Saturday, April 27, 2013

France jobless rate hits new high , 3.2 million out of work in March surpassed former all - time record from 1997 ! Ambrose Evans - Pritchard opines Spain can end its " crucifixation " by leaving the EMU ! Luxembourg set to become next Cyprus - Luxembourg's bank assets represent 2500 % of GDP ( Cyprus was 800 percent of GDP ) , the financial sector in Luxembourg represent 38 percent of GDP in 2010 and the ratio of banks to people is one bank to 3,808 ! Germany seeks to grind down another country and tax evasion and secrecy seems the ticket for Germany to put the boot on the neck of Luxembourg - consolidation of the financial sector seem inevitable , question is what might the speed be .....

http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite2_1_26/04/2013_496257



Bonds maturing in May to create funding gap


 The most likely scenario is for the disbursement of the tranches of 2.8 billion and 4.2 billion euros (the latter being the eurozone’s share in the first-quarter installment) to be approved by the May 13 Eurogroup meeting.





















By Sotiris Nikas

The Greek streamlining program is facing the threat of a funding gap and the Finance Ministry is examining the option of an extraordinary issue of treasury bills to cover part of the Greek bonds which are set to expire next month.

May 20 is the maturity date of bonds totaling 5.6 billion euros. While 4 billion euros of that amount is in the portfolio of the European Central Bank, the rest (1.6 billion euros) is in the portfolios of the national central banks of the eurozone. The latter bought the Greek bonds before the outbreak of the crisis and, according to a Eurogroup decision last December, they were to examine the possibility of postponing the maturity date of those holdings, known as ANFA.

Nevertheless, sources say that none of the eurozone’s national central banks has opted to do so, meaning that Greece will have to pay out next month, despite the existence of a provision in the country’s funding program that this amount would not be paid. This generates a funding gap that will have to be covered in some way so as not to create fresh problems with the Greek debt figures.

Ministry officials say that the government and the country’s international creditors have approved the issue of an extraordinary set of T-bills up to May 14. The reason for this is because the executive council of the International Monetary Fund is expected to convene after May 20 to approve the disbursement of its next bailout tranche to Greece, amounting to 1.8 billion euros.

No decision has been made yet, but the solution of an extra T-bill issue is gaining ground as the clock keeps ticking. Strengthening the likelihood is the fact that that is exactly what happened last year in a similar situation.

Alternatively, any such hole could be plugged by a front-heavy disbursement of bailout installments by the eurozone. For this reason, the Greek side is pushing for the approval of the second quarter’s 3.2-billion-euro tranche by eurozone finance ministers at the May 13 Eurogroup meeting – before the creditors’ representatives complete their inspection on the course of the bailout agreement’s implementation. That cannot be ruled out but it is not very likely.

Equally unlikely – though not impossible – is the disbursement of the 2.8-billion-euro March installment this Monday, when the Euro Working Group of eurozone finance ministry officials convenes. If the Greek Finance Ministry’s multi-bill is passed by tomorrow night, the EWG might give the green light for the immediate release of the 2.8 billion euros. However, ministry officials say that the most likely scenario is for the disbursement of the tranches of 2.8 billion and 4.2 billion euros (the latter being the eurozone’s share in the first-quarter installment) to be approved by the May 13 Eurogroup meeting.

Besides the ANFA issue, the ministry is also concerned about the delays in the privatizations program. The revenues from sell-offs could be used for the servicing of the country’s debt, but on a cash basis they are also used for the coverage of day-to-day needs.

According to the state budget, in the period from January to May 2013, the state coffers should have earned 272 million euros from privatizations. Instead their revenues from this source were less than 50 million euros in the year’s first four months.


http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2013-04-28/it-gets-its-latest-european-lifeline-life-greece-about-get-even-harder



As It Gets Its Latest European Lifeline, Life In Greece Is About To Get Even Harder

Tyler Durden's picture




A few hours ago, Greek lawmakers approved a reform law to unlock about €8.8 billion of rescue loans from the European Union and the International Monetary Fund. The law, which was a condition for further aid installments, passed easily with the solid backing of the three parties comprising Greece's ruling coalition, by 168 to 123 votes. Next, euro zone officials will meet on Monday to approve overdue payment of 2.8 billion euros ($3.65 billion) in rescue loans, finance minister Yannis Stournaras said. Euro zone finmins will then meet on May 13 to release a further 6 billion euro installment, he added. The use of proceeds? To have enough cash to pay salaries and pensions, and of course to pay Mario Draghi for a bond that matures on May 20. The fact that Europe has gotten the green sign to hand over some pocket change to Greece, so Greece can pay for the maturity on Greek bonds by the ECB was the good news (for someone, unclear exactly who). The bad news, for Greece, starts now.
As BBC reports, some 15,000 state workers will lose their jobs by the end of next year. Naturally, in light of the recent epic backlash against austerity (or fauxterity as penned previously) whose corpse has already promptly been trampled in Spain, and now in Italy, Greece would like to get back on the gravy train as well. Yet they are being denied, and the result is indignation at what the people rightfully see as B-class European citizen treatment.
As MPs debated the measures inside parliament, several hundred demonstrators outside took part in a protest called by Adedy, the civil service trade confederation, and the private sector GSEE union.

They were demonstrating against what the unions called "those politicians who are dismantling the public service and destroying the welfare state".

Critics say the law, which is part of a larger package of measures, will only add to Greece's record unemployment rate of 27%.

They say many of those who will lose their jobs are older workers already struggling to support their families and make ends meet.
It's only downhill from there too. As Kathimerini adds the tax burden for all Greeks is about to go through the roof. Literally:
Besides regular income taxes and numerous other obligations being faced by Greek taxpayers, the taxation of real estate property has become the focus of attention after the ministry’s decision to demand the payment of the 2011 and 2012 property tax (FAP) in seven monthly installments this year.

Taxing property is seen as the only safe and efficient way to boost revenues, given that indirect taxation is bringing ever-smaller amounts of money into state coffers due to the drop in consumption. In this context, the fiscal adjustment as far as revenues are concerned this year will rely on taxing property.

The measures of the multi-bill are projected to generate an additional 5.9 billion euros in state revenues for the period from 2013 to 2017. The state stands to gain in excess of 6 billion euros from the measures with the addition of a planned increase in teachers’ working hours that is expected to save 103 million euros from the budget spending of 2013 and 2014.

The settlement of debts to tax authorities is expected to fetch 2.73 billion euros in these five years; the application of the extraordinary special property levy, to be paid again this year through electricity bills, will bring in an estimated 1.9 billion euros; the settlement of debts to the social security funds will result in the collection of 795 million euros in the period from 2013 to 2016 according to labor industry estimates; and the extraordinary levy on photovoltaic systems will add 490 million euros this and next year to state revenues.

The property tax to be paid again via power bills will be broken down in five installments, with the last due in February 2014. Its rate will be 15 percent lower than in the two previous years, as the number of properties to be taxed has grown considerably with the inclusion of properties rented to the state, 17 percent of the surface of camping enterprises and even unfinished buildings that are connected to the power grid.
What this means, logically, is that tax revenues in Greece are about to go inversely parabolic as even more resentment builds against austerity, as increasingly less people pay any taxes, and as more workers migrate to the shadow "cash-based" economy, where no taxes are paid at all.
In fact, that is already starting. As the Greek Finance Ministry reported earlier today, after reporting better than expected tax revenues in January and February (+1.8% and +7.8% above target, respectively), March tax revenues plunged, missing the Troika target by a massive 9.3%. Prepare the negative misses to get worse and worse.
Of course, where things get really funny is that as the Finance Minister (not the one with the Swiss bank account, the current one) reported, should the Greek recession prove to be worse than forecast, no new austerity measures would be imposed.
And just like that, Greek GDP craters by 100% in 5....4...3....









and......








http://finance.yahoo.com/news/bank-cyprus-converts-portion-uninsured-182341121.html

( For uninsured deposits , 90 percent either converted to equity / held for future conversion / presently frozen and not presently unavailable - and Cypriots still want to stay in the Eurozone ? Are they getting what they deserve if they want to stay in the Euro , after all that has occurred ?  ) 


Bank of Cyprus converts portion of uninsured savings to equity

NICOSIA (Reuters) - Cypriot lender Bank of Cyprus said on Sunday it had carried out a conversion of uninsured cash deposits in the bank into equity, one of the conditions of international lenders to offer the cash-starved island financial aid.
The process, known as a 'bail-in', made depositors in the bank pay for its recapitalization, after the institution was hit by massive losses from its exposure to debt-crippled Greece.
Bank of Cyprus, the island's largest bank, said it had converted 37.5 percent of deposits exceeding 100,000 euros into "class A" shares, with an additional 22.5 percent held as a buffer for possible conversion in the future.
Another 30 percent would be temporarily frozen and held as deposits, the bank said.
A spokesman for the bank said he was not authorized to say what the percentage corresponded to in cash terms. The precise recapitalization needs of the bank will be concluded at the end of June.
The bail-in, including the dissolution of Cyprus's second-biggest lender Popular Bank, is part of attempts by Cyprus to find 13 billion euros to shore up its economy.
The European Union and the International Monetary Fund are providing a further 10 billion to the island, one of the euro zone's smallest economies.
Cyprus's parliament was due to vote on the bailout on April 30. The EU and the IMF were expected to disburse a first tranche of aid to the island in May.



http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2013-04-28/one-month-later-what-cyprus-thinks-aftermath-its-bank-sector-collapse




One Month Later: What Cyprus Thinks In The Aftermath Of Its Bank Sector Collapse?

Tyler Durden's picture




Curious what the Cypriot people think just over a month after the most dramatic European banking sector collapse in years, and subsequent first bank sector bail-in and depositor impairment ever? Courtesy of Bloomberg, which summarizes a poll conducted via Symmetron and posted in Kathimerini Cyprus we now have an idea of what the still stunned Cypriot population thinks.
The Cyprus financial crisis is fault of country’s political, economic and social systems, not foreign institutions such as troika, according to 84% of Cypriots in poll by Symmetron published today in Kathimerini Cyprus. Poll also showed:
  • Of 800 people questioned, 68% said bankers were most responsible for crisis, 63% said politicians next most to blame, 48% said central bank
  • 79% said previous President Demetris Christofias and his govt is more to blame vs 13% for current administration led by President Nicos Anastasiades
  • 54% said it was mistake for parliament to vote against 1st loan deal
  • 68% said they don’t have enough money to meet direct needs, pay financial obligations
  • 70% said personal economic situation to worsen over next 12 months
  • 92% no longer trust central bank
  • 66% said current govt actions to confront crisis not enough
  • 64% against exit from euro area
  • 73% said faithful implementation of loan agreement won’t lead country out of crisis
  • Symmetron conducted poll April 22-26; margin of error +/-3.5 percentage points




and.....




http://www.zerohedge.com/contributed/2013-04-27/few-bungas-more



A FeW BuNGaS MoRe



williambanzai7's picture





"[If] you miss you had better miss very well. Whoever double-crosses me and leaves me alive, he understands nothing about Tuco. Nothing!"
THE GOOD, THE BUNGA AND THE UGLY













http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2013-04-28/germanys-perspective-how-europes-crisis-countries-hide-their-wealth



Germany's Perspective: "How Europe's Crisis Countries Hide their Wealth"



Tyler Durden's picture





Much has been said about the relative disparity of wealth between Germany and the rest of Europe, with the conventional wisdom being that Germans are rich and everyone else poor. This assumption has been challenged to the core recently, with some studies even suggesting that median household wealth in places like Cyprus is far, far greater than that of Germany, contrary to previous assumptions. In turn, this helps to explain the lack of "eagerness" of the Germans to constantly "assist" with the bailouts of peripheral countries by directly funding or assuming debt guarantees, or otherwise be loaded with the primary burden of future inflation if and when the ECB's creeping monetization of European debt, both directly and indirectly via PIIG bank collateral, unleashes the Weimar flashback tsunami. In this context, it is easy why it was the Germans who were intent on demolishing not only Russian billionaire savings (which as the Spiegel article below demonstrates, Germans are convinced are largely ill-gotten and hidden), but also why the punishment should stretch to uninsured depositors.
After reading the Spiegel article below, which reveals so much about German thinking, it becomes very clear that not only is Cyprus the "benchmark", but that the second some other PIIG country runs into trouble again, and its soaring non-performing loans inevitably demand a liability resolution a la Cyprus, it will be Germany once again at the helm, demanding more of the same. As the following punchline from Spiegel summarizes, "It would be more sensible -- and fairer -- for the crisis-ridden countries to exercise their own power to reduce their debts, namely by reaching for the assets of their citizens more than they have so far. As the most recent ECB study shows, there is certainly enough money available to do this." And that is the crux of the wealth-disparity demand of the EuropeanDisunion.
The Poverty Lie: How Europe's Crisis Countries Hide their Wealth
How fair is the effort to save the euro if the people living in the countries that receive aid are wealthier than the citizens of donor countries like Germany? A debate over a redistribution of the burdens is long overdue.
The images we see from the capitals of Europe's crisis-ridden countries are confusing to say the least. In the Cypriot capital Nicosia, for example, thousands protested against the levy on bank deposits, carrying images of Hitler and anti-Merkel signs, one of which read: "Merkel, your Nazi money is bloodier than any laundered money."
German Chancellor Angela Merkel was greeted by a similar scene when she visited Athens in October 2012. An older man with a carefully trimmed moustache and pressed trousers stood in Syntagma Square. The words on the sign he was carrying sharply contrasted with his amiable appearance: "Get out of our country, bitch."
Despite these abuses, the protesters and all of Merkel's other critics in Rome, Madrid, Nicosia and Athens agree on one thing: Germany should pay for the euro bailout, as much as possible and certainly more than it has paid so far.
They argue that Germany is a rich country that has benefited more than all others from the introduction of the euro, and that it has flooded other European countries with its exports, becoming more prosperous at their expense.
Germans Own Less than Those Asking for Money
But there is also a second image of Germany, one that's based on numbers, not emotions. The figures were obtained by the European Central Bank (ECB) and released last week. This image depicts a country whose households own less on average than those that are asking for its money.
In this ranking of assets, Cyprus is in second place Europe-wide, while Germany ranks much lower, even lower than two other crisis-ridden countries, Spain and Italy.
And this Cyprus, with its affluent households, is now supposed to receive €10 billion ($13.1 billion) from the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), the Euro Group's permanent bailout fund, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), at least according to the decisions reached after dramatic negotiations, which the German parliament, the Bundestag, is expected to approve this week. But a new question is arising: Why exactly are we doing this? Isn't Cyprus rich enough to help itself?
In light of the new ECB study, a new discussion of the Euro Group's bailout strategy is indeed necessary. So far taxpayers have born the risks of this strategy, by guaranteeing all loans the ESM has paid out to needy countries. Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain are already part of this group, and now Cyprus has been added to the mix.
Germany is already guaranteeing about €100 billion in loans. If even more countries request aid and can then no longer serve as donors, the amount of money guaranteed by the Germans could rise to €509 billion, according to an estimate by the German Taxpayers' Association. This figure doesn't even include the latent risks in the balance sheet of the European Central Bank (ECB).
One-Sided Burdens
In addition, interest rates are very low, because the ECB is flooding the euro zone with money to stabilize the system. People who save their money are currently getting the short end of the stick, as they are stealthily being dispossessed. On the other hand, those with enough money to invest in stocks and real estate are benefiting from the boom triggered by the flood of funds coming from the ECB. In other words, taxpayers and ordinary savers are paying for the euro rescue efforts, which are primarily benefiting the rich in Europe's most troubled economies. Their assets remain largely untouched, while the assets of their rescuers are melting away.
In the past, the affluent have only been expected to participate in the rescue twice. In the case of Greece, owners of government bonds had to relinquish a portion of their claims, and in the case of Cyprus, bank deposits of more than €100,000 were either partially or fully lost.
Both cases mark a turning point, indicating that government donors are no longer willing to bear all the risks without the private beneficiaries of the euro rescue paying part of the bill.
But this could be only the beginning. The current strategy is not only unfair, because it distributes the burden one-sidedly. It is also economically dangerous, because it could put too much of a burden on the donor countries. And if they began to falter, the monetary union would inevitably break apart.
Besides, the aid programs to date have only replaced old loans with new ones, so that the borrower countries will never shed their heavy debt burdens. On the contrary, the necessary austerity measures are stifling and shrinking the economy in Greece and other Southern European countries.
Crisis Countries Should Seize Assets
It would be more sensible -- and fairer -- for the crisis-ridden countries to exercise their own power to reduce their debts, namely by reaching for the assets of their citizens more than they have so far. As the most recent ECB study shows, there is certainly enough money available to do this.
The numbers are potentially explosive. For instance, the average German household has assets of €195,000, almost €100,000 less than the average Spanish household. The average net wealth of households in Cyprus is €671,000, more than three times the German value. Italian and French households are also significantly wealthier than their German counterparts.
The differences are even more pronounced when it comes to median net wealth, which is the level that the lower half of the population just reaches and the upper half exceeds. On this measure, Germany, at €51,400, is actually in last place in the euro zone. The corresponding value for Cyprus is five times as high. Median net wealth is even higher in crisis-rattled Portugal than in Germany.
The conclusions of the ECB study had hardly been published before various efforts to relativize and whitewash the figures began. The results were apparently embarrassing to the ECB itself, but also to the German government.
ECB Downplays Report's Significance
When politicians with the center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU), perused the confusing figures at a breakfast meeting last Wednesday and turned to the finance minister with a questioning look in their eyes, Wolfgang Schäuble responded by shrugging his shoulders.
Schäuble was unwilling to offer a clear interpretation. He eventually commented that the figures were not as clear as they appeared, and there were no further questions.
Schäuble had reached his objective, given his fears that the material would be welcome ammunition for critics of the current rescue policy. Even the ECB, apparently feeling uneasy about its own numbers, came up with all kinds of footnotes to downplay the statistics' significance.
The ECB noted, for instance, that the average Cypriot household consists of three individuals, while the average German household has only two members. This is true, and yet a difference of 50 percent in household size cannot explain a difference of 200 percent in average wealth.
More convincing was the note that the differences in wealth were mainly attributable to property ownership habits in the various countries. Whereas just over 80 percent of households own their own homes in Spain (83 percent) and Slovenia (81.6), and even 90 percent in Slovakia, this is true of only 44 percent of Germans.
The following comparison shows what a significant role property ownership plays in wealth statistics: While the median wealth of a German household that owns its own house or condominium is €216,000, it's only €10,300 for renters.
It is also clear that homeowners in Spain and Cyprus are not nearly as wealthy as the ECB study suggests. The data for most EU countries are from 2010, while some of the information for Spain is even from 2008. In both countries, the value of many houses and condominiums has declined sharply. Spain alone has seen a decline of 36 percent in the meantime.

Two World Wars and a Partition
Nevertheless, some attempts to downplay differences in wealth within the euro zone are reminiscent of card tricks. One argument holds that the Germans are portrayed as being too poor, because their figures do not account for their claims against the government pension system. In other countries, people provide for their retirement by buying property, which Germans don't have to do because they have government pension insurance.
But this is a spurious argument. Claims against a government pension fund do not constitute the asset accumulation in the classic sense, but rather a promise that could quite possibly not be kept. The current working generation pays for the pensions of retirees, which is precisely why pension claims cannot be reflected in the wealth calculation. They are offset by the younger generation's obligation, which is essentially a liability to vouch for the claims.
There are in fact understandable reasons why the Germans even lag behind such crisis-ridden countries as Greece, Cyprus and France when it comes to asset accumulation. In the last 100 years, Germans have been the victims of several events with the traits of expropriation. The hyperinflation of the 1920s, a consequence of World War I, destroyed the wealth of a middle class that had seen its fortunes consistently improve during the German Empire.
The monetary reform of 1948 eliminated the Reichsmark, which had become worthless after Germany's defeat in World War II, and wiped out the savings of an entire nation. In East Germany, 40 years of socialism destroyed the last vestiges of wealth and property. In the less than 23 years since German reunification, residents of the former East German states have not yet managed to attain the same levels of affluence as their fellow Germans in the west.
Most countries in the euro zone were spared such disasters. Either they emerged victorious from the two world wars, like France, or they remained neutral, like Spain. Either way, their citizens were able to build wealth over generations.
It is also not surprising that the Germans, despite high incomes, accumulate much less wealth than their fellow Europeans. Wealth consists of savings from the past. But German citizens tend to spend their money on consumption. They have no objection to renting expensive city apartments. They also like to go on vacation two or three times a year. In other words, those who spend their money lack funds to accumulate assets.
'A Devastatingly Shoddy Piece of Work'
The news that they are supposedly so much more affluent than the Germans was the source of astonishment -- and, in some places, outrage -- in Europe's debt-ridden countries.
Nikos Trimikliniotis is sitting in his garden in a modest suburb of Nicosia. The 44-year-old has a stack of documents spread out in front of him: academic studies, newspaper articles and notes. Trimikliniotis, a professor of law and sociology, is one of the leftist academics in Cyprus whose opinion carries some weight. In his opinion, the ECB study on the wealth of private households in the euro zone is "a devastatingly shoddy piece of work," and "completely misleading and dangerous."
Although the Cypriots are at the top of the ECB table in terms of their assets, "these are average values," says Trimikliniotis, "and they are from 2009 and 2010. And why aren't the different standards of living, the different social insurance systems and infrastructure in our countries compared at the same time? Why does the study fail to mention that social services like childcare are not subsidized in our country?"
He has other figures on hand, figures that do not appear in the ECB statistics. "They show that one in four Cypriots is threatened with the poverty of old age," he says. "One in two Cypriot retirees already lives on a pension of less than €4,000 -- a year. And now, with the austerity measures and sharp decline of the gross domestic product, old-age poverty will only get worse."
When the European press has addressed the ECB study at all in the southern countries, it has tried to downplay the numbers, citing the usual arguments, like property ownership, which has also declined sharply in value, and household size. Most of all, the press has warned against drawing the wrong conclusions from the statistics.
Italy Swimming in Poverty, not Money
The numbers, Italy's leading business newspaper Il Sole 24 Ore wrote, seem to suggest that "la Bundesbank" were trying to say to us: "You're the rich ones, and if you have problems, kindly solve them on your own."
Italy isn't swimming "in money, but in poverty," the paper argued, noting that 16.5 percent of Italians are considered poor while only 13.4 percent of Germans fall below the poverty line. The Italian central bank prepared its own report, which emphasized that Italy has more poverty and a lower average income, but also more wealth and less private debt.
It isn't this supposed wealth but growing poverty that has Italians upset these days. And it isn't the lives of the rich that shape the headlines, but the fates of people like Anna Maria Sopranzi, 68, and Romeo Dionisi, 62. Dionisi was a self-employed craftsman from Civitanova Marche in central Italy.
Sopranzi and Dionisi hung themselves from a heating pipe in their basement. A farewell note was stuck to the windshield of their neighbor's car. "Forgive us," they had written. Deeply in debt and impoverished, they had had no income for months but plenty of delinquent customers. Right up until the end, they hadn't shown any signs of despair or asked for help, neither from relatives nor the church.
They died of shame, and of the burden of the demands imposed by Equitalia, a government-owned company that collects taxes for the tax authorities.
People commit suicide every day in Italy. This was also the case before the crisis, but the deaths of Sopranzi and Dionisi were suicides committed out of despair, a warning sign that shook the entire country. The newly elected president of the parliament, Laura Boldrini, a former spokeswoman for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, attended the funeral. "This is government murder," people said in the church. "To you we are just numbers." The archbishop appealed to politicians, saying: "It must become clear to you that we can no longer manage."
Plunging into Poverty
The crisis has plunged many people into poverty in Southern Europe, people who no longer know how they will make ends meet. Unemployment has risen to record level, and there are no new jobs in sight.
In Spain, a third of residents have taken out mortgages on their homes. With more than 4 million people losing their jobs in the years of crisis since 2007, many have been unable to continue servicing their loans with banks and savings banks.
There were 30,000 foreclosures last year alone, and most of them were primary residences. In most cases, the downgraded price paid at auction isn't sufficient to cover the entire outstanding debt, so that the mortgage holder is forced to continue paying high penalty interest and pay off the remaining debt in installments.
The foreclosure victims have formed self-help groups in recent months, and they have collected signatures to achieve a change in mortgage laws the European Court of Justice has ruled illegal and make personal bankruptcies possible.
In response to the government's neglect of the plight of thousands of families, protesters marched a week ago Tuesday in front of the offices of the governing party, Partido Popular (PP), in Barcelona and many other cities. They blew whistles and waved cardboard signs with the words "Stop desahucios!" ("Stop the evictions").

A Culture of Shirking Taxes
But even people who are considered affluent by the numbers do not consider themselves rich. They too feel that they are victims of the crisis, and they are worse off today than in the past. But does this mean they cannot be expected to bear a greater burden to save their country?
Take, for example, Dimitris, a resident of Crete (not his real name). He's a post office employee, his wife works in university administration, and both have been public servants for decades, which gives them secure incomes and small pension claims, although those benefits have been cut substantially since the debt crisis hit Greece.
Dimitris, his wife Maria and their two teenage sons live in a condominium in the administrative capital Heraklion. They also own a building in the southern part of the island with a small owner's apartment and 12 guest rooms that are rented out, a small but clean building with a view of the water, directly on the beach. The mother lives in a small house that she owns in the nearby village. The road to the village passes Dimitris's olive groves and fields of orange trees.
Now that he is close to retirement, Dimitris devotes most of his time -- including his working hours -- to the trees, which he grows organically. Dimitris and Maria are not doing well, subjectively at least. "Our costs are too high," he complains, after maneuvering one of his three cars into a parking space at the beach. "Just imagine. Now we have to pay taxes on all three properties and the cars."
The world doesn't make sense to Dimitris anymore. "Twenty-five percent," he says. He now loses a quarter of his earnings to taxes. "I don't know how I'll manage it."
In the past, life for Greek civil servants was often a different one. Their income taxes were taken directly out of their wages, but the tax authorities could traditionally be easily circumvented when it came to side earnings from things like olive oil sales or renting rooms to tourists.
Lois Labrianidis, a 59-year-old economist and professor at the University of Macedonia in the northern Greek city of Thessaloniki, attributes the lack of acceptance of tax payments and a tax liability to a sort of north-south gradient in the general consciousness, as well as an absence of public spirit. "We lack the parameters," he says. He is referring, for example, to the recognition that paying taxes to the government also enhance a citizen's personal social security and provisions for old age.
Southern Europe's Shadow Economies
Southern Europeans in a number of countries have traditionally paid no taxes on a good share of their income, which is one reason households with far smaller incomes have been able to accumulate substantially larger assets than German households.
Estimates by Friedrich Schneider, an economist in the Austrian city of Linz, reveal how horrifying the scope of the shadow economy is in the crisis-ridden countries of the euro zone. Among all the countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain occupy the first four positions in the applicable negative ranking.
On the Iberian Peninsula and in Italy, the hidden economy makes up 20 percent of GDP, compared with almost 25 percent in Greece. By comparison, it only constitutes about 13 percent in Germany, and significantly less than 10 percent in other euro countries, like Austria and the Netherlands.
The greater the importance of moonlighting, the lower the tax revenues. The shadow economy deprives Spain, Italy and other countries of dozens of billions of euros in tax revenue each year, and has been doing so for decades.
Schneider's figures also show that in Greece, Spain and Portugal, the shadow economy plays an even greater role today than it did in the late 1980s. The scope of the shadow economy has declined in Italy, but only slightly. In other words, if attitudes toward taxation in Southern Europe were just as good as they are in the north, the debt-ridden countries would have solved their budget problems long ago.
All problems aside, Lars Feld, a member of the German Council of Economic Experts, also sees the ECB figures as good news. "They show that Germany, with its tough conditions for the euro bailout funds, is in the right."
After all, the debt-ridden countries are only eligible for the billions from bailout funds if they satisfy certain conditions in return. In addition to spending cuts and tax increases, they generally include the obligation to actually collect taxes. If tax laws not only appear on paper, but are also enforced, then "even Greece will be able to set aside doubts concerning the sustainability of its debts," says Feld.
Countries More Prosperous than Previously Thought
Despite the drawbacks and qualifications of the ECB's wealth figures, one realization remains: The countries of the south are far more prosperous than previously supposed.
For these countries' governments and the politicians in the partner countries dealing with bailouts, this can only lead to one conclusion: There is still plenty to be had. Cash-strapped countries that have already taken advantage of aid from the bailout funds should be required to increase their own contribution even further.
In fact, the ailing economies have already begun increasing taxes on their citizens, in some cases substantially. In this context, many governments are also taking aim at assets.
Last year, for example, Spain reintroduced a wealth tax that had been abolished five years earlier. It doesn't generate much in revenues, in fact, less than €1 billion. This is because of generous exemptions that can reach €1 million on properties used as primary residences.
The Socialist government in France introduced a special tax on assets last year, which generated €2.3 billion in revenues. The Greek government plans to tax the rich to an even greater extent. After the government drastically increased revenue goals for the wealth tax last year, it now expects revenues to increase from €1.2 billion to €2.7 billion.
The Fight against Tax Evaders
Economist Labrianidis also favors requiring the wealthy to play a stronger role in repaying the government debt. "The biggest problem is tax evasion and tax flight. And I'm not talking about the kiosk owner who doesn't give you a receipt for a pack of cigarettes," says the professor. He is referring to "the very rich," and he is calling for political will and a "wealth registry." Still, Labrianidis sees "no steps being taken in this direction. There is no political will to chase capital."
The average wealth of Greek households may seem high, but the country ranks near the bottom in Europe in terms of tax revenues. In 2011, tax revenues, including social security contributions, amounted to 35 percent of GDP, compared with an EU average of 40 percent.
Greek authorities are also making very little headway in their fight against tax evasion. Lists exist of delinquent doctors, wealthy people unwilling to pay their taxes and tax fugitives in Switzerland. There are also lists of undeclared swimming pools (which are subject to a tax) and proud owners of luxury yachts whose incomes are barely large enough to pay taxes. But the tax collectors continue to come up short. Last year, tax authorities were expected to drum up €2 billion in back taxes to help pay off the country's debt, at least under the conditions imposed by the troika consisting of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the ECB and the European Commission. The actual figure was barely €1.1 billion.

'No Great Sacrifice'
In all southern European countries, the rich show little inclination to help pay for the consequences of the crisis. One exception is Diego Della Valle, 59, the inventor of the driving shoe and the president and CEO of Italian leather goods company Tod's. He proposes that companies like his, which are doing well despite the crisis, invest 1 percent of their profits to help the weakest members of society: the local elderly and unemployed youth.
In the case of Tod's, that would amount to €1.5 million, and if other profitable, publicly traded companies follow suit, he hopes to raise €150 million. Della Valle, who plans to launch his voluntary welfare contribution campaign this week, notes that this is something he can afford, and that for him it is "no great sacrifice, nor is it populism."
As nice as that may sound, keeping the government's hands away from private assets is a very popular pastime in Italy. It's an approach embodied by Silvio Berlusconi. More than anyone else, the self-made billionaire and longstanding former prime minister personifies the notion of circumventing the law and living according to the motto: Taking is more sacred than giving.
Although Italy has a high income tax rate of up to 43 percent, the government loses an estimated €120 billion a year to tax evasion and tax flight. There have long been discussions of tax increases and capital levies, but as is so often the case, little has ever been implemented.
Some ideas that have been discussed are the reintroduction of the land tax, an increase in the value-added tax and a wealth tax. The IMU, a tax on real estate ownership, including primary residences, was finally introduced under former Prime Minister Mario Monti. His predecessor Berlusconi had pledged, if re-elected, to reimburse around €4 billion in money that had been paid under the IMU tax. There was also a levy on yachts 10 meters or longer.
Sinking Revenue
Greece is in a similar position. Tax revenues have decreased instead of going up in the crisis. The self-employed alone reportedly owe the government up to €30 billion, a study by American researchers found.
The regular tax on real estate planned by the Greek government is also not going to materialize for the time being. Instead, the special tax on real estate will continue to be collected through electricity bills. The Finance Ministry knows this is the only halfway reliable method for the government to get its money. Starting this year, Greeks who own property, which is almost everyone, are required to provide the number of their electricity meter on their tax return. At the same time, some 30,000 customers a month are having their power cut off. The state-owned electric utility, DEI, reports that 80 percent of electric bills are paid very late or not at all.
Spain is a little further along in this respect. The conservative government of Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy, which came into office in December 2011, felt compelled to increase the maximum income tax rate from 45 to 52 percent. Rajoy also limited the possibility of reducing corporate income tax with write-offs. Before, on average, companies paid a de facto rate of only 10 percent to the government, says Josep Oliver i Alonso, a professor of applied economics at the Autonomous University of Barcelona.
Rajoy also reinstated the inheritance tax abolished by the Socialists, which will now apply to medium-sized and large estates. But because the crisis-torn population is already suffering under the increased value-added tax of 21 percent, as well as prescription fees and increases in taxes on alcohol and tobacco, Spaniards are growing less tolerant of the rich who try to avoid paying taxes on their money. New scandals are uncovered almost daily.
A former treasurer with the governing party, the conservative People's Party, hid €38 million in Swiss bank accounts, while a son of the former head of the Catalan government reportedly moved €32 million to tax havens. Even the son-in-law of the Spanish king allegedly siphoned ill-gotten public funds abroad.
Too Little, Too Late?
But the measures introduced to date by governments in the debt-ridden countries, their tax increases and their attempts to improve the tax administration will not be enough to come to grips with the massive debt in the long term. "Without cutting spending and introducing new taxes, most of the crisis-ridden countries will not be able to turn things around," says Guntram Wolff of the Brussels think tank Bruegel.
In his view, the ECB statistics at least point the way to how governments should address the problems. Italy is a case in point, with government debt comprising a gigantic 130 percent of GDP, compared with 80 percent in Germany. But at €173,500, median household wealth is almost three times as high as it is in Germany.
Peter Bofinger, a member of the German Council of Economic Experts, which advises the federal government, also believes that the crisis-ridden countries should ask the wealthy to make a substantially larger contribution. To clean up government finances, he is even calling for a capital levy. "The rich would then, for example, be required to relinquish a portion of their assets within 10 years."
A model of this sort of capital levy is the so-called Equalization of Burdens program implemented in Germany after World War II. At the time, the wealthy were compelled to pay a special tax for a period of 30 years.
Bofinger is convinced that a wealth tax would be far more appropriate than imposing a levy on savers, as was recently the case in Cyprus. "Resourceful wealthy people from Southern Europe will simply move their money to banks in Northern Europe, thereby evading the levy."
For Brussels economist Wolff, the ECB statistics provide more than just an answer to the question of who should pay the bill for the crisis in Southern Europe. "It becomes clear, once again, how unfair wealth is distributed, in Germany and elsewhere."
What he means is that wealthy Germans should also be expected to cover the costs of the crisis. "The effort to rescue the euro would be completely absurd if, in the end, the relatively poor average German household helped the super-rich in Greece avoid paying higher taxes."
Translated from the German by Christopher Sultan



http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/apr/27/french-minister-attacks-merkel-austerity



French minister says Merkel's austerity drive has failed

Benoit Hamon says the German leader is the only one still backing the policy

Benoit Hamon
Benoit Hamon says austerity measures have failed. Photograph: AFP/Getty Images
A French socialist minister has launched an impassioned attack on the "failing" austerity policies imposed on European economies, which he said were now only supported by the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, and a few others.
In outspoken comments that will fuel tensions between France andGermany, Benoit Hamon, the social and consumer affairs minister, told the Observer that it was "time to finish with the politics of austerity inEurope". He added: "Only Merkel, supported by a few northern countries, believes austerity is working … when it's clear there is no prospect of unemployment rates going down."
Figures released last week revealed that French unemployment had reached a record level, with more than 3.2 million people seeking work. As the economy stagnates, approval ratings for President François Hollande have plummeted to the lowest levels recorded since the fifth republic began in 1958. As a signatory to the European stability pact, which was strongly promoted by Germany last year, Hollande is committed to a programme designed to bring France's budget deficit below 3% of gross domestic product by the end of this year, although that target is almost certain to be missed.
On Saturday a leaked French Socialist party draft document accused Merkel of "selfish intransigence" as she continues to insist on austerity policies. Hamon said the French government needed to bite the bullet and accept that ending austerity would lead to a falling-out with Europe's biggest economic power. He said: "This will cause political tension with the Germans and cause political differences."
However, he added that as eurozone economies continued to stagnate and unemployment soared, particularly in southern Europe, the tide was turning against Merkel's emphasis on reducing debts at all costs. "The wave of opinion against austerity is in the majority now among leaders and economists," he said. "The only economy that is resisting, opposing, vetoing is Germany."
The deficit-cutting demands of the stability pact have been pushing eurozone governments to breaking point, as spending cuts and tax rises choke off economic growth. Last week Spain – which has a youth unemployment rate of more than 50% – said it would require two more years to hit its deficit targets.
Hamon's intervention also comes after a week in which the economics of austerity have come under scrutiny. Influential research on the effects of public debt by two American economists, Kenneth Rogoff and Carmen Reinhart, was attacked as fundamentally flawed. Their study, published in 2010, claimed that high levels of government debt lead to a sharp fall in economic growth, but the authors have been accused of basic errors in methodology.











http://www.cyprus-mail.com/cyprus/dirty-money-claims-were-just-excuse-bail/20130428


‘Dirty money’ claims were just an excuse for bail-in

By Stefanos EvripidouPublished on April 28, 2013
Expert says Cyprus no better or worse than other member states when it comes to money laundering

THE EUROPEAN Union, led by Germany, has made Cyprus pay dearly for its alleged money laundering transgressions but one leading anti-money laundering expert questions how the EU will ever repay Cyprus if those charges are proved wrong. 
Andreas Frank is an independent adviser to the German Bundestag and Council of Europe, who has already initiated two infringement proceedings against Germany for violations of the EU’s anti-money laundering (AML) directive. 
A German national living in Switzerland, he argues that mostly German allegations of money laundering in Cyprus were used to justify the unprecedented Eurogroup decision to force a ‘bail-in’ of depositors in Cypriot banks, the argument being that German taxpayers’ money should not be used to save ‘dirty’ Russian money deposited on the island. 
However, this premise could fall flat on its face if the recently submitted reports by the Council of Europe’s Moneyval and private auditor Deloitte Financial Advisory show Cyprus to be no more or less guilty of AML violations than other EU member states. 
In fact, according to Frank, all 27 member states are failing to comply with the EU’s third AML directive from 2005. The European Commission, meanwhile, is currently working on a fourth. 
Each new directive repeals and replaces the older one, meaning that when the fourth anti-money laundering directive is passed, the previous three will no longer be applicable. 
Speaking to the Sunday Mail, Frank said the reason was that none of the member states were complying with the directives. 
He highlighted the difference between adopting the directive’s measures “on paper” and actually ensuring “effective implementation”. 
Rather than accusing member states of AML violations and taking all 27 to the European Court of Justice, as the Commission is obliged to do, it simply wipes the slate clean every few years and starts fresh with a new directive, giving member states more time to comply, he argued. 
The EU’s AML directives are based on the 40+9  recommendations made by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an inter-governmental body established in1989 to set standards and promote effective implementation of AML and counter-terrorism financing (CTF) measures. 
According to the previous Moneyval review of Cyprus in September 2011, the country was found to be compliant to some degree with all 40+9 recommendations. 
It concluded that Cyprus adopted measures that comply with international standards and has a comprehensive legal framework in place which compares favourably with other EU and developed countries. In fact, the ratings assigned to Cyprus in relation to its compliance with the 40+9 FATF recommendations outranked most eurozone countries.  
Cyprus has been evaluated by Moneyval four times before last month’s evaluation, imposed by the Eurogroup, along with a private audit, as a precondition to signing a bailout agreement. In all previous four reports, Cyprus received an overall positive evaluation.
The Basel AML Index, developed by the Basel Institute on Governance, uses a composite methodology, aggregating 15 variables from third party sources that deal with AML/ CTF regulations, financial standards, transparency and disclosure and political risks. 
Frank notes that the Basel AML Index assigns Cyprus a lower money laundering risk than the eurozone average and lower than EU countries like Germany, Luxembourg, Austria and the Netherlands. 
He also highlights the difficulty in correctly assessing countries’ compliance using current evaluation procedures, hinting at much deeper problems in the worldwide approach to fighting money laundering and terrorism in general.
“To stop money laundering and transnational organised crime from further undermining the civil societies, the current AML/CFT regulations must be urgently adjusted and improved,” he said.
Taking Germany as an example, Frank noted that Germany’s 16 federated states (Lander) have requested the federal government take on the responsibilities of implementing the AML directive as they are not able to do so.  
Germany’s largest Lander, North Rhine-Westphalia with a population of 18 million, has clearly acknowledged that its’ offices of public order will not be able to oversee AML measures in the non-financial sector of the federated state. 
Frank also notes that on October 22, 2012, Italy’s anti-mafia prosecutor Dr Roberto Scarpinato was asked to speak at a public hearing of the Bundestag Finance Committee where he testified that “for international crime syndicates and Italy’s mafia, Germany is one of the most important countries for their money laundering operations”. 
A staunch supporter of the EU project, Frank has over the years lobbied and pressured the German government to ensure full implementation of the EU’s AML directive, even getting a mention in German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaueble’s official biography for his efforts. 
Frank knew him when he was Interior Minister, and responsible for the AML framework, before it was passed on to the German Finance Ministry. Frank also shared correspondence with Schaueble’s underling Gerhard Schindler at the time, who incidentally, was later promoted to head of the German intelligence agency BND.  
In the run-up to the Eurogroup’s fateful decision last month to impose massive losses on depositors of the island’s two biggest banks in exchange for a €10 billion loan, the German media and lawmakers embarked on a consistent campaign to point the finger at money laundering activities on the island. 
In November, 2012, Germany’s Der Spiegel cited a BND report as saying “Russian oligarchs, business people and Mafiosi” would benefit most from any bailout and that Cyprus was a “gateway for money laundering in the EU”.  
In January, 2013, the same publication wrote: “Several dozen oligarchs and financial sharks have set up offshore companies in Cyprus, where they can protect their assets, at very favourable tax rates, from the Kremlin-controlled Russian justice system,” and listed all Russian magnates with interests in Cyprus. 
According to the BND report, attorneys and trustees in Cyprus have specialised in financial services, some of which “are used to conceal money earned illegally”, Spiegel said.
Schaueble and Bundestag MPs threatened at the time to veto a Cyprus bailout deal over money laundering concerns and applied heavy pressure on Cyprus to accept an independent audit on its AML framework. 
“Can you imagine what Germany would say if Cyprus demanded the same?” asked Frank. 
The AML consultant argued that Cyprus is obliged to abide by the “hard” law provisions of the EU’s AML directive. The Commission, as the “guardian of the treaty”, is responsible for ensuring that EU law is correctly applied. 
When the Commission, as a troika member, supported the demand for an independent audit by a private company, it not only broke EU law but also destroyed its foundation, said Frank.
 “Why should the member states comply with EU law when the Commission confirms that it is unable to fulfil its obligations in accordance with the treaties on European Union?”
For most Cypriots, the allegations were taken half-seriously, as most were under the impression Cyprus had improved its act after EU accession. To most members of the public, Cyprus was no longer tainted by the serious allegations levelled against it in the 1990s of UN sanctions’ violations connected to bagfuls of money being sent to Cyprus by former Serbian leader Slobodan Milosovic.
It’s not that Cyprus became squeaky clean, but that as a member of the EU, it had to act within a framework of certain rules and standards, meaning any possible AML violations could only go so far before the Commission would come along and take Cyprus to court for non-implementation.  
However, failure to heed the warning signs proved most costly for the average Cypriot who operated their business accounts, deposited their savings or put away their pension/provident funds in seemingly safe places, like the island’s biggest and most systemic banks. 
In 2012, the two banks, Laiki and Bank of Cyprus, had suffered massive losses from the EU-imposed haircut on Greek sovereign bonds, to which they were disproportionately exposed. They desperately needed bailing out, but the government was in no position to help, leading the country to request a eurozone bailout. 
Various polls showed that the majority of Cypriots were in favour of signing a memorandum with the hydra-headed troika, and swallowing the austerity measures that this would entail, in exchange for a bailout of the systemic banks. 
What they didn’t expect was for Cyprus to be used as an experiment, or as President Nicos Anastasiades put it a “guinea-pig” for the Eurogroup to send out a clear message that EU taxpayers will no longer foot the bill for the mistakes of eurozone banks, and even sovereigns.    
Schaueble made it clear after March 25, 2013, that Cyprus was dealt with successfully. The German and IMF-inspired precondition that Cyprus does not inflate its public debt was met by using depositors’ money for most of the ‘rescue package’. This was morally justified, according to Schaueble, because those who were responsible for the crisis have been made to pay for it. 
In the process, through its handling of the Cyprus debacle, the EU sent a host of other messages to the European public that, put simply, are almost Orwellian in nature: 
If you are a prudent saver, as opposed to a reckless spender, you are liable to be punished and whatever money is not taken from you will be frozen indefinitely in your account. 
If you fail to live within your means and have loans taken out with the bank, your savings will be spared from a haircut.
And equally controversial, if you choose to put your money in a bank which happens to offer high-interest rates on certain deposits, you are liable to be punished. Unless, of course, the offending party happens to be the University of Cyprus, a local authority or the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (which employed the services of Laiki to run its operations), in which case you are entitled to a ‘get out of jail’ card. 
On April 18, the Bundestag overwhelmingly voted in favour of the Cyprus bailout, while the debate on money laundering was completely sidelined. 
“The money laundering accusations were used to serve as justification for the Eurogroup's extraordinary demand for a depositors' haircut, disregarding that many of the expropriated depositors earned or received their deposits from legal sources,” said Frank. 
To prevent the creation of conspiracy theories, the results of an “unsparing and transparent” AML/CFT probe has to be published without omissions, he said. 
“To prove that Cyprus was not discriminated or misused to set an example, the inquiry’s results have to be evaluated in the context and comparison with the AML status in the other EU member states which have to comply with the EU Money Laundering Directive.” 
The German consultant was quick to add that US investigations have shown that some Cypriot banks have been involved in money laundering operations for Russian organised crime. But they are not alone. 
“Many large international banks, some of them operating from the EU, have recently been ensnared in money laundering/financing terrorism cases.”
According to the US authorities, HSBC and Standard Charter laundered billions of dollars for their customers ranging from drug syndicates to failed states while German banks like HSH Nordbank, Commerzbank and Deutsche Bank have also been sanctioned by US authorities for AML related failures, he said.
As for Cyprus, the Moneyval/Deloitte reports were submitted to the troika last Wednesday. It remains to be seen whether they will be published in full, what their conclusions are, and whether Moneyval will reverse the positive evaluations of its last four reports on Cyprus, the most recent being one and a half years ago. 
If it finds serious violations of the EU’s AML directive in Cyprus, then Frank believes there are legal grounds to sue the Commission over its failure to ensure enforcement of EU law.  
If not, how will the EU make amends after forcing Cyprus to swallow a gut-wrenching pill before even completing the diagnosis, he asks. 


http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2013/04/yanis-varoufakis-intransigent-bundesbank-mr-jens-weidmanns-surreptitiouscampaign-to-bring-back-the-greater-deutsch-mark.html


SUNDAY, APRIL 28, 2013


Yanis Varoufakis: Intransigent Bundesbank – Mr. Jens Weidmann’s SurreptitiousCampaign to Bring Back the (Greater) Deutsch Mark

By Yanis Varoufakis, Professor of Economics at the University of Athens. Cross posted from his blog
Any fair minded reading of the Bundesbank’s latest Constitutional Court deposition must lead to one of two conclusions: Either the Bundesbank has failed to recognise the existentialist threat to the Eurozone (that was placed in suspended animation during the past eight months or so), or the Bundesbank has intentionally opted for a strategy that will, sooner or later, see the disbanding of the current Eurozone. Loath to assume naiveté on the Bundesbank’s part, I opt for the latter. Here is why:
The 12th June Moment
On 12th June, 2013, Germany’s constitutional court is scheduled to rule on the legality of Mr Mario Draghi’s OMT (outright monetary transactions) program. Of all the institutional interventions during the past three years of cascading Euro Crisis, OMT (together with Germany’s reluctant acceptance that Grexit was too risky) was the single most significant measure that has calmed the bond markets and allowed the euro not to fragment (beyond the recent de facto exit of Cyprus from the Eurozone).
This is not the first time that Germany’s constitutional court has heard cases against Europe’s institutional reforms the purpose of which was to calm markets and buy the Eurozone (and its political class) additional time. It was only last September that it ruled, through clenched teeth, that the ESM (the European Stability Mechanism) could go ahead, while imposing massively constrictive conditions on Germany’s participation in it (e.g. limiting Germany’s contribution to the ESM to less than €200 billion, specifying that the ESM would not be able to make a move without the Federal Parliament’s consent etc.)
While no one really expects that Germany’s Constitutional Court will dare a ruling that explicitly bans Mr Draghi’s OMT, almost everyone expects that it will attempt to weigh in regarding the form of conditionality that will accompany any bond purchases under the OMT – exactly, in other words, as it did with the ESM; i.e. give it a grudging green light while binding its operations in a manner that, effectively, renders it ineffective. Then, of course, the proof of the pie will be in the eating, both in terms of how the markets will react and, more importantly, how the ECB will act if it needs to activate OMT quickly to assist, say, Italy’s bond market (i.e. will Mr Draghi and Ms Merkel abide by the Court’s conditions or will they, quietly, sweep them under the carpet?).
The Bundesbank’s Deposition
In a sense, the German Constitutional Court is doing nothing new; hedging its verdict by officially saying ‘yes’ to Berlin while piling up the conditions so that it is an effective ‘no’. Yet, this time it is different. While Karlsruhe (where the Constitutional Court is situated) will, most likely, tread a fine line between obstructionism and avoiding a public clash with Berlin and Frankfurt, what makes this hearing different is a deposition that was tabled last December at the Court by Germany’s Central Bank, the intransigent Bundesbank – a document that was only yesterday released by Handeslblatt and commented upon extensively in the financial press.
Three statemets make this is bombshell of a deposition. The first openly questions whether the ECB has a mandate to preserve the integrity of the euro; that is, to prevent the currency’s collapse. The second, in reality, questions the joint decision of Mrs Merkel and Mr Draghi to keep Greece in the Eurozone. And the third challenges Mr Draghi’s oft-stated conviction that the ECB’s broken monetary transmission mechanism should be mended as quickly as possible. Taken together, these three passages constitute an act of war against the euro as a coherent currency; especially in view of the fact that they are official depositions by the Bundesbank to the German Constitutional Court for the purpose of invoking a constitutional ban on Mr Draghi’s monetary stance. In view of the gravity of the matter, it is perhaps important that we take a look at each of these three acidic statements:
Statement 1It is not the role of a central bank to guarantee the irreversibility of the currency
One wonders whose role it is, if it is not the Central Bank’s? As long as the democratically elected political leadership declares (for better or for worse) a cast iron determination to keep the Eurozone intact, it would be a gross violation of the ECB’s mandate not to guarantee, to the best of its abilities, the irreversibility of the currency (nb. Besides price stability the ECB’s charter specifies that the ECB is obliged to assist the European Council in the pursuit of its borader objectives). Especially in a Eurozone that, in truth, only has one substantial common institution: the ECB! By challenging this simple assumption, the Bundesbank adopted a brand new, utterly incendiary, position: The Eurozone’s salvation is not paramount, even if its political leadership thinks it is! Nothing can damage confidence in the Eurozone more than such a position-statement by the Central Bank of the monetary union’s most powerful economy.
Statement 2The credibility of the OMT program, by which Mr Draghi tried to guarantee the euro’s irreversibility, was cast in doubt (even before OMT was announced) by Greece’s use of its own Central Bank’s ELA (from around April to December 2012).
This statement requires some unpacking. Lest we forget, Greece was cut off the troika’s loan tranches when the Papademos government lost its credibility in the early Spring and had to call for elections. The troika, citing the impossibility of coming to an agreement with a non-existent government, suspended all payments to the Greek government till further notice. It did not resume lending to the Greek state till the end of the year, well after the election in June of an acquiescent conservative administration that accepted all its terms and conditions to the full. Meanwhile, some time in the Spring of 2012, the ECB also cut Greek banks off its own refinancing operations; something it could not avoid given the clear state of insolvency of these banks. If at that point (when the state was utterly impecunious), the Greek banks had also lost access to ELA funding, they would have closed down instantly and the Greek government, whether it liked it or not, would have had to reconstitute the drachma and exit the monetary union.
Of course, this did not happen because the ECB never approved Grexit (thinking of it, correctly, as a systemically catastrophic development) and allowed the Greek Central Bank to continue providing liquidity to the bankrupt Greek banks. Moreover, and this is not unimportant, the ECB had another reason to do this: In May and in August of 2012, tranches of Greek government bonds that the ECB had purchased in 2010 (as part of the ill-fated SMP bond purchasing program) matured. Allowing Grexit would have meant taking losses on those bonds; a political and symbolic eventuality that Mr Draghi dreaded. Thus, the Greek government issued T-Bills to pay back the ECB (while keeping a few ‘peanuts’ for itself), T-Bills that only the Greek banks bought before handing them over to the Central Bank of Greece in exchange for ELA liquidity. In this manner, Greece was kept on a drip feed until the end of the year when the loan tranches from troika started flowing again and the ECB started accepting again Greek bank collateral (on the pretense that, somehow, they had become solvent again).
This is the background to Bundesbank’s charge against the ECB’s OMT. What Mr Weidmann is saying is that, in the above case, the ECB played fast and loose with its own rule book, accepting collateral that is worthless and, even when it could no longer bring itself to do this, allowing the Greek Central Bank to create euros on behalf of clearly bankrupt Eurozone entities (the Greek banks). And if the ECB played fast and loose with its rulebook on that occasion, why should we trust it not to do the same with OMT? What will stop Mr Draghi from purchasing Italian bonds even if the Rome government is less than diligent in the implementation of agreed spending cuts, tax hikes and ‘reforms’? One must admit that Mr Weidmann has a point. But, imagine what would have happened if Mr Draghi had proposed to the ECB’s Governing Council to veto the Greek Central Bank’s ELA liquidity provisions in June, in August, in September? Greece would have exited the Eurozone overnight, defaulted on the ECB’s Greek bonds (the first time that would have happened in the Eurozone’s short history), Italy would have crashed, and the euro would have been history.
Put briefly, by castigating the ECB’s handling of the Greek debacle during those crucial months in 2012, the Bundesbank is questioning whether the Eurozone ought to have been saved. In conjunction with Statement 1 above, it sends a signal that the Bundesbank thinks it preferable to let the Eurozone collapse than adopt a ‘flexible’ interpretation of insolvency or, in the case of OMT purchases, of ‘conditionality’.
Statement 3Mr Draghi, and almost every other commentator, laments often that the interest rate transmission mechanism of the ECB has broken down; that unprecedented reductions in ECB refinancing interest rates are not passed on even to profitable and efficient firms in the hard-hit Periphery. Uniquely amongst all European financial and economic authorities, the Bundesbank told Germany’s constitutional court this: “the question arises as to whether and why such a development must be corrected”.
This statement seemingly reveals a degree of callousness that exceeds the negative expectations of the Bundesbank’s most ardent critics. But is it callousness? It would only callousness, dear reader, if the Bundesbank truly thought that it is fine for a Spanish company to be paying interest rates of 7% when a comparable (in terms of efficiency and potential profitability) German company secures loans at a mere 2%. I am, however, beginning to tilt towards the interpretation that the Bundesbank does not think that this is a defensible situation. The reason it does not want the transmission mechanism to be ‘corrected’ may be because it is more useful to the Bundesbank’s strategy while ‘broken’. Useful in what sense? Useful in the sense that, while broken, the political climate in Europe becomes increasingly amenable to the idea of a Eurozone break-up; without the Bundesbank ever having to propose such a break-up.
Conclusion: Error or Stratagem?
Some readers may feel inclined to dismiss my hypothesis as too far-fetched; too conspiratorial. It is perfectly true that I have no evidence that Mr Weidmann has intentionally embraced a strategy of pushing the Eurozone toward disintegration (thus creating an inexorable dynamic that will lead to the DM’s re-introduction). However, a close reading of the Bundesbank’s constitutional court deposition leaves us with only two possible interpretations. One is that Mr Weidmann does not ‘get it’; that he cannot see that a Greek exit in 2012, or an Italian exit in 2014, would spell the end of the Eurozone; that he cannot see that Mr Draghi’s OMT announcement played a crucial role in stopping the disintegration of the common currency last year; that he has no appreciation of the catastrophe facing good, solid Spanish and Italian enterprises due to the broken down interest rate transmission mechanism. The other is my interpretation: Mr Weidman can see only too well that the above hold unequivocally but is tabling this deposition at the constitutional course knowingly and as part of a strategy that leads the euro to a death by a thousand, almost silent, cuts. You take your pick, dear reader: Do we behold a Bundesbank Grand Error or a Grand Strategy, the purpose of which is to bring about a new hard currency east of the Rhine and north of the Alps, unencumbered by the deficit countries and France? I know which interpretation I would place money on.












http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2013-04-27/what-killing-europe



What Is Killing Europe



Tyler Durden's picture





From Mark Grant, author of Out Of The Box, a follow up to our  "A Few Quick Reminders Why NOTHING Has Been Fixed In Europe (And Why LTRO 3 Is Not Coming)" from March 2012.
What is Killing Europe

The bigger the real-life problems, the greater the tendency for people to retreat into a reassuring fantasy-land of abstract theory and technical manipulation.

Many people have little or no understanding of what is presently taking place in Europe. This is because it is reported nowhere, discussed in public by no one and carefully hidden in the data supplied by the European Central Bank.

What I will discuss today is the prime mover, in my opinion, of the destabilization of the European economies and yet, like the debt to GDP ratios on the Continent; just because it isn’t counted does not mean that it does not exist. I will endeavor to explain it as simply as possible.

A bank in some European country such as Spain lends money but the collateral, Real Estate or commercial loans, are going bad. The bank then securitizes a large pool of this collateral and pledges it at the ECB to receive cash. In many cases to take the pool the country has to guarantee the debt. So Spain, in my example, guarantees the loan package which is then pledged at the ECB and is a contingent liability and which is not reported in the debt to GDP ratio of the country but nowhere else that you will find either. “Hidden” would be the appropriate word.

Then as time passes the loans get even worse so that the ECB demands cash or more collateral because they will not be taking the hit; thank you very much. The bank cannot afford to post more collateral so that the country, Spain, must post the collateral and add an additional guarantee for the new loan or they must post cash which is oftentimes the case.

Consequently as time passes and more cash has been spent the country, Spain, begins to run out of capital and the 10.6% deficit figure, that Spain announced recently, is not anywhere close to the actual reality so that they will get forced to officially borrow more money from the ESM as the sovereign guarantee of bank debt becomes unsustainable.

What is happening is then becoming clearer as the nations of Europe are running out of capital as they endeavor to support their banking institutions. The breadth and depth of this problem is nowhere to be found but the effect is unmistakable.  The European nations are going bankrupt.

The problem is that Europe pretends to be asleep. The difficulty then is that you cannot wake them up.

The longer that time passes; the worse the situation. The countries cannot afford to pay their known bills. The banking crisis worsens. The debt at the ECB must get paid which worsens the finances of the sovereigns. It is a death spiral unless the economies pick-up and experience real growth which is just not happening. Soon the problems will become bad enough that they will hit the fan once again and this time; there will be real Hell to pay.

You can expect this for Spain, Greece, Portugal, Cyprus, Slovenia, Ireland et al and in short order. I have used Spain as the example today because their stated 10.6% economic decline is only a fraction of their real issue. Again, what is not counted or what is not stated does not ease the burden of what must be paid. They may proclaim fantasy but they are living in reality. The famous windmills are becoming unhinged.

I have no issue with myths. I just have difficulty when governments fly them as banners of truth

France unemployment hits new high

About 3.2 million people were out of work in March, beating the previous all-time record set in 1997.

Last Modified: 25 Apr 2013 22:38
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The number of unemployed people in France climbed to new record levels in March, according to official data.
Around 3.2 million people were out of work in the country, an 11.5 percent annual increase, the labour ministry said on Thursday.
With a wave of industrial layoffs taking effect, the March jobless figure beat the previous all-time record of 3.1 million set in January. 1997.
The new figures are a symbolic blow to President Francois Hollande, whose approval ratings have sunk to the lowest of any modern French leader in recent months as jobless claims soared.
Battling to make good on his promise to reverse the rise in unemployment by the end of this year, Hollande has launched subsidised youth-job schemes and pushed through a reform to make hiring and firing slightly easier.
On Thursday Hollande reaffirmed his goal to reverse the rising trend, calling on his government to combine with industry and other players to use all means possible to create jobs.
"Everything the government does, in every ministry, must be to continue to strengthen the battle for jobs," he told a news conference during a state visit to China. "I want all the French people to unite behind this one national priority."
Factories threatened
Al Jazeera's Jacky Rowland, reporting from Paris, said Hollande had predicted that by the end of 2013, fewer people will be out of work but that prediction seems very optimistic at this point. She added that more factories are being threatened to closure.
"The French motor industry is finding it difficult to compete in the market and labour costs are a significant factor," our correspondent said.
Auto-makers, once major job-providers, have announced thousands of staff cuts, with PSA Peugeot Citroen scrapping more than 10,000 domestic jobs and rival Renault aiming to cut 7,500 posts in France by 2016.
The March data showed that the average time that job seekers spend on the jobless roster hit a new multi-year high of 485 days, up from a previous record of 482 in February, a level that was also reached in April 2000.
The news of France's unemployment rate follows news out of Spain where more than six million peoplewere out of work in the first quarter of this year. The jobless rate rose to 27.2 percent from 26.02 percent in the previous quarter, the highest since records began in the 1970s.
The number of unemployed climbed by 237,400 people to 6.2 million, the National Statistics Institute said on Thursday.
Spain, once the motor of job creation in the 17-nation single currency area, is in a double dip recession, having yet to recover from the collapse of a property boom in 2008.
The Spanish economy contracted by 1.37 percent last year, the second worst yearly slump since 1970, and the government forecasts it will shrink again by between 1.0 percent and 1.5 percent this year.



http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/finance/ambroseevans-pritchard/100024242/the-great-spanish-nation-can-end-its-crucifixion-at-will-by-leaving-emu/



The great Spanish nation can end its crucifixion at will by leaving EMU

The mind goes numb. Spanish unemployment jumped by yet another 237,000 people in the first quarter to 6.2 million, or 27.2pc.
This is equivalent to roughly 8.3 million in Britain, or 39 million in the United States. The country is losing 3,581 jobs a day. There are 1.9m households where no member of the family has a job.
As you can see from this graphic, the rate has reached 36.8pc in Andalusia, Spain's most populous region.

Click for original
The national rate of unemployed youth is 57.2pc, rising to 70pc in the Canaries.
This is in spite of mass emigration by Spanish youth. El Pais reports that 260,000 young people aged between 16 and 30 left the country last year.
A great number have come to London. They are all around the Telegraph offices at Victoria working in Pret a Manger and Starbucks, delightfully well-mannered.
Others have gone to Germany, or the Persian Gulf, or further afield. Such is Spanish diaspora, unseen since mass exodus after the Civil War, or the Conquista.
Some claim that unemployment was almost as high in the early 1990s. It was not. A study by the Bank of Spain found that today's rate would be 4pc to 5pc higher under the old way of counting, nearer 32pc.
Nothing like this has been seen before in modern times. Spain's jobless crisis in the 1930s was much milder, and for a good reason. Spain was not strapped the deflationary disaster of the interwar Gold Standard. It went its own way.
The Rajoy government said today that the crisis is "dramatic" but insisted that the country has regained the confidence of the financial markets and is at last on the road to recovery. Sadly this is not the case. The bond vigilantes have been quiet only because the ECB has promised to backstop the Spanish debt market. The crisis in the real economy is getting worse. The City knows that.
Public debt jumped from 69pc to 84pc of GDP last year, and only part was due to the bank bail-out. That is a big jump in one year and it understates the actual debt. David Owen from Jefferies says the real figure is 113pc once trade credits and unpaid bills are included, a figure available from the Bank of Spain.
The deficit rose from 9.4pc to 10.6pc last year (or 7pc without bank costs). The IMF expects it to remain stuck at 6.9pc in 2014. The improvement is glacial. It has echoes of Greece, and Portugal. The economic damage caused by the austerity cuts is eroding tax revenues, feeding an infernal downward spiral.
Household consumption is collapsing, and so are house prices, as you can see:
As usual, there is much anguish, and complaints against "ultra-austerity" and the EU-IMF Troika (hardly the issue in Spain). The unions talk of a "national emergency". Usual stuff. Yet almost nobody in Spanish public life is willing to admit that the cause of all this grief is the structure of monetary union itself.
The euro led to negative interest rates of minus 2pc in Spain earlier in the decade, and set off an uncontrollable boom. The country now faces an uncontrollable bust. The elemental issue is loss of sovereign control over its exchange rate and monetary policy.
I am surprised that a great historic nation should put up with 27pc unemployment, or accept vassal status to an incompetent and dysfunctional EMU regime. Does anybody in Madrid think that EU officials in Brussels actually know what they are doing? Or that the monetary provincials in Frankfurt (Draghi excepted) are much better? Or that the Eurogroup is a civilised organisation after the way it treated Cyprus?
The EU Project is of course motherhood and apple pie in Spain. It is interwoven in the public thinking with the arrival of democracy after Franco and the re-entry of Spain into the European mainstream. The Brussels subsidies for a quarter century created a dependency culture, and warped the Spanish mind.
Well, minds can be unwarped.
There are a few lone voices willing to utter heresy. I am an avid follower of Ilusion Monetaria, a blog by ex-Bank of Spain economist (and monetarist) Miguel Navascues here.
Dr Navascues calls a spade a spade. He exhorts Spain to break free of EMU oppression immediately.
I leave you with this extract:
On account of the architecture of the euro zone, the countries of the European periphery cannot engage in a fiscal stimulus, a monetary stimulus, a competitive devaluation, or a financial restructuring. Trapped in the midst of recessionary downward spirals, their policy space is extremely limited. The euro zone framework has generated an economic depression and a crisis of democratic legitimacy. These are fertile conditions for even greater political failures, not for success.
Take the Spanish case: A stimulus originating in the public sector is both prohibited, on account of existing deficit targets, and impossible, on account of financing costs on the private markets. Lending channels in the private sector are blocked, as the financial sector’s balance sheet is still overwhelmed by the ever-increasing bad debts originating from the bursting of the real estate bubble. The obvious move would be to engage in a massive financial restructuring (i.e. let the bad banks fail).
This is not possible because the ECB will not act as a lender of last resort. Banks in the periphery cannot fail without wiping out small savers. In order to guarantee deposit insurance, a bail-out of the private sector (and Memorandum of Understanding) was therefore required. Last June the leaders of Europed stated: “We affirm that it is imperative to break the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns.” Events have shown this to have been an empty promise. The cost of the bailing out the banks is now being passed onto the public purse, and the drowning banks are pulling down the sovereigns with them. But if this were not bad enough, the Cyprus deal shows that not even deposit insurance for small savers can be taken for grant
The turn of events in Cyprus makes it far more difficult to defend the proposition that change in Europe is just around the corner, and that it will be for the better. The case for optimism does not rest on solid empirical foundations; there is little evidence of strong majorities in Germany favouring the reforms that would be needed to end the crisis and balance the euro zone
If the countries of the periphery were on a gold standard, they would have already been forced out of it. The euro-induced depression is a breeding ground for populism, anti-politics, extremism and bad-blood in general; it is a toxic environment for dreams of an ever closer Union.
The course of events demands a lifting of the taboo surrounding the dissolution of the euro zone. If solidarity cannot be achieved through a progressive reform of Europe’s economic institutions, then perhaps it is time to consider taking them apart. Perhaps the only way to save the Union is to ditch the euro.
There is hope yet.


http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2013/04/wolf-richter-luxembourg-is-not-the-next-cyprus-not-yet-but.html

SATURDAY, APRIL 27, 2013

Wolf Richter: Luxembourg Is Not The Next Cyprus, Not Yet, But….

Yves here. This article if anything underplays how much a one-trick pony Luxembourg is and what a fix it is in if Germany and/or the EU continues its campaign against tax avoidance and evasion (which as we argued was overstated in the case of Cyprus; a lot of the money was for investment in Russia, both by Russians and foreign nationals, because the Cyprus legal system uses UK law and is vastly preferable for contracting and resolving disputes. Notice that the party that would be the loser from tax avoidance by Russians, namely Russia, wasn’t the one leading the charge against Cyprus?)
Depending on how and when you measured it, Cyprus’s bank assets were roughly 800% of GDP. Luxembourg’s are roughly 2500% of GDP. Richter tells us that 38% of the Luxembourg economy is banking. That is presumably defined narrowly and does not include the accountants and lawyers who serve foreign investors and are major parts of the economy. I don’t have any firm data, but it’s not hard to imagine that they are as important as the formal banking sector.
Luxembourg hope to come to an understanding with the Eurozone and slowly reach accommodations, which would still shrink its banks, but in a less brutal manner than Cyprus. But with such a large financial sector, any action is still going to cause a fair number of customers to flee. It’s hard to see how any gradual path can be found, which then raises the question of whether a series of bank failures in Luxembourg would have broader ramifications.
By Wolf Richter, San Francisco based executive, entrepreneur, start up specialist, and author, with extensive international work experience. Cross posted from Testosterone Pit.
The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, with a population of just over half a million, smaller even than the other speck in the Eurozone, the Republic of Cyprus, ranks in the top three worldwide in per-capita GDP. In a Eurozone wealth survey, it had the highest average household wealth – €710,100. Only Cyprus, a former off-shore banking center in the Eurozone, came close. Yet Luxembourg is threatened with ruin.
It has 141 banks – bank companies, not ATMs. One bank per 3,808 people. Most of them do private banking. The financial sector added 38% to GDP in 2010 and contributed 30% to the country’s tax revenues, according to the Luxembourg Bankers’ Association (ABBL). All due to bank secrecy and tax laws. But suddenly, after Cyprus had been massacred, Luxembourg buckled.
With the big German guns, and the smaller guns from other nations, swinging in its direction, Luxembourg agreed to participate in an international automatic data-sharing arrangement that would send banking data of foreign clients to their countries, starting in 2015. Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker, somewhat defensively, proclaimed that lifting bank secrecy wasn’t such a big deal, that Luxembourg didn’t live from tax evasion. For the banks, the “lights won’t go out in 2015,” he said.
During the entire Eurozone bailout debacle that he presided over until February as President of the Eurogroup, he’d proven to be time and again an inveterate optimist.
“It’s expected that only 60 to 70 banks will survive in the coming years,” declared Alain Steichen, a prominent Luxembourgian tax lawyer, at a conference about the consequences of the data-sharing agreement. He should know. Per his online profile, he “assisted Thomson in the merger acquisition of Reuters in order to form Thomson Reuters, with the group’s main holding location being Luxembourg.” He also “assisted Chase Manhattan in the merger acquisition of JP Morgan in order to form their main holding company in Luxembourg.” Yup, there are a lot of benefits to doing business through Luxembourg.
Combine bank secrecy with nominee corporations to get a particularly juicy cocktail. An entire industry of “fiduciaries” has formed around the banks for that purpose. These firms set up and maintain tax-advantaged nominee corporations, the infamous mailbox companies, whose directors and top executives are principals of the fiduciary firm. The client and the source of money remain anonymous to the outside world. A perfect setup for money laundering. Because the bank is doing business with a Luxembourg mailbox company, not a foreigner, and because the signatories are pillars of Luxembourg’s society, the setup is impervious to the automatic data-sharing arrangement. But now mailbox companies too are under attack, not only in Europe, but also in the US Congress.
“I expect a serious change of the banking landscape because there will be customer withdrawals,” Alain Steichen explained. Some banks, he said, “would lose the critical mass needed to survive.”
The private banks he was talking about managed €300 billion in assets, generated €3.14 billion in revenues, and contributed €503 million in taxes, according to the ABBL. They employ over 10,000 people directly and indirectly. Of the assets under management, 19% are from Luxembourg, the rest from other countries. Half of that system would disappear; the survivors would have to shrink.
“A large part of the clients of the Luxembourgian banks have undeclared money,” Steichen pointed out. They wouldn’t have a lot of options other than closing their accounts in Luxembourg, he said. They might repatriate their funds – and pay fees, taxes, and penalties – or transfer their funds to Singapore, Monaco, or other murky banking centers. Either way, these assets would leave Luxembourg. Their power to generate income, jobs, and tax revenues would evaporate.
This “undeclared money” has been called “black money” in the battle over Cyprus, much of it from Russians. Northern Europe revolted against bailing out mailbox companies and their black-money bank accounts. While they were at it, Northern Europe, including France in this case, shut down the whole offshore machine, crippled the Cypriot economy, smashed its largest source of income and wealth, and demolished its business model. Encouraged by success, Northern Europe, now including the UK, swiveled its guns in direction of Luxembourg.
Luxembourg was horrified. There were too many parallels between it and Cyprus – the mailbox companies, foreign black money, a bloated financial sector, high household wealth…. It was the era of austerity when pensions, wages, and social services were on the chopping block in other countries. Taxes were being jacked up, as in France, to an absurd degree. Belts were being tightened around the poor. So, tax evasion by the rich and not so rich has become an obvious target. Governments would crack down, but not on their own tax dodgers, but more conveniently on countries whose business it was to help them.
With 38% of GDP depending on the financial sector, Luxembourg could not risk a sudden “transition” to a new business model, à la Cyprus. Some of the banks could collapse in the process. It would cause a depression and shred the country’s wealth. Instead, Luxembourg would cooperate, in return for a gradual transition, some loopholes, and a little wiggle room, knowing that the good times were over, and that on other end of the spectrum, there’d be the Cypriot scenario.
Austerity in Spain succeeded in trimming the bloated government sector. But instead of picking up the slack, the private sector destroyed jobs almost four times faster! The hope is that this fiasco will finally reverse course, that something will click and start a virtuous cycle before the unspeakable happens. But so far, it has relentlessly gotten worse. Read…. The Spanish Unemployment Powder Keg




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