http://ca.news.yahoo.com/spain-votes-stop-catalonia-independence-referendum-222409700--business.html
MADRID (Reuters) - Spain's parliament voted on Tuesday to block the northern region of Catalonia from holding a referendum on independence, the latest step in a growing political battle between Barcelona and Madrid in the midst of a deepening economic downturn.
The motion to permit the referendum was brought to the lower house by the Catalan ERC party but was voted down by the ruling conservatives (PP), which hold an absolute majority, the opposition Socialists (PSOE) and the smaller UPyD party.
The heavily indebted region, responsible for a fifth of the country's economic output, voted in favor of holding the referendum at the end of September, in defiance of Madrid.
Catalonia brought forward regional elections to November 25 after regional leader Artur Mas's proposal to create a separate Catalan tax agency was flatly rejected by Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy, who said it went against Spain's Constitution.
Mas then said he would seek a referendum on an independent Catalonia, rattling already nervous international markets which have pushed up Spanish debt premiums on concerns it cannot control its finances, largely due to its over-spending regions.
Catalonia, all but shut out of international debt markets, has requested a state liquidity line for just over 5 billion euros ($6.45 billion).
Independence fervor has been growing in Catalonia during the deep recession. More than half of Catalans say they want a separate state. ($1 = 0.7754 euros)
http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2012/10/09/1200921/sherlock-holmes-herein-played-by-buchheit-says-debt-reprofiling/
A read for the train home from Buchheit (who helped mastermind the Greek restructuring at Cleary Gottlieb) and Gulati on the options now facing the eurozone’s sovereign debtors and those holding the purse strings.
Not too surprisingly:
[Their paper] concludes that there are no painless or riskless options. In the end, the question may come down to this — to what extent will the official sector sponsors of peripheral Europe be prepared to take on their own shoulders (and off of the shoulders of private sector lenders) a significant portion of the debt stocks of these countries during this period of fiscal adjustment?
It begins with the the bailout in Greece and contrasts it with historical precedent, particularly that of the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s and early 1990s. It then runs through the reasons for the original move — fear of contagion, balance sheet damage, reputation of the euro — before moving on to the rather belated change of course that was the Greek restructuring.
Next comes the ‘diagnosis’ (with our emphasis):
The original objective of containing the Eurozone debt crisis has failed. Exactly why it failed depends on your point of view. Some would argue that the measures adopted to ensure containment were inept, inconsistent and insufficient. The more charitably disposed may say that the underlying economic problems of the peripheral countries were so intractable that nothing short of a decision to monetize every debt instrument south of the Rhine could have successfully stopped the rot. Ireland and Portugal were the next to go; Cyprus, Italy and Spain now twitch nervously in the crosshairs.The options facing the Eurozone at this stage are a function of how the current problem is being diagnosed by the official sector. In a word, the view of the official sector is that we are confronting a temporal problem. Spain and Italy have each embarked on an aggressive program of voluntary fiscal adjustment. All that is needed, the argument goes, is time. Time to let that fiscal adjustment produce its desired effect. Above all, time for the markets to appreciate that the adjustment programs are irreversible and to reward the countries with lower interest rates on their new debt issuances. If we could only fast forward for a few years, this view holds, the entire problem would evaporate like a mist on a chilly hillside in the springtime.The only question is how to bridge this gap — measured in months or at most a few years — between the announcement of fiscal adjustment and the market’s willingness to reward that adjustment with lower risk premia.
And then the options for dealing with countries like Italy or Spain, of which there are probably only five according to B&G, ranked below in descending order of their attractiveness to the debtor country.:Option One: Jolly the marketsThe preferred option for the debtor country, and the stage we are currently in with Spain and Italy, is to jolly the markets into an act of faith, hope and charity…Option Two: Massage the yields[Essentially OMT, of which more below]If Options One and Two both fail, the country loses market access (as happened in Greece, Ireland and Portugal).Option Three: Full bailoutOption Four: ReprofilingWere the official sector to balk at paying out existing creditors at par (the now widely-recognized error of the first Greek bailout), some form of debt restructuring becomes inevitable. The mildest debt restructuring technique that will accomplish the official sector’s objective of moving maturities out of the program period is known as a debt reprofiling. This technique, used successfully by Uruguay in its restructuring in 2003, has the merit of simplicity. The maturity dates of all items of outstanding debt (except perhaps for short-term Treasury bills) are shifted out by a fixed number of years — three, five or seven years, for example. In a Uruguay-style reprofiling, no haircut is applied to the principal of the debt and the interest rate applicable to the extension period is the original coupon rate on each of the affected instruments.A reprofiling offers these advantages:Local politicians can claim that investors will be paid back every euro they lent together with interest calculated at the original rate. The repayment of principal will merely be delayed a bit.Reprofiling moves maturities out of the program period and obviates the need for the official sector to fund those maturities; this is its principal charm in the eyes of the official sector.The net present value loss to investors resulting from a reprofiling is muted. It will depend, of course, on the length of the extension period. In Uruguay’s case (a five year extension), the NPV loss was about 19%.If the debtor country cannot return effortlessly to normal market borrowing when the period of the extension ends, the ensuing debt restructuring will bite the private sector lenders, not taxpayers.Option Five: Full (Greek-style) restructuringThe final option is a full restructuring of the debt stock combining both a maturity extension and principal/interest haircuts. This is where Greece wound up in the spring of 2012.As to Option Two, OMT, it poses these risks, say B&G (which have been covered before but are worth repeating):The market will obviously realize that its own assessment of the appropriate risk/reward calculus (reflected in the coupon the market demands on a new bond) has been skewed by the presence of an official sector deus ex machina in the process. Investors will presumably continue to buy those bonds at that officially induced interest rate only if they believe that either (i) they effectively are being given a put of the instruments to the ECB or (ii) in the event of a future restructuring the ECB, as the largest holder of the bonds and now publicly committed to accept pari passu treatment, will use its considerable leverage to ensure that short-dated bonds are exempted from (or treated very leniently in) the restructuring.Nonetheless, the markets may mercilessly test the ECB’s willingness to persist in buying unlimited quantities of peripheral sovereign bonds. And every time a prominent politician in Germany or elsewhere, perhaps goaded by an ECB report of an eye-watering mark-to-market loss on OMT-acquired bonds, rails against the OMT program, the shorts will be emboldened. They will constantly be measuring the amount of political rope left in the ECB’s coil. Once the ECB commences buying, it must be prepared to continue doing so until the earlier to occur of a capitulation by the shorts or a general market acceptance that the crisis has abated in the target country.The OMT program will apparently restrict its buying to the short end of the yield curve (one to three years). Every atom of the political flesh in the debtor country will therefore want to concentrate primary market borrowings in this sweet spot where the yields benefit from official sector intervention. Why borrow for ten years at 9% when one can borrow for two years at 3%? Unless restricted by the terms of the IMF-prescribed adjustment program, however, this tendency to borrow short will very quickly produce an alarming debt profile, one characterized by an Himalayan spike in the early years. The optical impression that such a spike will leave on the retinas of prospective investors may itself become an obstacle to renewed market access.What happens if austerity fatigue forces the politicians in the debtor country to fall out of the fiscal adjustment bed at a time when the ECB owns a sizeable chunk of OMT-acquired bonds? Experience tells us that public resentment of austerity measures tends to intensify when the aggrieved citizens perceive the author of their misery to be an organization such as the IMF rather than their own elected representatives. The danger here is that the ECB, and more generally the EU, could become a hostage to its own policies. Rather than abruptly suspend further OMT purchases to a non-complying country, with the predictable consequence of an immediate spike in yields and massive mark-to-market losses in the OMT portfolio, the Europeans may feel that they have little choice but to accede to whatever relaxation of the adjustment program is demanded by the debtor country. So much for OMT conditionality.
Finally, assessing the options:Option One (cajole the markets into an act of faith, hope and charity) appears to be ending; perhaps it never really had much of a chance.Option Two (massage the yields) is about to begin. The OMT program may work but its fate will turn crucially on three factors that are difficult to handicap. How relentlessly will the markets test the ECB’s resolve to continue buying peripheral bonds in unlimited quantities? Second, how successful will the ECB be in mollifying the unhappiness of its largest shareholder with the very idea of buying bonds in the secondary market for this purpose? Third, will the economic recovery of the affected countries (and their planned return to normal market borrowing) be delayed by forces beyond their control, a further slowdown in global economic growth for example. This could require the deus ex machina to stay on the stage longer than anyone anticipated.For two reasons, Option Three (full bailout), if it is tried at all, may not last long. First, the memory of the ill-fated May 2010 Greek bailout is still fresh in the minds of the official sector. Will taxpayer money again be used to repay, in full and on time, private sector creditors, particularly when OSI (official sector involvement, a/k/a restructuring of official sector debt) is in the offing? Second, are there sufficient resources in the European bailout mechanisms to repay all of the maturing debt of the countries now in play over even the next 15 monthsOption Five (a Greek-style restructuring) seems unlikely. In Spain and Italy most of the foreign investors have already exited and been replaced by local financial institutions — banks, insurance companies and pension funds. A massive haircut to the debt stocks of either of these countries will therefore only decapitate the domestic financial systems. The money saved in debt service will have to be used to recapitalize those institutions.As Sherlock Holmes might have said, exclude the impossible and whatever is left, however improbable, must be true. That logic leaves Option Four, a debt reprofiling designed to shift maturities out of the adjustment program period while inflicting the least possible NPV loss on the debtholders. As the months roll sweetly on, however, a Uruguay-style debt reprofiling becomes less and less attractive. Uruguay had the luxury of extending its bond issues at their original coupon levels because those bonds had been issued at a time when Uruguay was investment grade. So the reprofiling meant an extension of low-coupon debt.European peripherals were in a similar situation at the start of this crisis; their bonds had been issued during the sunny years when the market failed to register any significant credit distinctions among Eurozone members. The coupons on those bonds, even for Greece, were therefore only marginally higher than equivalent-maturity German bonds.Once the illusion of uniform creditworthiness within the Eurozone was blasted by the events in Greece in early 2010, the coupons on new issuances of debt by European peripherals increased significantly. A Uruguay-style extension of the entirety of the debt stock of one of these countries today will therefore not be as attractive as it would have been two years ago, and it grows less attractive as each month passes and maturing debt has to be rolled over at interest rates higher than those applicable to the original issuances.
Let’s be clear: a debt restructuring, even a mild one like a reprofiling operation, is a last resort alternative for most members of the official sector. They may eventually come to it, as they eventually came to it in Greece, but only if all other alternatives show themselves to be financially or politically untenable. Even now, the official sector takes every opportunity to describe the Greek restructuring as “unique and exceptional.”Notwithstanding this revulsion to a debt restructuring, if one becomes unavoidable the process will be facilitated — as it was in Greece — by the high percentage of local law instruments in the affected debt stock. Moreover, the concentration of the paper in the hands of local investors, while it may rule out the more savage debt restructuring techniques, should at least give the sovereign a malleable creditor universe. Local institutions are susceptible to forms of governmental persuasion to which foreigners are immune.
http://www.businessinsider.com/protester-dresses-up-as-hitler-in-greece-to-protest-merkel-2012-10
( Greece welcomes Merkel.... )
AP
According to images, the Nazi flag was later burned.
http://www.athensnews.gr/portal/11/58565
| Greece must implement measures, eurogroup says | |||
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Greece must commit to implementing the fiscal adjustment programme by October 18 in order to receive the next tranche of the EU/IMF bailout loan, Finance Minister Yannis Stournaras was told at Monday's Eurogroup meeting in Luxembourg.
At a press conference after the meeting, Eurogroup chief Jean-Claude Juncker and International Monetary Fund (IMF) chief Christine Lagarde acknowledged the "substantial progress" made by Greece, particularly recently.
Juncker said he was impressed by the performance of the Greek government and the coalition government’s determination "to meet our demands".
Lagarde, however, added that much remains to be done in many sectors, including fiscal and structural reforms, taxation and recapitalization of the debt.
"We stressed that before the next disbursement Greece should demonstrate its commitment to fully implement the programme -- and the 89 terms agreed upon in March must be implemented by the 18th of October at the latest," Juncker said at the close of the meeting of finance ministers from the 17-nation euro single currency area.
IMF managing director Lagarde clarified that "from the initial list a lot has already been done," adding that "the list of prior actions has to be implemented."
In the next weeks a comprehensive decision must be taken on Greece, there is no time to lose, Juncker added.
Greek Finance Minister Stournaras added on his part that if Greece were to get a two year extension on the bailout, a possibility which is now “on the table”, it would only cost the an additional 12 billion euros, a sum which he claims could be covered relatively easily.
Stournaras further stressed that Greece’s progress must become a priority for all European nations. He emphasised that of the measures to be implemented in 2013-2014, 84 percent are meant to lower expenditures and 16 percent aimed at raising revenues. He also noted that Greece’s expenditures are the lowest in the eurozone at 40 percent of the GDP.
Finance ministers from smaller countries such as Slovakia, Slovenia, Malta and Estonia, were hostile regarding aid to Greece, Ta Nea reported, as they argued that Greece is a rich country and they cannot justify financing her to their constituents.
Asked if the next tranche of 31.5 billion euros would be disbursed in a one-off instalment, IMF managing director Lagarde said it was too early to give a specific reply. Stournaras also noted that Greece is owed an additional 5 billion euros from a September payment that was delayed.
To another question on whether the IMF presented a report on the sustainability of the Greek debt to the meeting, Lagarde replied in the negative, saying the report was expected. (Athens News/le, AMNA, Ta Nea)
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and.....
http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com/2012/10/parla-spains-54th-largest-city-poised.html
Monday, October 08, 2012 7:37 PM
Parla, Spain's 54th Largest City, Poised for Bankruptcy
Alarm bells and official denials about the state of affairs of Parla, Spain's 54th largest city, are ringing loud and clear today.
Courtesy of Google Translate from El Economista, please consider Parla, one step from bankruptcy: cannot deal with creditors.
Courtesy of Google Translate from El Economista, please consider Parla, one step from bankruptcy: cannot deal with creditors.
The economic situation of the City of Parla "can not deal with creditors and maintain basic health services to citizens," according to the report of the Audit Chamber of the Community of Madrid, who advised to take measures to continuity of the consistory. However, the City of Parla has denied Monday that is on the verge of bankruptcy.
The report, which has had access, stated that the measures that have been launched this Madrid City Council, which governs the PSOE since the first democratic elections, "not enough" to pay "a debt so high."
In this regard, local authorities summons to articulate "some exceptional plan" to allow continuity of the consistory of the town, which is located at number 54 in population census nationally (130,000 inhabitants) and in ninth place in the Community of Madrid.
From City of Parla, the Councillor of Finance, Fernando Jiménez, has denied "categorically" that the City is "on the verge of bankruptcy" and insists that they have taken steps to improve the economic situation.This is clearly an open-and-shut case. Parla is bankrupt. Expect to see more of these situations because they are 100% certain to happen.
He admits that the city is going through "difficult times" as all the authorities of this country, but emphasizes that the management has been done and is done in this Consistory is "effective and flawless" proof of this, he adds, is that this city " goes on. "
Mike "Mish" Shedlock
and....
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/debt-crisis-live/9595329/Debt-crisis-Greek-protests-as-Merkel-visits-Athens-live.html
18.17 AP has some colour from the protests in Athens, where estimates suggest that 50,000 people headed out onto the streets of the Greek capital to protest against Angela Merkel's visit.
AP writes:
Dozens of youths broke away from the peaceful rally and threw rocks and flares at riot police, who responded with pepper spray and stun grenades, in clashes that were relatively minor.
More than 7,000 police had cordoned off parks and other sections of city to keep demonstrators away from the German leader.
As a helicopter buzzed overhead, thousands of protesters, chanting "History is written by the disobedient" gathered in front of Greek parliament. One group of demonstrators burned a Swastika and threw it onto a police barrier, while a group of special forces reservists appeared in uniform and chanted "Merkel out of Greece" in time to their march.
"I have no doubt that (Merkel) has good intentions, and wants to help, but that won't solve Europe's problem," retired teacher Irini Kourdaki said. "Europe is polarized and ... we need a major change in policy."
17.30 The protests in Athens have turned bloody:
Riot police arrest a demonstrator during a protest against German Chancellor Angela Merkel's visit to Greece on Tuesday (Photo: Getty).
Protesters react to tear gas in Athens (Photo: AFP).
15.05 European finance ministers have released a joint statement following their meeting in Luxembourg.
The ministers confirmed that Portugal would be given a one year extension to meet its deficit targets. On a financial transaction tax, they said:
The Council was informed of developments regarding the possible introduction of a financial transaction tax (FTT), via enhanced cooperation, in a limited number of member states. The Commission indicated that it had received letters from seven member states requesting a proposal to that effect (Belgium, Germany, Greece, France, Austria, Portugal and Slovenia), and four delegations announced that they would shortly follow suit (Estonia, Spain, Italy and Slovakia).
14.23 Mrs Merkel says that Greece's progress on reform has accelerated, though she stresses that she is not visiting the country to preach or award grades.
14.18 The crisis will not be solved with the beat of a drum, says Mrs Merkel, and nothing will happen overnight.
But she is "deeply convinced" that tough medicine is the best medicine. The tough path Greece is on will pay off, she adds.
14.14 ...but there is much to be done, she adds.
Mrs Merkel says the pair discussed bilateral projects that would herald a new level of partnership. She adds that she will do all she can to helpGreece to gain access to funds from the European Investment Bank.
Germany will support the Greece's efforts to grow, she adds (the government forecast last week that Greece would enter its sixth year of recession in 2013).
14.11 Mrs Merkel says Greece and Germany are partners and friends, and that Greece is making progress every day. She adds that she was "glad" to travel to Athens.
Antonis Samaras and Angela Merkel speak after their statements to the press at the Maximos Mansion in Athens (Photo: EPA).
14.09 Greece's sacrifices must not go to waste, Mr Samaras adds. The two leaders discussed closer co-operation, and the meeting marked a new page in their relationship.
14.04 Mr Samaras reiterates that Greece is determined to stay in the euro, stick to its promises and implement reforms. The Greek people are "bleeding", he says, but are determined to stay in the euro.
14.02 Angela Merkel and Antonis Samaras are holding a press conference following their meeting in Athens. It is being broadcast live onSky News.
13.55 Mr de Guindos also said that the Eurogroup of finance ministers had not asked Spain for more cuts when they met on Monday night. He said:
There was a positive evaluation of Spain's economic policy and the need to carry out a fiscal adjustment that is sensitive, sensible to the economic situation in the country.
France's Finance Minister Pierre Moscovici (R) talks with Spain's Economy Minister Luis de Guindos (L) during a European Union finance ministers meeting on Tuesday (Photo: Reuters).
13.51 Spain's finance minister has said that the IMF's forecasts for the country are not set in stone and that it would work hard to avoid a deep recession. Speaking to reporters in Luxembourg, Luis de Guindos said:
I greatly respect the IMF forecasts ... but they are not written in stone [...] I don't think the Spanish government has been excessively optimistic regarding its forecasts for this year.
The only thing I can say (about the IMF's forecasts for Spain) is to try to avoid that they happen. Logically, we are working on the basis that such negative forecasts are not met. More than the projection, which is important, is to see how we are closing the Spanish macroeconomic imbalances.
The IMF now predicts that the Spanish economy will shrink by 1.5pc this year, and 1.3pc in 2013. In July, it forecast contractions of 1.4pc and 0.6pc respectively.
13.35 We have updated our picture gallery of the Merkel visit and protests.
13.33 ...and protests are in full swing:
Protesters hold a banner which reads in Greek "Revolt " during a demonstration in Athens (Photo: AP).
13.20 Talks are underway:
13.16 Greek police have used stun grenades and pepper spray to push back protesters in Athens, according to Reuters.
12.56 Angela Merkel and Antonis Samaras have been posing for photos outside Maximos mansion in Athens:
12.45 At least eleven eurozone states will sign up to a financial transactions tax, according to the EU's tax commissioner.
Algirdas Semeta told reporters:
Four additional member states intend to join the enhanced cooperation (see 09.08), which means we arrive at 11.
Sources told Reuters that Italy, Spain (both have publicly supported a FTT) and Estonia (which said last week it wanted more information on a proposed FTT before it signs up) intend to join. Slovakia declared its intentions this morning.
12.07 Mr Draghi also said that "peer pressure" would form part of making sure that national supervisors don't just act in national interests:
It will be addressed through peer pressure. This system, when it will be fully operational, has to be conducive to a very open exchange by supervisors on the state of health of the institutions they supervise.
So in this sense, there is going to be peer pressure, exchange, common decision-making and which should probably overcome the tendency for national supervisors to take care of national interest.
One of the requirements is the strict separation of monetary policy and supervision, so there no one who is more attached to this.
11.59 Mario Draghi has said that the ECB will take one year to adapt to its new role as the eurozone's banking supervisor. He told the European Parliament:
The ECB is not supposed take over supervision in three months' time and do it. There is a phase-in time. We foresee that one year will be needed to adapt all the structures ...
The important thing is that the (European) Council regulation enters into force on Jan. 1 and then we can start officially to work with national supervisors to put in place this system. By and large, we give ourselves one year.
11.50 Let's turn to Spain for a moment, where the Red Cross will make its first ever public appeal on behalf of cash-strapped citizens in the eurozone's fourth largest economy. The BBC's Tom Burridge reports:
The 10th of October is always Little Flag Day in Spain, when people wear a small white badge with a red cross and volunteers, and those working for the Red Cross collect money from people on the streets of Spanish cities.
The Spanish Red Cross says this is the first time they have launched a domestic appeal to raise money for Spanish families.
The 300,000 people the Red Cross wants to help represent a very small minority, who are living in difficult conditions as a result of the economic crisis.
However this is one of Spain's most recognised charities, known in the past for public appeals for disaster-hit or poverty-stricken countries abroad. And a campaign in Spain, to help Spanish people, is symbolic and will draw attention to the often invisible, social impact of the economic crisis.
10.02 For those wondering what the difference is between the ECB's new bond buying programme and QE in the UK, US and Japan - the ECBplans to "sterilise" its OMT purchases by taking an equal amount of money out of circulation as it puts in.
09.55 ECB president Mario Draghi has also been talking about the eurozone at a parliamentary hearing this morning, where he has ruled out money printing and said that cuts are the only way to resolve Europe's debt crisis. He said:
We should remember that the ECB cannot undertake monetary financing and cannot replace what other member states should do in this. This is true for Ireland and this is also true for every other case like this.
It's too easy to think that the ECB can replace government action or lack of it, printing money -- that's not going to happen.
[...] It is without doubt that the process of fiscal consolidation in the short term will depress, and has depressed, the output in different parts of the euro area.
But what's the alternative? Let's not forget that the crisis started from increased risk aversion, which addressed several problems, one of which was the unsustainability of deficits and debt levels.
09.38 As our Brussels correspondent Bruno Waterfield highlights:
There is a stark message for Germany, which is blocking a rapid move to an EU deposit insurance guarantee. The IMF said:
"Unless recent ECB actions are followed up with more proactive policies by others... the euro area could slide into the weak policies scenario, with deleterious consequences for the rest of the world.
"Banking union also requires a pan-European deposit insurance guarantee programme and a bank resolution mechanism with common backstops."
09.31 But unless eurozone members are willing to make a banking union work - and quickly - the downturn could become "entrenched", the IMFhas warned. It said in its global forecast:
In this scenario, the forces of financial fragmentation increase and become entrenched, capital holes in banking systems expand, and the intra-euro-area capital account crisis increasingly spills outward.
09.25 One country that isn't in favour of a FTT is Holland. Jan Kees de Jager, the Dutch finance minister, said his country opposes the tax, and that he’s reluctant to see other countries forge ahead with it.
Mr de Jager also stressed that it was important not to rush proposals through for a banking union. He told reporters:
The January 1 deadline is probably ambitious yes. We have to do it right, without mistakes like we have seen in the past with the eurozone. So it’s important to do it fast but not too fast. We are not fixed on a calendar, we are fixed on the substance.
09.08 Maria Fekter, Austria's finance minister, told reporters this morning that she was optimistic that there would be enough countries in favour of a financial transaction tax (FTT) in order to press ahead with plans.Enhanced co-operation rules require nine or more countries to agree. So far, seven have said yes:
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Portugal and Slovenia.
Ms Fekter said:
We will see how many countries have agreed to this. I am very confident that we will reach nine -- if not today then after the debate today and then we’ll start with the enhanced cooperation.
08.50 Her Majesty puts things into perspective:
08.46 Greeks were out on the streets of Athens last night to protest against anti-austerity measures ahead of the German Chancellor's visit. Some held up banners with the words: "Get out of our country b----".
Greek newspaper Kathimerini reports this morning that Mrs Merkel's visit will disrupt public transport in the capital.
Several metro stations will be closed, while buses will stop running from 11am to 4pm as part of a drviers' strike.
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