted in a third silver investigation initiated by the Commission, one that exists to this day.

Another unfortunate anniversary was that of the manipulative price smash of two years ago, in which silver fell an unprecedented $6 on the Sunday evening of May 1, 2011 and $15 (30%) for the week. There would be another 30%+ price smash that September. Although such price declines were unprecedented, neither Chairman Gensler nor Commissioner Chilton would publicly comment on them.

I know that silver was never the prime focus of the agency’s push for financial reform, but I also knew that no market was more in need of position limits than COMEX silver. And the public provided Gensler and Chilton with more official comments and private e-mails about manipulation in silver and the need for position limits than for all other commodities combined. Sadly, Gensler and Chilton largely ignored the public or gave lip service to the many thousands of public requests.

Chilton seemed to come to his senses in late 2010 when he began to publicly reference the obvious concentration on the short side of COMEX silver and his comments appeared to result in a civil class action lawsuit being filed against JPMorgan. But then Chilton began to distance himself from his previous comments about concentration in COMEX silver and just as quickly, the lawsuit floundered.

I single out Gensler and Chilton because they were once the good guys on the Commission or the only ones pushing for position limits. Since they have allowed position limits, the silver investigation and the unprecedented price declines in silver to fade into the sunset unresolved, they must be held to the greatest standards of failure. In a very real sense, Gensler and Chilton have done more harm as a result of first championing the important issues and then abandoning them.

In fact, this whole Dodd-Frank experience looks like a colossal failure because neither was strong enough to speak out publicly about how the large banks and JPMorgan in particular had corrupted the process. By them cow tailing to JPM we are actually worse off today than if Dodd-Frank had never come up. As I said, I think it’s a matter of Gensler and Chilton not being courageous enough. Where each could have used the bully pulpit to hammer the issues home, they squandered precious public TV time (Chilton in particular) talking about a variety of issues away from position limits and concentration and manipulation. The only plausible explanation is that someone got to them on silver and persuaded them not to intercede in the ongoing manipulation.

I wrote all of the above yesterday in preparation for today’s article, but the disturbing news out of Cleveland and the rescue of the decade-long kidnapping and rape of three young women is the prime influence for what follows. It’s hard to believe that human beings can be so cruel to other people and I found the news reports shocking. Most disturbing is the appearance that the local police had prior opportunities to discover and save the young women, but failed to do so. I’ve been tossing and turning all night contemplating that potential failure and comparing it to the CFTC’s failure to end the ongoing silver manipulation.

Yes, I know that the physical imprisonment and torture of human beings is different than the financial rape and torture experienced by silver investors due to the actions of JPMorgan and the CME Group and the complicity of the CFTC. That said, on many other levels what has occurred in silver is actually worse. Please hear me out.

It appears that the police in Cleveland only had a few opportunities to discover and rescue the women and while it is alarming that they may not have properly utilized those opportunities, it’s actually much worse in silver. I have petitioned the CFTC for more than 27 years about the silver manipulation in every way imaginable. For more than 4 years, I have sent to all the commissioners, the CEO of JPMorgan (Jamie Dimon) and the top regulatory officials at the CME Group (including Terry Duffy since the previous CEO was sacked), copies of all my articles in which I refer to JPM and the CME as crooks and criminal enterprises. Since I write two articles a week, the total amount of articles sent numbers in the many hundreds.

I’m very careful to include Gensler and the other commissioners and Dimon and Duffy on the same email sent so that they all know who else got the articles. I don’t know if they read my articles (Chilton “boasted” a while back that he doesn’t read my stuff), but I have never had an email returned as undeliverable. These are all intelligent and powerful officials and they all know how unprecedented it is to have two of the most powerful financial institutions in the world being openly and continuously accused of criminal activity by an ordinary citizen. I’m not trying to pat myself on the back, but one thinks twice before calling JPMorgan and the CME crooks and signing your real name. I would only do so if the facts warranted it. The police in Cleveland had maybe a few chances to crack the case; the CFTC has had many hundreds of chances to crack the silver manipulation and has not done so. That makes the CFTC look much worse than the Cleveland police.

Supposedly, the police went to the house where the women were imprisoned but left when no one answered the door. Certainly, there was no formal investigation ever initiated against the perpetrators. Contrast that to the CFTC’s actions. In the last 9 years alone, the agency has conducted three formal reviews into whether silver was manipulated by the big shorts. In the first two, the agency concluded no manipulation existed. Yet the idea that a silver manipulation exists is more widely embraced than ever. The current open formal investigation by the Enforcement Division is now more than 4.5 years old, making it perhaps the longest investigation in US Government history. Although I was directly responsible for all these reviews being initiated, I have never heard from the agency. This is some great way of conducting an investigation, never seeking input from the person who prompted the investigation in the first place. Not even the local police would think of such behavior.

The important point is that the issues that I raised that prompted the silver investigations must have been substantive enough to warrant the continuous reviews; otherwise a federal agency would just be squandering limited and valuable resources in their pursuit. It’s hard to reach any other conclusion than the CFTC felt it must investigate silver given the facts in their own data but had predetermined that the outcome would find nothing beforehand. When it comes to silver, the agency has no intention of judging the matter objectively.

This jibes with the behavior of the agency regarding the truly unprecedented two silver 30% price smashes of 2011 and the recent 20% smash of mid-April. It is inconceivable that the CFTC would sit by and say nothing if any other regulated futures market fell as much as silver did (twice) in 2011 and a few weeks ago. The same goes for the CME which is the designated self-regulatory organization for COMEX silver. The inescapable conclusion is that the CFTC and CME know full well that silver is manipulated in price by JPMorgan and none of them has any intention of doing anything about it. Everyone in Cleveland wanted the women rescued, including the police. Because of this, it’s hard to reach any conclusion other than the CFTC, CME and JPMorgan are corrupt beyond measure. This has nothing to do with the CFTC’s competence; this strictly concerns the agency’s intent to enforce the law which doesn’t exist when it comes to silver.

Just so there is no misunderstanding about the issues involved; it’s really quite simple when viewing the official data. JPMorgan holds such a large concentrated short position in COMEX silver that it is automatically manipulative to the price. Even after a reduction in this concentrated short position of nearly 50% over the past few months, JPMorgan is short 126% of the entire total commercial net short position in COMEX silver futures. In other words, without JPMorgan’s net short position of 18,000 contracts (90 million oz), there would be no commercial net short position in COMEX silver (all data as of COT of April 30). It was precisely JPMorgan’s concentrated short position that caused the CFTC to start the formal silver investigation in September 2008 and it is still JPM’s concentrated short position that backs my allegations to this day.

Throw in the daily HFT trading scam and it’s easy to see that the price of silver is not taking its cue from real supply and demand. Rather it is the crooked COMEX dictating prices to the real world. Of all the regulators around, the CFTC knows this better than anyone, yet they refuse to do anything about it. This is what makes the agency the worst regulator possible.

What is it that the CFTC should be doing? For starters, they should be resolving the matter once and for all. No federal agency should announce, with great fanfare, a formal enforcement investigation, complete with periodic updates saying the investigation continues, with no resolution. That undermines public confidence in and of itself. Worse, the price action in silver (to this day) has been so extreme and unprecedented and suggestive of manipulation while the supposed investigation has taken place that the agency’s continued silence also undermines public confidence. And someone please tell Bart Chilton to stop saying in private emails that the agency is looking into it when it is clear that is the last thing they are doing.

It is time for the CFTC to come clean about silver and stop pretending it is investigating. It will be better for everyone (except holders of long COMEX contracts) for the CFTC to simply shut down this crooked exchange instead of letting the manipulation continue. At one time I did think the exchange could be reformed, but I no longer feel that is possible. The corruption goes too deep. It’s bad enough that an important American financial institution is corrupt beyond repair, but it is more a loss that the COMEX has dragged the CFTC down with it.

In my latest article, I referred to the commissioners and other high officials of the agency as traitors to the American people. I still feel that way. Not only are none of them fit to hold their current positions, they should never hold any other public office again. Not even with the Cleveland police. I do plan on upping the pressure on these people. Some readers asked me to include the appropriate e-mail addresses.

Ted Butler

May 8, 2013

The following is a gem




(courtesy Gene Arensberg)

So Much for Position Limits on COMEX Gold

HOUSTON -- We are using this space to put something in the public domain out of convenience more than anything.

Where were the regulators on gold futures position limits April 12 and April 16? 

Flash back to Friday, April 12, when the paper gold futures market was slammed with an enormous sell order in the early going of New York trading, following a “tenderizing” of the market right at the New York open. 

We have read and heard various descriptions of the initial sell order being as little as 124 tonnes and as much as 400 tonnes of gold equivalent – sold by a single source or by a group all at once – with the express intent to break the gold market. 

Friday, April 12 5-minute tick chart courtesy of Ross Norman, Sharps-Pixley, UK. 

We want to voice a concern of ours which we thought of that very day and have thought about off and on since then, but have yet to act on it.  (Other than to share it with several colleagues.)

Our simple question:  Where are the regulators (in this case the CFTC and CME Group) with regard to size and accountability limits?

First, though, a caveat:  We do not have the actual trade data which would include the actual orders and the sellers of those orders. Without that, this is pure speculation and subject to receiving that actual data. (More...)

That said, what we do know is that the volume spiked to an unprecedented level April 12 and Monday, April 15 and that initial sale triggered an avalanche of trading and trailing stops.  The net effect was that the initial order was indeed large enough and sold into the market fast enough that it literally overwhelmed the gold futures market.  Whoever it was used a bazooka at a knife fight. The selling panic that ensued will be talked about for generations.

Whether the initial sale into the gold market was 124 tonnes or 400 tonnes is not really material to our question.  Either size would be so much higher than any one trader should have been able to sell into the gold market at one time that it begs the question:  How many traders would have had to be involved in order to “legally” sell that many gold futures contracts into the market? 

Let’s assume for this discussion that the initial sale was 124 tonnes. That’s about 4 million ounces or the equivalent of 40,000 COMEX contracts. 

From earlier work we know that the CME Group has position limits for gold futures of 3,000 contracts in the front month and 6,000 contracts in all months.   

We know from the open interest that the initial sale on April 12 was concentrated in the front month, so no one trader should have been able to sell more than 3,000 contracts at one time, and that’s assuming that trader had a zero open position when the sale occurred. The 3,000 number is supposed to be the limit of all contracts and options, both long and short at any time, even intra-day. 

Assuming all the traders involved had no open contracts before opening four million ounces worth, how many traders would have had to be involved?  Simple math says (40,000 contracts / 3,000 lots limit) = 13.3 traders.  Call it 14 traders. 

So, in order for the initial 124 tonne sale to have occurred “legally” it would have had to have been 14 traders, all with zero orders open, all acting simultaneously, all acting independently, in their own self-interest, without colluding with each other to “sell-for-effect” or conspiring to foment a price smash. 

In actuality, the chances that there were 14 traders who held zero open orders all acting independently, all throwing their full allowable 3,000 contracts into the gold market within a few minutes of each other are infinitesimally small.

Much more likely is that the initial sale which triggered the sell stop putsch in gold was done by a single trader, acting so far outside the position limit regime as to be brazen about it.

How about a few facts:

At the time of the large sale on April 12, the gold price was breaking through $1,520.

4 million ounces at $1,520 is roughly $6 billion in notional value. 

40,000 contracts would have required about (40,000 X $5,940) = $237.6 million in initial performance bond requirements, if the traders were Spec members.  (CME Group subsequently raised Spec initial margin to $7,040 for the close on April 16.)  If the big seller was a commercial hedge member, then it would have required (40,000 X $5,400) = $216 million in initial bond requirement.  (CME Group subsequently raised Hedger initial margin to $6,400 for the close on April 16.)

At the time of the large sale the COMEX open interest was a little over 416,000 contracts.  So the initial sale was about 10% of the entire open interest of the COMEX.  There was little change in the number of contracts open as of Tuesday, April 16, by the way (413,083). 

A few questions:

Who was the large trader who decided to hammer the gold market with 40,000 contracts all at once? 

How did that trader manage to do so without running afoul of the CME Group position limits or the CFTC regulators? 

Was the initial trade by one, two or many traders?   If by one or two, then there is no way in hell the trade was “legal” under the position limits.

If by many traders all acting at once, then how is that possible without their conspiring in advance to do so? (We are talking about the initial smash trade here, not the ensuing stops triggered.)

We invite well-informed commentary on this subject and would be grateful to any N.Y. traders who know the facts to comment either here on the blog or privately. 

We suppose it is possible that the initial sale was actually much smaller than 124 tonnes, but that it triggered a series of sell stops that collectively amounted to that much, but we are doubtful that the sale which triggered this sell down was “legit” when we look at the facts. 

Our sense is that no one would sell that many gold contracts so fast unless it was with the express intent to drive the market lower and by doing so, trigger sell stops of many other traders - which is, of course, trading for effect, which is patently illegal. (And yes, we know it happens all the time, but there you go.)

Our sense is that we won’t be bothered with any commentary or enforcement action by the CME Group or the CFTC on this issue.  The history of the paper gold and silver futures markets suggests that rules and position limits are just so much sausage – to be ground up by a few elite traders from time to time. 

Not that we are complaining, mind you.  We are merely trying to understand if there really are position limits and whether they should have come into play on April 12, 2013. 

Edit to add:  A trader buddy, responding to our inquiry reminds:  “The hedge members can use their bona fide hedger exemptions to sell more than the limit, but not without filing paperwork with the exchange.”    

If true, and we do believe it is true, then whoever blew out the gold market on April 12 is already known to the CFTC (and what documentation they used to back up their trade).   But don't hold your breath waiting to hear about if from the CFTC under Goldman Sachs-ex Gary Gensler.  

Mr. Gensler is a Goldman sausage grinder from way back...  

Gene Arensberg for Got Gold Report


end

from Jim sinclair:

Major figures to ponder over:

While physical demand is on a 1:1 basis, the paper supply is easily 100:1. Let’s skip the cartoon shows called MSNBC, CNBC and their ilk and consider:

- London continues to deliver physical bullion at a blistering pace.
- Shanghai appears to be ‘out’ of bullion.
- GLD has dropped 300 tons YTD.
- COMEX vaults are down 100 tons YTD.
- JPM keeps juggling their ‘eligible’ and ‘registered’ inventory to keep from running out.
- China imported 220 tons in March alone.
- Indian demand is UP, but only 10% of bullion orders are being filled.