http://www.zerohedge.com/news/referendum-germany-preparing-nuclear-option
Submitted by Tyler Durden on 08/10/2012 14:52 -0400
Submitted by Tyler Durden on 08/10/2012 10:16 -0400
While they wait, Madrid should stick with the policies it is pursuing but intensify its work on the banking sector. If high yields persist, Spain can bear it for a while – no one should buy the kabbalism according to which a certain level of yields marks the entrance to a black hole. The eurozone needs to convince investors it will be able to act if panic persists, which it can best do by giving the new rescue fund a banking license.
But the best remedy against panic is reassurance. A greater sense of political competence in Madrid and of decisiveness in Brussels would do wonders.
I see it very differently. Policy is certainly adding to the problems in Spain, but I don’t think it is because, as the editorial claims, Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy has mismanaged the political process, and I am not sure that greater political competence in Madrid, or decisiveness in Brussels (!), will do anything at all, let alone wonders.
Too Late to Save Spain
The problem, I think, is much more serious than Rajoy’s flunking hard choices, and I don’t think there was anything he could do to increase the country’s credibility in a significant way. We have long passed that stage.
Why? Because, as I have been suggesting for the last six to twelve months, Spain has already started on its downward spiral and there is almost nothing Rajoy or anyone else can do to prevent all parts of the economy – workers, small businesses, large businesses, creditors, depositors, and yes, policymakers – from acting each in their own way to increase the debt burden, increase economic uncertainty, make the balance sheet more fragile, and reduce growth. These different economic agents by now are simply behaving rationally in response to declining credibility, and unless we expect from them a huge burst of irrational cheer, there is no reason to expect them to change their behavior.
All of their actions, of course, reduce credibility further, and as credibility drops it simply reinforces the adverse behavior of all the rationally misbehaving economic agents. This is the dreaded self-reinforcing loop typical of countries in the nightmare stage of a debt crisis.
We have seen this process many times before in the history of sovereign debt crises, and it is mind-numbingly mechanical. No matter how well Rajoy implements fiscal austerity (assuming that this is indeed the right thing to do), no matter how many times policymakers plead with markets to give them time to implement reforms, no matter how often the government begs workers and businesses to have more confidence, at this point it is going to be incredibly difficult for Spain to escape from this cycle.
Problem is Arithmetic
The problem is arithmetic, not confidence. Basic balance of payments math tells us that in order to repay its external debt Spain must run a large trade surplus. If it ends up however with a trade surplus caused simply by a collapse in domestic demand and soaring unemployment, which is the current path, domestic politics will become unmanageable and Spain will eventually be forced to leave the euro in order to regain competitiveness in a less painful way. One of the good things about a well-functioning democracy is that it simply won’t permit a debt crisis to be resolved by forcing an unacceptable burden onto the working population.
Trade Surplus Math
The requirement for a trade surplus is the key point. Even if there were no capital flight, and assuming we are unlikely to see large investment-driven private inflows into Spain for many years – a pretty safe bet, I would think – Spain must run a large trade surplus in order to repay foreign debt holders (technically Spain must actually run a current account surplus, but in practice this means a trade surplus). Of course capital flight, which is already large and rising, as I will discuss later, means that Spain must run an even larger trade surplus than otherwise if it is going to repay external debt.
Under what conditions can Spain run a large enough trade surplus? There are really just four ways this can happen. One way is through a collapse in domestic consumption caused by many years of unemployment above 20%. In this case eventually relative wage growth will be sufficiently negative for Spain to regain competitivity, although declining prices and wages also mean that the debt burden will get worse during this period. Of course the political cost of many years of unemployment above 20% will be tremendous and almost certainly unsustainable, and we are already seeing this in the growing popular rage in Spain against the political establishment. There is no reason to think that popular anger won’t get worse.
The second way is for Germany to reflate domestic demand enough to cause its large trade surplus to become an equally large trade deficit. This will allow eurozone countries like Spain to reverse their own deficits, which under the conditions of the monetary union were simply the flip side of Germany’s surplus. If Germany does this, however, its own real growth will slow significantly and may even become negative for many years.
In addition Germany’s debt burden will rise rapidly, because in order to reflate it will need to cut consumption and income taxes sharply, to boost fiscal spending, and to absorb rapidly rising non-performing loans in its banking system. As of now there seems little chance that Germany will do this, especially as it will also need to guarantee Spanish debt directly or indirectly to stop the downward spiral in the debt markets.
The third way is simply a variation on the second. The euro would need to fall sufficiently to allow the whole eurozone to run large – huge – trade surpluses. This is Martin Feldstein’s argument in last week’s Financial Times, A rapid fall in the euro can save Spain, where he suggested that “financial markets may already be in the process of forcing a solution upon Brussels policy makers”.
The problem with this, however, is obvious. It can only work if Europe were small enough and the rest of the world were in good enough economic shape that the global economy could absorb a sharply rising European trade surplus.
But with deficit countries doing all they can to reduce their deficits, and surplus countries doing all they can to maintain or increase their surpluses, it is hard to imagine how Europe, which is already a surplus entity, can possibly increase its overall surplus enough to bail out peripheral Europe.
That leaves the fourth way. Spain can freeze banking deposits, abandon the euro, and devalue. This would be very painful, but it would allow the country to regain international competitiveness in much less time and run a trade surplus (mainly at Germany’s expense, by the way) with much lower levels of unemployment and economic self-destruction. Of course it would also mean a soaring debt burden as the new currency devalues relative to the country’s euro-denominated debt, and so would almost certainly come with a debt restructuring (again mainly at Germany’s expense) that would reduce the debt servicing costs.
These are the four conditions under which Spain can run a sufficiently large trade surplus to service its external debt, and since three of them are impractical or highly unlikely, we are left with the fourth. This is why I think the probability of Spain’s abandoning the euro is much higher than its staying in the euro.
Downward Spiral
Meanwhile, and in case there is any doubt, we have had more chilling news that indicates just how firmly Spain is caught up in the downward spiral. First, Madrid last week downgraded its growth forecasts, saying that the recession would continue into 2013.
This apparently shocked the market but I cannot see why. I have argued many times over the past three years that quarter after quarter policymakers are going to adjust their forecasts downwards, not because they have been dishonest in their previous forecasts but simply because they never take into consideration the impact that rising debt and declining credibility have on forcing adverse changes in the behavior of economic agents.
Expect Downward Revisions
The economy will always perform more poorly than expected because rational economic agents will always behave in ways that automatically make matters worse. Expect many more years of downward growth revisions, not just for Spain but for all of Europe.
I had bookmarked Martin Feldstein’s column with an intent of challenging the notion that a falling euro could save Spain, but I failed to get around to it. The irony is just a couple years back, nearly everyone thought the solution to the global financial crisis was a cheaper dollar.
Indeed, a quick search shows that on August 24, 2011, less than a year ago, Feldstein argued in a Bloomberg Interview (Dollar Decline Benefits U.S. Economy) that "A lower dollar means more exports, and it also means a shift from consuming imported products to consuming goods and services that we produce in the United States".
Apparently a lower dollar and a lower euro are both needed. Given the euro is 57% of the US dollar index just how likely is that?
Moreover, a falling euro, even if it did help the eurozone as a whole, would hardly help Spain more than Germany given Germany's productivity advantages over Spain.
What Spain Needs
Spain does not need a lower euro, it actually needs a higher one (with Spain back on the pesata). Alternatively (and in fact preferably) Spain can indeed benefit from a lower euro (provided of course Germany is back on the Deutsche Mark.
The key point is that it is complete silliness to think anything else but a breakup of the eurozone (coupled with genuine work rule reform) can help Spain.
What About Italy?
Pettis did not mention Italy in his email, but I think Italy exits the eurozone before Spain.
Anti-euro and anti-German sentiment is high and rising in Italy, and technocrat prime minister Mario Monti will be gone by April.
It will not take much to push Italy over the edge given the rise of the Five Star Movement. For details, please see
Read more at http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com/2012/08/problem-in-europe-is-arithmetic-not.html#7Cb24ZqVt738M76D.99
Referendum: Is Germany Preparing For The Nuclear Option?
Two months ago, in the aftermath of the "surprising victory" for the Italian PM from the June 29 European summit, which the media mistakenly interpreted as successful for Monti and Rajoy, whose hijacking tactics merely led to even more European animosity and instability in a system that is beyond fragile (i.e., Europe), we proposed an entirely different explanation, namely that "Merkel's Surprising "Defeat" was Merely A Gambit For A German Referendum?" To wit: "it appears that events over the past week may have been merely a gambit for something that Schauble and Weidmann have already hinted at: a popular referendum that decides the fate of Europe once and for all, washing Merkel's hands and letting the people decide if they want the European experiment to continue or not." Turns out we were right.
From Spiegel:
Germany Considers Holding EU Referendum
The chancellor is in a tricky position at the moment, as she fails to get the euro crisis under control. Of course, the Economist's notion of a secret plan to break up the euro zone is purely fictitious. But it fits into the current debate, where more and more politicians from Germany's coalition government are talking about radical steps to solve the euro crisis.
Officially, though, Merkel's line is that she wants more Europe, not less. In the chancellor's bid to save the common currency, she is willing to go to the very limits of what is permissible under the German constitution. That was made clear by her support for the permanent euro rescue fund, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), and her pet project, the fiscal pact. But Merkel still wants more. "We need a political union," she recently said on German public television station ARD. "That means we have to give up further competencies to Europe, step by step, in an ongoing process."
Talk of a Vote
But that will probably not work, given the limits of the German constitution, something that members of the opposition have been pointing out for some time. In the meantime, more and more people within the governing parties have been talking about holding a referendum in Germany on the European Union. Rainer Brüderle, the floor leader of the business-friendly Free Democrats, Merkel's junior coalition partner, said on Friday that there could come a point "when a referendum on Europe becomes necessary."
Horst Seehofer, head of the Christian Social Union (CSU), the Bavarian sister party to Merkel's Christian Democratic Union (CDU), has even called for several referendums. Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble has also talked about holding a national vote on the EU.
Such a vote could indeed be a way to get the much needed legitimacy for a transfer of national competences to Brussels. But how would it actually work in practice? SPIEGEL ONLINE presents an overview of some possibilities.
There are three conceivable options for a referendum:
1. The Voluntary Way
The German constitution, officially known as the Basic Law, does not make much mention of direct democracy. Referendums are only specifically foreseen for the case of a reorganization of Germany's territory and for the event that the Basic Law, which was originally supposed to be temporary, is superseded by a new constitution. There have been repeated calls to give the population a greater say beyond ordinary elections, especially from the opposition. In contrast to the CDU, the CSU and FDP are open to the idea.
Critics say that questions about transfers of competence or measures to save the euro are too complex. But CSU leader Seehofer considers those objections to be "pure arrogance" towards the people. In the newspaper Die Welt, Seehofer listed three areas where people should have more say. They include: the transfer of significant competencies to Brussels; the enlargement of the European Union through new member states; and German financial support for other EU states.
What is striking here is that the CSU would answer "no" to all of these questions. And the party believes that an increasingly euroskeptic German population would also say the same. But not even Seehofer himself appears to believe that the constitution would really be amended to include his proposed referendums.
2. The Forced Way
Even more likely than opening up the constitution for referendums is that it comes up for discussion as a consequence of European integration. And this, of course, would require Germans to decide on a new constitution. Article 146 of the constitution stipulates that the current constitution "shall cease to apply on the day on which a constitution freely adopted by the German people takes effect."
Indeed, Schäuble and Brüderle aren't the only ones that suspect that when the Federal Constitutional Court delivers its verdict on the fiscal pact and the ESM, it will say that the limits of the current constitution have been reached. What's more, since the official stance of almost all German political parties is that the response to the crisis should be "more Europe," a referendum seems inevitable.
At the moment, the questions of exactly what Germans would be voting on and when are just as unclear as what the court will decide. So far, there has only been vague talk about such issues as "political union," "yielded sovereignty" and "common budgetary policy." Peer Steinbrück, a former federal finance minister and leading figure in the center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD), predicts that there will be a referendum within two years, while Schäuble says five. Typically, Chancellor Merkel refuses to speculate.
Despite this guessing game, one thing is clear: Before Germans can hold a vote on the EU, the European Union has to decide what it wants. "Creating a new constitution, if necessary, can only be the absolutely final step and therefore never a 'foundation stone' in the construction of a new European statehood but, rather, always only the 'keystone,'" stressed constitutional law expert Hans-Peter Schneider in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung newspaper.
Still, getting to the keystone stage could take some time -- even if the crisis calls for determined action. Seen from this perspective, the various ideas about referendums that even the ruling coalition is throwing around right now are probably nothing more than a way to keep voters calm.
In short, the message they want to send is this: Don't worry. You will have the last word.
3. The European Way
A referendum in Germany could also be embedded within a pan-European referendum. This would theoretically have all EU member states vote on the expansion of EU powers, and on the same day.
The idea of having a common constitution for all EU states is not new. In 2004, EU heads of state and government approved a draft constitution that, among other things, would have given the European Parliament more power and limited the influence of individual member states. But after failed referendums in France and the Netherlands, the constitution idea fizzled out. Instead, leaders agreed on the Lisbon Treaty in 2007.
In order to put some teeth into EU policies aimed at better combating the financial and economic crises, there needs to be a new agreement -- or, better yet, a constitution.
A few weeks ago, European Justice Commissioner Viviane Reding said that such a constitution would have to be ratified by referendums in all EU countries. And that includes Germany.
and......
http://www.zerohedge.com/news/spanish-bonds-give-50-gains-week
Spanish Bonds Give Up 50% Of Gains In A Week
While we have pointed out that 10Y Spanish bonds have deteriorated notably since the Euphoric moves recently, we have oft heard the stoic bulls arguing thus: but, but, but... 2Y is where the real action is and that's where the ECB will support them. Umm, sorry, even amid a dismally quiet and illiquid week which should see yields drifting lower as they roll gently down the curve, 2Y Spanish bond yields have retraced 50% of their rally from last Friday and are comfortably back above 4% once again. Perhaps, slowly but surely, the realization that for it to get better, it has to get much worse is taking hold - though obviously US equity holders have yet to get that message.
and...
http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com/2012/08/problem-in-europe-is-
Friday, August 10, 2012 2:57 AM
Problem in Europe is Arithmetic, Not Confidence; Why the Eurozone Cannot Possibly Survive Intact
Via email, Michael Pettis at China Financial Markets makes a compelling case why Spain is destined to leave the euro. For ease in reading, I added the subtitles in bold.
In my forthcoming book (Princeton University Press, February 2012) I argue that there is little chance that the euro survives the next few years, or that we avoid major sovereign restructurings and/or defaults. I am not just talking about Greece, by the way. I think a Spanish devaluation (accompanied inevitably by a sovereign debt restructuring) is pretty much a sure thing too, along with devaluations among many of the other obvious suspects.Last week the Financial Times had an editorial, “Politics is adding to Spanish woes”, which they ended with the following:
After I turned in the completed manuscript of my upcoming book, my editors were a little worried about my extreme pessimism over the euro, and suggested that I hedge a little so as not to look foolish if these things didn’t happen, but honestly I am less worried about that possibility than I am worried that by the time my book comes out Spain will have already abandoned the euro. I really don’t see any progress at all in resolving the euro crisis, and the longer it takes to resolve, the more financial distress peripheral Europe will suffer, making a resolution of the crisis all the more difficult and urgent.
While they wait, Madrid should stick with the policies it is pursuing but intensify its work on the banking sector. If high yields persist, Spain can bear it for a while – no one should buy the kabbalism according to which a certain level of yields marks the entrance to a black hole. The eurozone needs to convince investors it will be able to act if panic persists, which it can best do by giving the new rescue fund a banking license.
But the best remedy against panic is reassurance. A greater sense of political competence in Madrid and of decisiveness in Brussels would do wonders.
I see it very differently. Policy is certainly adding to the problems in Spain, but I don’t think it is because, as the editorial claims, Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy has mismanaged the political process, and I am not sure that greater political competence in Madrid, or decisiveness in Brussels (!), will do anything at all, let alone wonders.
Too Late to Save Spain
The problem, I think, is much more serious than Rajoy’s flunking hard choices, and I don’t think there was anything he could do to increase the country’s credibility in a significant way. We have long passed that stage.
Why? Because, as I have been suggesting for the last six to twelve months, Spain has already started on its downward spiral and there is almost nothing Rajoy or anyone else can do to prevent all parts of the economy – workers, small businesses, large businesses, creditors, depositors, and yes, policymakers – from acting each in their own way to increase the debt burden, increase economic uncertainty, make the balance sheet more fragile, and reduce growth. These different economic agents by now are simply behaving rationally in response to declining credibility, and unless we expect from them a huge burst of irrational cheer, there is no reason to expect them to change their behavior.
All of their actions, of course, reduce credibility further, and as credibility drops it simply reinforces the adverse behavior of all the rationally misbehaving economic agents. This is the dreaded self-reinforcing loop typical of countries in the nightmare stage of a debt crisis.
We have seen this process many times before in the history of sovereign debt crises, and it is mind-numbingly mechanical. No matter how well Rajoy implements fiscal austerity (assuming that this is indeed the right thing to do), no matter how many times policymakers plead with markets to give them time to implement reforms, no matter how often the government begs workers and businesses to have more confidence, at this point it is going to be incredibly difficult for Spain to escape from this cycle.
Problem is Arithmetic
The problem is arithmetic, not confidence. Basic balance of payments math tells us that in order to repay its external debt Spain must run a large trade surplus. If it ends up however with a trade surplus caused simply by a collapse in domestic demand and soaring unemployment, which is the current path, domestic politics will become unmanageable and Spain will eventually be forced to leave the euro in order to regain competitiveness in a less painful way. One of the good things about a well-functioning democracy is that it simply won’t permit a debt crisis to be resolved by forcing an unacceptable burden onto the working population.
Trade Surplus Math
The requirement for a trade surplus is the key point. Even if there were no capital flight, and assuming we are unlikely to see large investment-driven private inflows into Spain for many years – a pretty safe bet, I would think – Spain must run a large trade surplus in order to repay foreign debt holders (technically Spain must actually run a current account surplus, but in practice this means a trade surplus). Of course capital flight, which is already large and rising, as I will discuss later, means that Spain must run an even larger trade surplus than otherwise if it is going to repay external debt.
Under what conditions can Spain run a large enough trade surplus? There are really just four ways this can happen. One way is through a collapse in domestic consumption caused by many years of unemployment above 20%. In this case eventually relative wage growth will be sufficiently negative for Spain to regain competitivity, although declining prices and wages also mean that the debt burden will get worse during this period. Of course the political cost of many years of unemployment above 20% will be tremendous and almost certainly unsustainable, and we are already seeing this in the growing popular rage in Spain against the political establishment. There is no reason to think that popular anger won’t get worse.
The second way is for Germany to reflate domestic demand enough to cause its large trade surplus to become an equally large trade deficit. This will allow eurozone countries like Spain to reverse their own deficits, which under the conditions of the monetary union were simply the flip side of Germany’s surplus. If Germany does this, however, its own real growth will slow significantly and may even become negative for many years.
In addition Germany’s debt burden will rise rapidly, because in order to reflate it will need to cut consumption and income taxes sharply, to boost fiscal spending, and to absorb rapidly rising non-performing loans in its banking system. As of now there seems little chance that Germany will do this, especially as it will also need to guarantee Spanish debt directly or indirectly to stop the downward spiral in the debt markets.
The third way is simply a variation on the second. The euro would need to fall sufficiently to allow the whole eurozone to run large – huge – trade surpluses. This is Martin Feldstein’s argument in last week’s Financial Times, A rapid fall in the euro can save Spain, where he suggested that “financial markets may already be in the process of forcing a solution upon Brussels policy makers”.
The problem with this, however, is obvious. It can only work if Europe were small enough and the rest of the world were in good enough economic shape that the global economy could absorb a sharply rising European trade surplus.
But with deficit countries doing all they can to reduce their deficits, and surplus countries doing all they can to maintain or increase their surpluses, it is hard to imagine how Europe, which is already a surplus entity, can possibly increase its overall surplus enough to bail out peripheral Europe.
That leaves the fourth way. Spain can freeze banking deposits, abandon the euro, and devalue. This would be very painful, but it would allow the country to regain international competitiveness in much less time and run a trade surplus (mainly at Germany’s expense, by the way) with much lower levels of unemployment and economic self-destruction. Of course it would also mean a soaring debt burden as the new currency devalues relative to the country’s euro-denominated debt, and so would almost certainly come with a debt restructuring (again mainly at Germany’s expense) that would reduce the debt servicing costs.
These are the four conditions under which Spain can run a sufficiently large trade surplus to service its external debt, and since three of them are impractical or highly unlikely, we are left with the fourth. This is why I think the probability of Spain’s abandoning the euro is much higher than its staying in the euro.
Downward Spiral
Meanwhile, and in case there is any doubt, we have had more chilling news that indicates just how firmly Spain is caught up in the downward spiral. First, Madrid last week downgraded its growth forecasts, saying that the recession would continue into 2013.
This apparently shocked the market but I cannot see why. I have argued many times over the past three years that quarter after quarter policymakers are going to adjust their forecasts downwards, not because they have been dishonest in their previous forecasts but simply because they never take into consideration the impact that rising debt and declining credibility have on forcing adverse changes in the behavior of economic agents.
Expect Downward Revisions
The economy will always perform more poorly than expected because rational economic agents will always behave in ways that automatically make matters worse. Expect many more years of downward growth revisions, not just for Spain but for all of Europe.
Capital FlightSilliness From Feldstein
Second, money is fleeing the country. An article in Germany’s Spiegel describes just how bad it is:
Capital outflows from Spain more than quadrupled in May to €41.3 billion (compared with May 2011, according to figures released on Tuesday by the Spanish central bank. In the first five months of 2012, a total of €163 billion left the country, the figures indicate. During the same period a year earlier, Spain recorded a net inflow of €14.6 billion.
Capital flight is one of the most powerful parts of the downward spiral, and of course it is extremely self-reinforcing. Capital flight is driven largely by disinvestment and bank deposit withdrawals, and the former reduces growth while the latter both reduces growth and increases balance sheet fragility.
We may have already reached the point where it will be impossible to stop the outflows, and I can’t imagine that already-reluctant Germans are going to be happy to reconcile their increasing investment in Spanish government bonds with increasing disinvestment by Spanish businesses and depositors.
I had bookmarked Martin Feldstein’s column with an intent of challenging the notion that a falling euro could save Spain, but I failed to get around to it. The irony is just a couple years back, nearly everyone thought the solution to the global financial crisis was a cheaper dollar.
Indeed, a quick search shows that on August 24, 2011, less than a year ago, Feldstein argued in a Bloomberg Interview (Dollar Decline Benefits U.S. Economy) that "A lower dollar means more exports, and it also means a shift from consuming imported products to consuming goods and services that we produce in the United States".
Apparently a lower dollar and a lower euro are both needed. Given the euro is 57% of the US dollar index just how likely is that?
Moreover, a falling euro, even if it did help the eurozone as a whole, would hardly help Spain more than Germany given Germany's productivity advantages over Spain.
What Spain Needs
Spain does not need a lower euro, it actually needs a higher one (with Spain back on the pesata). Alternatively (and in fact preferably) Spain can indeed benefit from a lower euro (provided of course Germany is back on the Deutsche Mark.
The key point is that it is complete silliness to think anything else but a breakup of the eurozone (coupled with genuine work rule reform) can help Spain.
What About Italy?
Pettis did not mention Italy in his email, but I think Italy exits the eurozone before Spain.
Anti-euro and anti-German sentiment is high and rising in Italy, and technocrat prime minister Mario Monti will be gone by April.
It will not take much to push Italy over the edge given the rise of the Five Star Movement. For details, please see
- Mish on Capital Account: Discussion of Social Media Panic in Italy, Soaring Yields in Spain, and the Upcoming 20th Euro Summit, Bound to be Another Failure
- Time-Lapse Interactive Graph Shows Stunning Rise in Anti-Euro Sentiment in Italy
- Italy "Gasping Like Beached Whale"; Berlusconi Reiterates Euro Exit "Not Blasphemy"; Beppe Grillo Discusses "Taboo of the Euro"
- Six Reasons Why Italy May Exit the Euro Before Spain; Ultimate Occupy Movement.
Read more at http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com/2012/08/problem-in-europe-is-arithmetic-not.html#7Cb24ZqVt738M76D.99
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